False Singers

A number of touchy details about the methods, the network and the operations of the secret service (KOS) were revealed between February 1992 and April 1993, the time of the campaign against its then chief, General Aleksandar Vasiljevic, and head of the airforce and anti-aircraft defence colonel Slobodan Rakocevic.

The fabricated war in Slovenia resulted in a dwindling resistance of the JNA command structures favoring the preservation of Yugoslavia and the theory of socialism (these two things were identical according to the ruling military doctrine), and opposing the formation of national states, including greater Serbia. During the fabricated war in Croatia, which started with "breakingdown" general Kadijevic (as depicted by Borisav Jovic) on 10th July 1991, the resistance became virtually non-existent in the all-round confusion.

Paramilitary formations were in charge on almost all battlefronts, and their position was made even easier by the fact that they were given the status of regular armed forces. General Yazov's attempted coup in Moscow, which many an individual including general Kadijevic had very high hopes for, failed on 19th August 1991. The army had fallen for Milosevic's communist rhetoric: instead of saving the state and letting communism become history, it lost both and ended up nowhere. There were no political prerequisites or a national consensus for a successful war in Croatia. There was only Milosevic and his rump presidency of a rump Yugoslavia. The military factor was eliminated from politics. Everything else developed naturally and resulted in a new decisive moment - the outbreak of war in Bosnia. The army's resistance to the planned disintegration of Bosnia was expectable and only logical, for Bosnia had been the cornerstone of Yugoslavia's strategic defense plans since 1918. Many generations of ranking JNA officers graduated with this subject in the past.

As professional soldiers, they quite rightly assumed that losing Bosnia would be too painful and costly. Beside, all troops, commands, arms and equipment withdrawn from Croatia and Slovenia early in 1992 were deployed in Bosnia. The JNA had a firm grip on the former Yugoslav republic, and its intelligence naturally had a lot of field work on its hands in such a situation.

In order to secure regular supplies to what was the Republic of Serb Krajina, General Aleksandar Vasiljevic built up a good position for himself in the Bosnia-Herzegovina police. This had to be done for obvious reasons: the Croatian side tried to cut off the supplies by all means, for reasons just as obvious. Back in September 1991, general Vasiljevic and Bosnian Interior Minister Alija Delimustafic reached agreement on joint checkpoints to be controlled by JNA military police and Bosnian police units. All sides in the conflict had an interest for such a compromise: the army had secure transport routes, the Bosnian Serbs were able to obtain as many arms and equipment as they needed, while the Bosnian interior ministry had an insight into all that.

The political assessment of the situation in Bosnia until the very end was that the JNA was a stability factor with the capacity of preventing ethnic clashes. General Vasiljevic believed that things would be under control as long as he had his men in the operation and lasting cooperation with the Bosnian police. Arming the Bosnian Serbs was regarded as a political rather than a military issue; it improved their negotiating position.

The problem was that The One who pulled the strings never actually wanted negotiations or a political solution to the conflict. The guns were loaded and ready to fire, the war was about to begin. In order to pull the trigger, the last cores of resistance had to be eliminated from the army. For some reason, the first to go were members of the secret service and the security bodies of the airforce (RV) and anti-aircraft defence (PVO). The whole story began with the airforce.

Planned infiltration into the airforce ranks started in the summer of 1991, through the Serbian police and its coquetry with ambitious and nationalist-minded officers. The idea was to create Serbia "blue on the ground and in the sky", resting on police and the airforce. The first incidents occurred in November 1991: Vojislav Seselj was given a helicopter to visit "his men" in Vukovar. Seselj was the only the sole radical deputy in the Serbian assembly at the time. Two RV and PVO colonels refused to fly with him, and he was even kicked out by pilots at airports in Bihac and Banjaluka. The well-known 252nd squadron became the main target of infiltration. Its composition was predominantly Serb (the composition of the entire airforce was 52 percent non-Serb), with pilots whose age was above the average. The squadron was visited and inspected by captain Dragan and Mirko Jovic, the leader of the SNO (a party not represented in parliament). Arkan was sent back by military police at the Batajnica airport. The unit called itself "First Serbian squadron" and the "Usce Wolves." It made a name for itself by bombing its own troops and killing about 20 in Topusko, near Bac and Tovarnik. It spent most of the war bombing Vukovar with conventional and unconventional means.

