More Autonomy

It seems that the war in the former Yugoslavia is finally history now that the elections in Bosnia have ended and the sanctions imposed against Serbia and Montenegro have been lifted. Politicians and analysts are now focusing on two vital issues: will the fragile Dayton accord hold and actually become a long-term guarantee of peace, and can the implementation of the treaty ensure lasting stability in a region with more powder kegs, such as Kosovo and Macedonia, potentially the venues of future conflicts.

To make any safe predictions about the latter issue is an ungrateful task. It is apparent that the situation in Kosovo, the hallmark of the Yugoslav crisis back in the eighties, has not culminated to a point of no return and therefore an armed conflict. In other words, Kosovo remains a crisis area and a possible war zone. Armed clashes have so far been averted thanks to a wise decision by ethnic Albanian politicians to refrain from military methods in the attempts to resolve a conflict of interests in controlling Kosovo. War and large-scale disaster evaded Kosovo even after Serbia had demonstrated readiness to use all means available and appointed a military governing body in the province in 1989. A situation of neither war nor peace has prevailed in Kosovo over the past six years, a kind of status quo resting on delicately balanced fear present both among the Serbs and the ethnic Albanians.

However, it is quite clear that the status quo cannot and will not hold much longer. The ethnic Albanians, who have formed some kind of a parallel government, made it clear that they are not prepared to tolerate Serbia's hard-line policy indefinitely. The parallel system, formed as a resistance factor which has served its purpose more or less successfully, does not satisfy their ambitions. Although it has played a crucial role in their cause, in the long run it will become counterproductive and exhaustive of their resources because ethnic Albanians are actually paying two sets of taxes: one to those who have "occupied" them, and another to those who are supposed to "liberate" them. In addition to this problem, their ranks include a number of influent radicals accusing the present leadership, headed by Ibrahim Rugova, of incompetence and collaboration.

Worrying signs that things could change for the worse appeared a few months back with a series of terrorist attacks on Serbian police and civilians, which haven't ceased to this day. An illegal foreign-based ethnic Albanian organization, previously unknown, allegedly claimed responsibility for the attacks. However, there are theories according to which other factors are involved. One of them is that the entire affair is a set up by Serbian police which could give them a perfect excuse for repressive measures against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

All factors involved in the Balkan crisis are well aware that the key to securing lasting stability in the region lies in finding the most adequate solution to the Kosovo problem. A recent and dramatic decline in Serbia's tight grip on Kosovo showed both the efficiency and the purpose of keeping Serbia isolated with extended economic sanctions, not included in those lifted after the end of the Bosnian conflict. The measure, which forced Serbia to reconsider its position, came as result of U.S. pressure and brought an agreement between Milosevic and Rugova last month on the restoration of the ethnic Albanian education system. In addition to that, a prominent Serbian academician, Jovan Despic, promised back in June he would address the nation with his vision of a new approach to the Kosovo problem, based on a proposition for "territorial demarcation" with the ethnic Albanians.

Rumors in Kosovo's capital, Pristina, have it that secret Serb-Albanian talks, held in Rome last summer under the auspices of a Catholic goodwill mission, resulted not only in agreement about the education matter, but also agreement in principle on the gradual resolving of specific political and other issues.

The agreement indicates that politicians in both Belgrade and Pristina, although Tirana officials should be counted as an interested party, realize that the conflict in Kosovo must not be allowed to get out of hand because neither side will benefit from armed clashes. In other words, they are aware that they must compromise and accept as the most appropriate solution, a form of autonomy for Kosovo similar to the model provided by the 1974 constitution, with outlets needed in case additional or other solutions are required.

Although other options have been mentioned, most of them with a disastrous

scenario of full-scale war as the end product, the most realistic solution seems to be the one envisaging a political solution through the gradual introduction of a model called "autonomy plus" and subsequent federalizationof the ethnic Albanian issue.

If all goes according to plan, events in Kosovo should bring about a process

exactly opposite to the one which took place in Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs were forced to give up their military dominance and become a federal unit in the newly formed Bosnian state, while the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo should gradually gain a similar status within Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, only time will tell whether that will result in the recognition of a future Republic of Kosovo as an integral part of Yugoslavia, or perhaps some other outcome.