Assessment of a Strategy

It is apparent now more than ever that Albania is one of the greatest victims of communism and totalitarianism. Half a century of total isolation transpired in which the whole country was transformed into a concentration camp, and in which unheard of military paranoia on the part of the regime resulted in the erection of hundreds of thousands of bunkers, and the production of weapons that exceed military needs many times. Following profound disappointment in the democratic regime and anger at lost money and property — a disappointment in the dream of a quick and easy way of getting rich — Albanians apparently had to vent their anger, on the one hand, through a nearly complete, crazed masochism of the rubble which shot countless rounds of ammunition skywards, looted, destroyed and burned public property and symbols of the state and of oppression (police stations, barracks, administrative buildings), and, on the other hand, through a nearly complete desertion and collapse of the state. A social and state collapse on this scale had not been witnessed for some time, at least not in Europe. Nearly all institutions of social cohesion came apart overnight. It came to light that the Albanian society and state had only a temporary solution in their social and systemic contract, a kind of pontoon bridge from revolutionary rights and the dictatorship of the proletariat of bygone days.

CONSPIRACY THEORIES: At key moments in the Albanian conflict, when the entire southern region was in revolt and beyond the control of Tirana, for a few days it appeared that what was at hand was a regional rebellion against the Beris Regime and the revival of Toskerij aspirations for revenge, autonomy, and even secession from the rest of Albania. A CNN reporter had shots taken of herself at the river Skumbini, which presents a natural border between Toskerij and the rest of Albania — a border between the two principal dialects of the Albanian language, Toskerij and Gega — which she accompanied with very serious disinformation about the significance of the river Skumbini as the border between two Albanina entities, Toskerij and Gega; in her disinformed view the development of events is pointing toward the beginnings of another ethnic war in the Balkans. Many hasty and schematic analyses of this type, despite not making the cardinal mistake of declaring Gega and Toska as separate peoples, still forecast the outbreak of war between the south and the north of Albania, pointing to particular regional rivalries and religious divisions (predominantly Orthodox Christians in the south, Catholics in the north, and Albanian Muslims in between). Some found a seemingly more convincing argument for civil war in the schematic explanation of current political divisions in Albania. It was claimed that the south is the traditional stronghold of the Communists, that it is culturally more oriented toward communal living, Russia and the East in general, while the north of Albania has been and remains the stronghold of pro-Western oriented democrats. Out of Tirana Sali Berisha was disseminating hatred toward the south from the beginning, claiming that the unrest in the south of the country is part of a communist plot whose object is the overthrow of the democratic government. Among Albanians from Kosovo and Albanian patriots in general, the unrest in the south caused bitterness and profound distrust because of the acceptance of the Serbian, that is the Orthodox symbol — the raising of the arm with three fingers, in the place of the democratic symbol, with two fingers as the sign of triumph, of victory. The attempts of the opposition’s potentates in Kosovo to interpret the symbol of the three fingers as the sign of the political coalition of the left, the center and Berisha’s anti-autocratic right, was subjected to derision. The patriots from Kosovo and Albania, but also the surprised international analysts, initially saw the unrest in the south as part of a geostrategic plot that has as its object the initialization of the dissolution or the regionalization and partitioning of Albania (just as in the case of Bosnia and Hecegovina), so that Albanians would lessen or completely lose their aspiration of imposing themselves as one of the factors of balance in the Balkans. Many conjectures were made about the Greek origins of the plot where the object would be the assumption of strategic control over the south of Albania, or about its Serbian origins, where the object would be a weakened and destroyed Albania that would allow Serbia greater leeway in dealing with its problems in Kosovo. As we are discussing conspiracy theories, one of them suggested a conspiracy between oddly coupled interests of the Albanian Socialists and the Italian Mafia, where both supposedly planned and opened banks in which the Mafia profited enormously, while the Socialists channeled the ire of the dispossessed citizens toward the destruction of the democratic regime, partly profiting in the process.

