An Off-Tune "Opera"

General-Major Vojislav Radovic was retired this fall, together with a large group of his colleagues. His last duty was assistant commander for moral education and legal affairs of the Airforce and Anti-aircraft Defence, and at the same time deputy president of the Council for Intelligence-Propaganda activities. The general spoke to VREME about the struggle in the security service, the coup in the army, vanity, lust for revenge and the silence of competent bodies and figures.

"It is necessary to clear up what 'Opera' is," Radovic said. "It was not formed by the Security Department of the Airforce. It is a unit for intelligence-propaganda and psychological-propaganda activities of the Airforce command. We developed a make-up which is envisaged in war situations, but in a specific way, since a state of war had not been declared. Precisely because of that, we could not get people of quality from the media. 'Opera' was created on the basis of orders from the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (SSNO) and on the basis of our plans for war. Our task was to counter the propaganda activity of the adversary: Slovenian and Croatian separatism, assisted by organizations from abroad, especially Germany. The SSNO issued a number of orders, and several times we ourselves launched initiatives for improvements in this field of activity. An additional difficulty was presented by the fact that we were counting on the help of the media while getting prepared for external enemy. But, this was not the case in Slovenia, and especially not in Croatia. To put it simply, the carpet was pulled out from under our feet."

When did the unit begin to operate?

In August and September 1991 activity was well under way. It began with the forming of press centers at airports, followed by TV crews in our academies and schools with the necessary technology and personnel. In order to reduce our inferiority in comparison with Croatian propaganda, the Political Department initiated the installing of a number of broadcasting stations, so that the territory of Croatia was covered by radio signal. This provoked great dissatisfaction among the political leadership there. TV Belgrade played a major role by renting a satellite channel in October 1991, which enabled us to install satellite antennas at airports and in garrisons. People could thus get information from our side as well. We proposed that a TV center from Serbia be mobilized, so that, reinforced by our people, it could broadcast programs using transmitters on Pljesevica, Celavec, Kozara, Petrova Gora and so on, which meant we could cover the entire territory of Croatia and a good part of Hungary. This was not possible because a state of war had not been declared. We were also considering forming a radio station in the central part of the country, which could enable us to take over the programs of Radio Belgrade and other clearly patriotically oriented stations, but also to produce our own programs. This is where "Opera" was born, a body whose task was management and command, a substitute for the unit which would be formed in times of war.

What results were achieved?

From October 1991, when the unit was finally formed, until January 1992, when the cease-fire in Croatia came into effect, we issued more than two hundred various statements, denials, notices, articles, partly ours and partly ordered by TV Belgrade, Belgrade radio, newspapers, as well as the media from Podgorica, Sarajevo, Skopje, for as long as that was possible. We worked hard on exposing the real goals of the Croatian side. We got precious assistance from two volunteers - Radenko Radojcic and Slavko Malobabic, who are now, unfortunately, on trial. Besides this, we sent around 30 TV programs to the world and some of them were broadcast by more than 40 TV stations. Thanks to our press centers, the Airforce was open to the domestic and foreign media. In any case, it should be emphasized that the work of "Opera" in 98% of the cases was public.

What was secret?

The psychological-propaganda activities which were focused on Croatia. Their goal was to weaken the morale of troops, provoke confusion, create the impression of the general presence of the Counter-Intelligence Service (KOS), oppose the political forces there... We also worked on the territory of B-H, where we told the Moslems what awaited them in an alliance with the Croats. The only activity on the territory of Serbia and Montenegro was the distribution of leaflets in support of the creation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That was done in secret. You can succeed only if the adversary does not know who stands behind it. I would like to stress that "Opera" has no connection either with sabotage or smuggling...

Were the Federal Secretary, Chief of General Staff and the army leadership in general informed of the activities of "Opera"?

I believe that not a single organ within the SSNO knew anything about the word "Opera." That is the name of the unit. We did not submit reports about the content of each individual leaflet. We reported about the essence of the work and received consent, but it did not even occur to me to speak about the details before forty or fifty people. I myself found out about certain things after the war ended. To repeat, people from security were also involved in "Opera," and it is good we had it that way. They represented only a part of the team.

What provoked the "Opera Affair"?

It should be viewed in the context of everything that happened with the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). The affair represents a trampoline for various jumpers - for political or egoistic reasons. It served, above all, General Stevanovic, current Commander of the Airforce and Anti-aircraft Defence, and his superiors to settle accounts with Airforce generals.

What is your opinion of the inquiry in connection with "Opera" and the methods used?

The affair has been going on for nine months now. People are being held in prison, even though the constitution and the law provide for detention to be as short as possible. The press accused us of betrayal and espionage, and so it writes about the trial of "Opera," even though among the accused, only Radojcic and Malobabic belonged to this unit. Colonel Rakocevic was a member of the Council. "Opera" is today still serving for political goals (how some conceive the army and how it should be "purged"), for gaining general's stars, but also for "laundering" own blame in this war through retired generals and the "scapegoat" - "Opera."

Who is, in your view, to blame for the affair?

The biggest culprit is the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), headed by vice-president Branko Kostic, and the former and new chiefs of General Staff, Generals Blagoje Adzic and Zivota Panic. General Mircetic and I addressed a letter to the Presidency pointing out all the irregularities. We sent a copy to the Chief of General Staff but, although we know that the letter was received, none of them had the decency to at least return it to us. Despite the constitution and the laws, both those who are in prison and those of us who were not of that "fortune" have been sentenced in advance. One of the important elements of the affair is probably also the rivalry in the security service. There are indications of an attempt to subordinate the army security service to state security, as was the case immediately after World War Two. In any event, a coup was carried out in the army with the assistance of the rump SFRY presidency.

The press frequently referred to the "Opera Orientis" enterprise, founded by a member of "Opera."

There was hostility towards official information, so Radenko Radojcic founded a private enterprise which was to serve as an independent company with contacts abroad. Besides this, our survival in Zadar and Krajina was in question, so that initiatives for the forming of an "air bridge" existed on both sides. Contacts were made by the "Plitvice Orientis" enterprise, one of whose co-owners was Radojcic. A legal contract was concluded with the Airforce Command for the use of "Opera" premises. Profit was not of foremost importance, but our presence in Krajina. We were interested also in helping the economic development of Krajina. Borisav Jovic, the then president of the Federal Presidency, was informed about some initiatives. With the adoption of the Vance plan it became important for us to be present there through various activities which would also be supported by the army. The reason for forming the private enterprise was to enable our military and economic presence in a region of demarcation. Besides, we wanted to introduce a little order. Now everything is being interpreted quite differently.