The first coup in the airforce was attempted in July 1991 when the 5th airforce corps sent a letter, published by the Zagreb daily Vjesnik, demanding the resignation of the defence minister, General Veljko Kadijevic, and RV and PVO commander, general Zvonko Jurjevic. The letter was signed by the corps commander, general Ljubo Bajic. The attempt was foiled by gen. Kadijevic, who demanded a procedure against Bajic but changed his mind after a security service assessment that it would be counterproductive. The second attempt was concerted with a planned coup of the Elite brigade on 23rd September 1991, and it was far more dramatic: twelve airforce commanders from all corps sent a written ultimatum demanding the resignation of General Zvonko Jurjevic.

They came to the RV and PVO headquarters in Zemun and handed the ultimatum to Jurjevic personally. The next day, the met with Veljko Kadijevic, Blagoje Adzic, Zvonko Jurjevic and his staff. Kadijevic and Adzic refused to accept the ultimatum calling it treason; Bozidar Stevanovic apologized to Kadijevic in public. Once again no charges were pressed, which was strange enough because a mutiny with elements of conspiracy occurred this time. The same thing happened with the Elite brigade coup. The influence of pro-Milosevic forces in the army and the awareness that the nationalist faction was becoming dominant were the two reasons for not pressing any charges against the mutineers. A moderate coup was attempted in December 1991: one of the generals demanded an RV and PVO staff session and the appointment of "younger ranks" as corps commanders. He wanted only general Stevanovic to stay as one of the elder commanders. The proposal never saw daylight because it was rejected. All this was happening in the most successful department of the armed forces, deserted by less individuals than any other.

The notorious "biggest spy affair", the courtesy of Branko Kostic, looked more than shabby in the end. The RV and PVO command formed a Council for information and propaganda activities on 21st October 1991, at the orders of its commander. Instead of forming a platoon for propaganda purposes, which it couldn't do because a state of war had not been declared the Council formed a group of volunteers later known as the "Opera" group. The "Opera" group was involved in propaganda activities and psychological warfare in the entire former Yugoslavia, through 10 RV and PVO bases, various strongholds and Zemun headquarters. The group had active and passive activities. passive activities focused on analyzing all available publications in the entire former Yugoslavia and gathering information. Field work included public relations, contacts with the media and discrete psychological warfare involving various forms of propaganda and fabricating information. Quite logically, the secret service took part in that particular segment of the group's activities. The "Opera" analysis team sent daily reports to the Council and the RV and PVO commander with its assessments, predictions and proposals.

The group coordinated all its activities from the Zemun airforce headquarters, which wasn't much of a secret. Many local reporters were invited to visit the headquarters during the operation. The "Opera" formed its own airline in December 1991, under pressure from Serbia and the Republic of Serb Krajina.

The company was called Opera-orijentis in Serbia and Plitvice-orijentis in Krajina. This was done because the airforce could not register as a civil aviation company, so the new airline company formally rented AN-26 and JAK-48 transporters. The route was Belgrade-Bihac-Udbina, its prices were moderate. The names "Opera" and "Opera-orijentis" were given by one Radenko Radojicic, linked to this day with the alleged existence of a Masonic lodge called Opus-orijenti.

Things started going wrong for the military service early in 1992. General Stevanovic asked for the resignation of general Rakocevic, a security service member, while general Vasiljevic was asked back in November 1991 to sack his deputy, general Simeon Tumanov. When he asked why he should sack a loyal and credible officer like Tumanov, he was told by Slobodan Milosevic in person that "Tumanov can be his deputy when a Serb makes a deputy commander in Macedonia."

The coup began in Zemun in March 1992, with a dramatic military police pursuit of Slavko Malobabic, an "Opera" member. The military police intruded into the group's premises in the airforce headquarters with orders to arrest and take into custody Malobabic and Radenko Radojicic. They were both taken to the basement of the headquarters and kept there for three days before they were released after an intervention by general Veljko Kadijevic. Malobabic went to Banjaluka while Radojicic stayed in Belgrade. At that time, General Boskovic was in charge of the RV and PVO security department. Radojicic was arrested again on March 27 and charged with treason; a number of documents given to him by the service were found in his possession, on which the head of the JNA security department informed the military prosecutor's office in a letter dated March 31. The same letter said that Radojicic and Malobabic were associates of the JNA security organs, both in the service of the Council for information and propaganda warfare of the RV and PVO. It said that they were under the command of "the highest RV and PVO ranks" and that the documents found in their possession was given to them in accord with the army regulations. Radojicic was released again on April 30.

A change at the top of the army was being awaited....