All such hasty and schematic assessments lost all value when the same unrests and anarchy spread throughout Albania. For several days there was mass desertion from the Albanian army and police as the rubble was going wild. The north behaved just like the south, not showing any ambitions toward attacking Toska. The appropriation of weapons, looting and wild shooting at the sky and at the symbols of the government were replaying the same crazed, bloody carnival, and not some regional or collective interests. The degraded and the humiliated citizens, those who under the old regime had been completely crushed both financially and spiritually, who suffered the traumas of utter mistrust in a society where everybody was everybody’s informer, where all family and social moral values had been brought into question, ceding to the cruelest type of egoism — within all this, the democratic regime of Sali Berisha, during the transitional period, attempted to give open entrance to the new order with apparent liberation of the space for small business. The basis of the Albanian economic revival, however fictive its planning, was largely founded on the support of anarchist individualism and the black market economy.

AUTOCRATIC AMBITIONS: When Sali Berisha came to power in 1992, the social and economic systems in Albania were already in total collapse. Nothing was functioning. There was no food. All production had come to a halt. Around a million workers had been on forced leave of absence, receiving assistance from the state in the neighborhood of $7 to $10. Italy at that time had sent a special military unit to assist in the humanitarian mission "Pelikan", in which food was distributed. The new government had managed to effect a turnaround and to stabilize the situation with the help of foreign aid and money sent home by several hundred thousand Albanian expatriates, mostly living in Italy and Greece. However, Berisha failed in achieving political stability mostly because of his autocratic ambitions. A strong Socialist opposition in the Parliament prevented him from making changes in the system of the sort he fought for. A consensus did not exist around the new Constitution. Berisha wished to implement a system where the power in the hands of the parliament would be minimized, and where he, as president, would be assured absolute power for a long time. His project did not even pass through the parliament, nor in the 1994 Referendum, despite a strong print media campaign and absolute control of all electronic media. The fiasco with the Referendum did not discourage him from seeking a political consensus with the opposition, instead giving him cause to turn to the time proven methods of the secret police (SHIK) in keeping power and "protecting democracy". In the desire to secure personal power he initiated expatriation and forcible confinement of political rivals (the opposition leader Fatos Nano was in prison until only a few days ago), and led a constant, fierce campaign against the Communists — i.e. demonizing any opposition as Communist and restorationist. In May of last year the political crisis reached a peak with the elections whose results were irregular because of drastic ballot tampering and theft. Berisha, it seems, had misinterpreted the signals from the West, which favored him over the leftist opposition, taking that as a cue for impudent, open tampering with election results, and for forcing the opposition to boycott the elections and to leave the Parliament. The U.S., which up to that point had supported Berisha, had distanced itself from his politics, demanding a repeat of the elections. Europe was dithering, considering him as one of the factors that could maintain stability in Albania. Or perhaps Berisha’s support in certain European capitals was dependant on his assurances that he would take a middle course in regard to Kosovo. In the mean time, it seems that Berisha had underestimated the danger of bankruptcy of the financial system, even though he was warned of the consequences well ahead of time. But a different opinion exists according to which he is responsible for inflating the balloon of accumulation of wealth and prosperity with the object of assuring a second term in office. However, relying on the secret police and a weak, corrupted administration were insufficient factors in standing up to the reaction of the opposition, and even less to the ire of a duped, defrauded people. The extent of the bureaucratization, sluggishness and inefficiency of the government machine is best illustrated in the example of barriers and senseless conditions placed on foreign investment and aid implementations. In this way, for instance, the German company Simens, which was to undertake, with German Government funding, the complete reconstruction of the only airport in Albania, "Rinas", simply gave up on the project after several months of insurmountable red tape.

