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April 19, 1997
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 289
Coalition Zajedno

Ringing Off The Hook

by Nenad Lj. Stefanovic

The greatest crisis to date in the history of Coalition Zajedno has been resolved in a five point agreement in which Zoran Djindjic, Vuk Draskovic and Vesna Pesic acquiesced to adhere to all those things which they had previously agreed, and which they had all formally ratified some time ago. In this agreement, the most significant point by far is point number three which reads verbatim, "All eventual, future conflicts and disagreements between the members of the Coalition must firstly be resolved in internal meetings of the Head Committee, and not in the media".

Given not only the practice of democratic societies (this falls into routine regulation of interpersonal relations), but also the everyday differences which have always existed between the main coalition partners, such a regulation, or one similar to it, should certainly have been included in the foundations of Coalition Zajedno. For this reason, every serious political organization institutes from the beginning very precise mechanisms for the resolution and mediation of all conflict situations, so that occurrences of conflict resolution in large print across the pages of newspapers is avoided at all cost. In Coalition Zajedno, something like this was not done in time to avoid its leaders media correspondence, which fully exploited their vanities and kept bizarre accounts of the conflict, backstabbing and selling short within the coalition. However, the journalists, regardless of the level of their professionalism or tendency toward sensationalism, are the least to blame for a crises which nearly threatened the very existence of the coalition. Whenever things were settling down, there was always someone from the coalition (and not from the media) who cast a new stone, setting off new waves. Much the same was done by those in the coalition who have the uncertain status of "half-journalists, half-party officials".

Point three of the new Coalition Agreement has been ironically interpreted by some as proof that "in 'Zajedno' the existence of the telephone has been rediscovered". In her first interview - following "the rediscovery of the telephone" and the joint acceptance of the responsibility to, in the future, "discuss all things firstly in the Head Committee meetings, and not in the media" - Vesna Pesic, the President of GSS, admitted that communication among the Coalition leaders reached unacceptably low levels. "After the daily protests ended, we did not see much of each other, and we communicated even less," she said, having also expressed the conviction that "the three of us, when we sit down to the same table to talk sincerely, are still a team". Vesna Pesic, who some claim has played a crucial role in mediating the conflict between Djindjic and Draskovic, insists that in the future the Head Committee meetings be held on a weekly basis. "If we only see each other from time to time, we will drift apart," she stated in the Radio B-92 Program "Interview of the Day".

Even if after the signing of the agreement many communication problems in the coalition appear more clearly, the first reactions to this document have raised some questions as to how point number five should be read. It predicts that "in the fight for democratic voting conditions and ultimate victory, Coalition Zajedno will ask for the support of all democratic forces in Serbia". Vuk Draskovic is obviously putting stress on the word "support", insisting that institutional expansion of the coalition, as well as any increase in its membership is out of the question. Zoran Djindjic, it appears, plays up the word "victory", insisting that the coalition is not a "sacred cow" - implying by this that he will not support a coalition that is decadent and self-serving. In the first press reports it came out that Vuk is satisfied with the agreement, because he supposedly feels that he overpowered Djindjic, and that the Coalition will definitely continue in three parts. At the same time, those who have access to "well-informed" sources in DS claim that general satisfaction can also be felt there: on the one hand, they feel that the agreement allows them to bring Panic, Covic and the students into the game; on the other hand, they are supposedly convinced that Draskovic himself will eventually realize that he is not the best presidential candidate, and that he will withdraw of his own accord. Vesna Pesic is attempting to keep both options on the table in her reading of point five of the agreement, claiming that the expansion of the coalition does not automatically imply membership in Zajedno, because all those wishing to help do not necessarily "have to be members". It is worth remembering that in 1992, the political scene in Serbia looked quite different. The leader of SPO, Vuk Draskovic, was working the hardest at founding DEPOS, while Djindjic (at the time the second in command in DS) was fairly reserved about a broader unification of the opposition.

Burying the hatchet in Coalition Zajedno (with the possibility that it might remain buried for a while), led many to consider the reasons which caused the opposition leaders to come together once more as a team, at a moment when the dissolution of the coalition, after a week of stunned looking on, appeared inevitable. Despite the differences that divide them (above all, concerning the idea of Draskovic's candidacy as a good or bad political investment), the leaders of SPO and DS have certainly realized the responsibility they would be taking on if the coalition dissolved. The ensuing accusations that the other side is solely responsible for the dissolution would not be of much use. They would forever be branded as players who promise much, but deliver little. They would be remembered as those who personally feared "drawing the shortest straw", letting instead the whole of Serbia "draw the shortest straw" in its blind hope that their whole project offered a democratic way out. Djindjic and Draskovic had probably been thinking with pencil in hand when they realized that in the event of a dissolution of Coalition Zajedno, as politicians they could not go on without serious liabilities, and without leaving disillusioned, apathetic masses in their wake. Even in the midst of the greatest conflicts and suspicions aired in the press, certain influential officials from SPO and DS claimed that basic math excluded any possibility of the coalition dissolving. Individual participation in the elections would simply lead to political marginalization of each faction. It seems that the logic at work on both sides was something akin to "I would let him, but he won't let me".

A segment of the government media hurried to interpret the "reconciliation" of the opposition leaders as a reflection of exclusive demands imposed from abroad, and to make a connection with the recent stay in Belgrade of John Kornbloom. His appearance certainly did have a profound influence on the behavior of the leaders of Coalition Zajedno, but not in the way that is interpreted by the government media. Clinton's former Balkan adviser did not have anything specific to relate to Djindjic and Draskovic, nor to convince them of anything in particular. They certainly understood a lot from the very fact that Kornbloom was exchanging warm handshakes with Milosevic, if only out of diplomatic reasons. At a time when Coalition Zajedno was leading a popular protest against the tampered election results, and Milosevic was refusing to respect the will of the people, such visits were not considered. The initiative is again in the hands of the President of Serbia, and not in the hands of those who lost their breaths following the protests, arguing about how to go on. (In the meantime, Milosevic is seriously preparing for an evacuation to the federal territory, doing everything to undermine the significance of the parliamentary, and especially, presidential elections in Serbia.) According to Vesna Pesic's admission, evident loss of initiative is among the principal reasons behind the crisis in Coalition Zajedno.

The gaining of the initiative is certainly one of the main topics that should be occupying the Head Committee of the Coalition. Their first meeting after some time has shown that there is not much disagreement on this topic. There is also no disagreement on whether Djindjic saw Milosevic in January, but that it did raise the temperature is beyond question. The same could be said for DS accusations that City Government and SPO are boycotting the new mayor and putting sticks in his wheels. As soon as the coalition phones started ringing, it became evident that such an accusation is unfounded. In future meetings of the Head Committee, beside questions of strategy, perhaps some very commonplace, but significant questions could be raised to ensure that the Coalition does not fall apart. For instance, it might be of some use to consider the question of nepotism in the rank and file of coalition politics, which, according to some unconfirmed sources, is on the rise.

The fact that the leaders of Coalition Zajedno have their sights set in the same direction, does not mean that they should avoid seeing eye to eye from time to time.

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