Natural Allies

It seems as though the majority of the top experts, users and consumers of the theory on Serbia's ill fate and the unjust world had satiated their sado-masochistic drives during the war and convinced themselves that they are right. The only thing they forgot was the order of the moves and mixed up the causes and the consequences, but the main thing is that great national misery is here, obvious and undeniable, so that now only those incorrigible hair-splitters can still deal with the issues of who had done, said and served what and when. Those far-seeing prophets, who knew that all those who had been insulted, provoked and assaulted would turn against the Serbs, have finally slightly drawn back and slacked off.

If that wasn't true, if they still had their old reflexes, they most certainly wouldn't have missed the chance to spot the injustice which is happening at this very moment. Namely, as things now stand, it seems as though the greatest advantage of the three-month-long protest of the Serbian citizens shall be felt by Montenegro. Prime Minister Djukanovic did not overly hesitate to come to an agreement with our local democratic opposition over Milosevic's politics and future, he then repelled the counter-attack and remained on his feet, and who shall condemn him now for having pulled away? Maybe with him also it is more a question of power than of principles, reforms, democracy or state independence, yet if he hadn't spoken of it he would not have managed to explain nor to sever from Milosevic, so that some of those issues shall have to be delivered, which is how Montenegro shall bene fit from it.

This process has still not been completed, since it is neither certain that Djukanovic has definitely won, nor is it evident how far he shall go if he has. However, this definitely stands as yet more proof that Milosevic's adversaries, whoever they are, cannot help but look better than him. Besides that, it turns out that each larger opposition protest and rebellion in Serbia brings changes and generates consequences only outside of Serbia. Larger or smaller-scaled wars break out, however, at the end someone always becomes liberated and breaks off. That is what happened after March 9 (1991) and after St. Vid's day (June 28, 1992) celebrations and the student strike at the time.

If such a coincidence repeats itself for the third time, it is time for all of us to draw a conclusion or practical lesson out of it. I offer the following conclusion to the melancholic interpreters of national collapse: see how the Serbs always selflessly help others, even at their own expense. It shall suit Milosevic and Seselj better to accuse the democratic opposition and demand that Serbia stop taking to the streets and trying to liberate itself otherwise both Kosovo and Vojvodina will break off, until finally nothing shall be left of it. All others are forced to think things out a bit.

Therefore, why does pressure on the fortress of power in Serbia never bring any results other than severance and collapse? What is the connection between territory and state order, and would this country be any bigger, or would it at least stop shrinking if it became democratic or even more so if it solidly became totalitarian? I believe the answer is: yes. In both cases the process of disintegration could be stopped; things would slowly head towards a gradual channeling and redirection in a democratic manner, while a stable and self-assured tyranny would freeze everything.

This Serbia is, however, territorially and time-wise unfavorably located for a true tyranny which can only be as such or a little worse, yet never stable. This is why it shall be liable to reductions and irresistible to any separatism until the moment when it starts resembling a free, legally established country. However, it seems as though the opposite stands as well: the regime shall change and improve only when all territorial and border dilemmas disappear, when no goal shall be more important than democracy itself and when Milosevic will no longer be capable of silencing whistles with stories of selling Kosovo, treason and outside enemies.

From this point it can be deduced that defeats and a reduction of territorial aspirations are linked to Serbia's democratization, at least in the sense of opening up a possibility of free choice. Even a small Serbia does not have to be a model of contemporary liberalism, yet shall know by itself why it isn't and shall decide by itself whether it shall be a monarchy or a republic, more capitalist or more socialist, and generally what it should do with itself. Therefore, what all are seeking is a good balance and a precise relation especially towards Kosovo, so that Serbia's freedom would not be limited and thwarted.

After Dayton, Milosevic was resolved to partially replace and relieve national extremists, leaving his wife to ideologically explain the necessity of their joint power. However, the sound of whistles caused a conditional reflex acquired at the previous demonstrations and he drew out patriotism, treason and anti-Serbian conspiracies. There was no other option than to address Seselj who was only waiting for his cue.

Therefore, if it seems as though the three-month-long protest shall most likely not prove to be enough for a final democratic breakthrough, that is not only due to the weaknesses and conflicts in the coalition Zajedno but also because room still exists in Serbia for dirty games and Milosevic is not flinching from using it. To him, Seselj is such a natural ally that it seemed both awkward and painful to me to helplessly listen to and stand the ugly words they exchanged in the period while they truly were, or were simulating to be, in conflict. Such people must be thrilled with each other and I believe that all those with good intentions have let out a sign of relief now.

Naturally, the opposition has the right to make use of his discomfort and the fact that they do not dare kiss and make up in public. However, they must and can only be defeated together, instead of one by one. They are the bearers of the same idea that Serbia must not be in want of devastating arrogance and violence. They both equally nurture the atmosphere of constant internal hostilities, while in foreign policies they harmoniously stress the stand that the wind is to blame for their wet trousers and proudly promise that they shall not change their stance. Even if the wind was to change direction they shall once again, out of principle, take up the same position.

If it is true that Seselj's popularity is rising, that is no great wonder, since countries and peoples in such a state usually look to find their Seselj and are rarely happy if they fail to find him. He is no medicine, yet a measure of the lost, crazed, broken up and impoverished Serbia. When he is offering him to the people, Milosevic definitely takes over enormous historical responsibility. However, if he had such emotions and worried over them, we would somehow have noticed it by now. All agree that in the television debates Seselj usually seems convincing and superior. That is because all fragments of dignity have been removed from public speech a long time ago as a mere burden -turning decency into self-defeat. Naturally, he is therefore superior just as an aggressive and educationally neglected bully is superior in elementary school, especially if he looks like his father who is the class teacher.

This patriotic power which Milosevic and the Socialists are counting on also has the advantage of not having any brakes and scruples, which spurs on the easiness which cannot be achieved by those who are reluctant of anything. Anyone who has any sense of responsibility in this country would have to call upon the people to slowly head uphill, apart from Seselj who is luring them downhill and is showing how much faster that is.

Therefore, this time the true election dilemma shall once again be: faster downhill or vice versa. The dilemma is no small matter, since experience is of little help here and since the challenge as represented by Seselj is not easy to resist in far better organized and stable countries which know how to defend themselves from such temptation which always generates surplus

disorder only in order to then generate surplus order. If there is no other way, democracies take refuge in non-democratic means against its enemies, yet Milosevic's democracy has yet to blossom and astound the world if he manages to insinuate Seselj to his highest office.