NO CONTROL IN THE SOUTH: When the crisis suddenly went out of control, Albania found itself precisely in the position it had been in during 1991, when Ramiz Alija, Enver Hodza’s successor, had to bow down in front of unbridled unrests and to accept a coalition government of national unity. In the place of the government of Aleksandar Meksij, Berisha had in the days of greatest anarchy and disintegration accepted the formation of the Government of National Salvation, led by Baskim Fino. The Socialists also, despite having initially poured gasoline on the fire of dissent, realized that things were getting serious and that the state must be protected against the consequences of total absence of rule and of the dangers of civil war. The new government with President Berisha addressed the world powers with an appeal for urgent humanitarian, economic and military aid. In the initial reactions of greatest despair, urgent NATO military intervention was requested, to be later reformulated -when the extravagance of the request was realized- to only foreign military protection of specific strategic positions, such as harbors and the airport in Tirana. The European Economic Community and the USA took the Albanian crisis seriously and decisively declared their position on Albanian state unity. They supported the Government of National Salvation and promised humanitarian, and even limited military assistance, which does not directly imply military engagement in the chaotic circumstances in which Albania finds itself today.

In the meantime, the situation has somewhat stabilized in Tirana and the greater part of Albanian towns. The new government enjoys the political support of sensible, patriotic citizens who have come out in numbers on March 16 for counterdemonstrations, demanding the maintenance of the integrity of the state, the halting of anarchy and of the wildness of armed individuals and gangs. The government has managed to regain control over a part of the police and the military (both have been promised a pay increase of 300%!), and the appeal for the protection of the state has been answered by many individuals. The key question for the government of Baskim Finoa is, to all intents and purposes, no longer the gaining of control over the crazed, armed free reign of groups and individuals; that can be achieved gradually. The greatest problem of the government is Sali Berisha, on whose resignation, it seems, the rebels from the south continue to insist. The recent events in Tirana have detracted slightly from the happenings in the south of the country. But the fact remains that the south is practically beyond the control of Tirana, and that it, despite sporadic shooting and wildness, continues to be the lair for organized units and self-proclaimed elements of authority which continue to set as their condition for laying down weapons the resignation of Sali Berisha. Some opposition leaders in Tirana also see his resignation as the only way for emerging out of the crisis.

TALLYING UP: Still, there appears to exist a double fear among the Socialists and part of the Opposition of any sudden demotion of Sali Berisha. First, if he were to resign today, the Opposition would take over nearly all responsibility for managing a difficult political and economic crisis. For this reason it is in its interest to tow the politically dead Berisha so that he would continue to take full responsibility, while the Opposition would continue to collect brownie points for constructive and responsible conduct in dramatic situations. Second, the Opposition fears the possible reactions of the armed segments of the Democratic faction, which continues to be a strong and respectable influence, decisively supporting Beris; this means that their disgruntled reaction could lead to new unrests and perhaps even to civil war in the struggle for power. As the Premier Fino, who comes from the south of the country and is a member of the Socialist faction, probably counts on having greater success in talks with the rebel south, than he would have in talks with disgruntled, angry democrats, were they to become leaderless. One of the arguments that Berisha also put forth, after renouncing the hearsay about having resigned, is that his withdrawal from the scene is inevitable following the next elections, to be held in June, in which the Government of National Salvation promises fairness and the presence of foreign observers. It is still to early to jump to any conclusions. The situation in Albania is changing daily and hourly.

As far as the question of Kosovo is viewed from the Albanian perspective, it has generated astonishment and despair. Albanian floundering, as it is quietly observed from here, fatally coincides with moments in which Kosovo Albanians are striving to maximize their aspirations, with those moments in which they are most in need of support and assistance from their state. Thus, on the same evening of June 2, 1990 when the Kosovo Parliament adopted the Declaration of Independence, the crisis in Tirana began with attacks on embassies and the mass exodus overseas. Even now, when more serious talks were to have begun regarding the status of Kosovo, Albania is experiencing another economic and military moral collapse. In any case, the Albanians of Kosovo will now be more careful in their "tallying up of available options" and reassessment of their strategies. The situation constantly demands of them to be rational and pragmatic.