All the colors of the "rainbow"

How successful intelligence work in the field is turned into defeat and used for generating false indictments is best illustrated in the "Labrador" case. Discrediting the "Opera" network and the scandal which ensued by accepting blame for the attack on the Jewish grave and municipality are mere children's games in comparison to the damage which was incited by the malicious exploitation of the "Labrador" case. Nine members of that network fell due to an error made by their chief officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Mirko Martic. By the subsequent public campaign of the "patriotic" newspapers at least another ten agents were discredited, seven of them being on Croatian territory at that moment; their names, code-names and the contents of their collaboration reports were uncovered. That couldn't have been accidental. Here is how the story unfolded.

When the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) won at the elections held in Croatia in May 1990, the future policies of that party could already be discerned. The Yugoslav National Army (JNA) became anxious and - most probably - started activating and organizing its security network on Croatian territory. While we do not know about the others, the history of the "Labrador" network can be precisely reconstructed. Prior to that moment the act of spying on one's colleagues amongst the various services was mostly unthinkable; now, however, due to JNA's assessment that Yugoslavia was in danger, a need arose to penetrate into Croatian (and the other republic's) ruling structures. 5th Air Force Corps in Zagreb, agents of the counter-security department group (KOG), received instructions to penetrate into the structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP), National Defense and para-military organizations in Croatia. A number of people were prepared to commit themselves to such a task due to their anxiousness over the future of Yugoslavia, which made it easy to organize such a network. The "Labrador" network, as part of the more extensive efforts in that direction, was established in 1989. The results of that network's operations were extremely valuable. In autumn of 1991, at the most critical moment, three security officers were managing that network - Lieutenant-Colonel Ivan Sabolovic, Lieutenant-Colonel Mirko Martic and two of their agents whose names cannot be published.

Towards the middle of September 1991, it was already evident that the Croatian police and army would inevitably raid the Command of the 5th Air Force Corps, located in no. 63 Maksimirska St. in Zagreb, where KOG was but a tenant. The Command had already been transferred to the Pleso Airport, leaving only one colonel, a few officers and a handful of military policemen in the building as physical protection. Two months prior to that, Colonel Slobodan Rakocevic issued a command by which all documents of the service from 63 Maksimirska St. were to be destroyed or removed. Most of the agents acted in accordance with it. Only the head of the KOG department Lieutenant-Colonel Mirko Martic did not carry out those orders. Warned on September 13 by his subordinate officer to destroy all computer disks and other documents in keeping with the orders issued from Zemun, he answered: "Kid, stay out of it, that's not your job". The building in Maksimirska 63 fell on September 15, 1991, around 11 am. That morning, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Martic, Major Stjepan Rakaric, a security agent (on a side duty), arrived and the two of them left to deliver certain notebooks to Martic's children. Martic took the keys of the strongbox containing the disks with all the data; he would later claim that the strongbox was left unlocked, which was denied by his subordinate: he says he tried to open the strongbox with explosives yet didn't have enough time. The register and three disks remained in the strongbox which contained the reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Sabolovic's five associates along with the reports of the other agents' four associates. The associates' codes were entered in the register along with the numbers of the submitted reports; their contents were on the disks. A tape was also found which had a taped conversation held between associate S-5 "Slobodan" and Josip Perkovic, a well-known ex-SDN (state security service) official and a chief of one of Croatia's secret services at the time. A pad (6x12cm) was also found belonging to Lieutenant-Colonel Ivan Sabolovic with a few filled in pages on which the code names of four associates are mentioned along with data that he had supplied them with the explosives. Ivan Sabolovic wasn't present since he was blocked at Pleso Airport. He telephoned Mirko Martic from there on September 14 begging him to destroy that pad. Sabolovic managed to extricate himself from Pleso on September 15, drove towards Maksimirska street, only to find that the job had already been completed. He went into hiding and telephoned Colonel Rakocevic in Zemun with the bad news, inquiring whether Martic had called and whether he had destroyed the pad. Martic called later saying that he didn't destroy the pad; he would later claim that Sabolovic didn't ask him to. However, the pad without the disks and the register was almost worthless: no associates could be identified by it while the contents of their reports clearly could. The disks were coded, i.e. protected by a computer code and password. The fact that nine members of the "Labrador" network along with two others were arrested a month later, on October 14 and 20, together with the indictment launched from Zagreb's district attorney's office, clearly show that the disks were soon decoded. Justified doubt exists that Stjepan Rakaric, who knew the codes, helped to decode them; anyway, Rakaric soon became General Antun Tus's and General Imra Agotic's man of confidence. Mirko Martic - according to some sources - first hid at Slobodan Praljak's place, after which he went to Zagreb's military hospital where he remained until the command of the 5th military region was pulled out in December. Upon his return to Zemun he was suspended due to liability over the loss of the documents; however, General Nedeljko Boskovic re-appointed him into the service, under condition that he testify against Rakocevic and Sabolovic, which he did. In the Zagreb court indictment against the "Labrador" members and in the Croatian and our press there was no mention of him, although many others were mentioned who had nothing to do with it... Sabolovic called for maximum caution from all his associates, since nobody knew what MUP had gotten hold of. Some disregarded that warning, laying all their hopes on the Service; others, like S-5 "Slobodan" and Sabolovic himself, managed to get out after being informed that they could be arrested towards the end of September.

The arrested members of the "Labrador" network , seven of them, were exchanged on December 12, 1991 without any undue formalities (two of them refused to be exchanged). The Croatian side insisted upon an exchange, in order to get back Dr. Vesna Bosanac, Dr. Jurja Njavru (from Vukovar's hospital) and especially Anton Kikas, who was their key person. One of the mediators in the negotiations was Jakov Binenfeld; he would hardly have done it if he had any doubts that they were involved in the attack on the Jewish cemetery and municipality, which General Boskovic later accused them of...

Since the "Opera" scandal did not unfold in accordance with the rigged scenario, the "Labrador" scandal was pulled out. Allusions, doubts and open accusations first appeared in the press stating that the "Labradors" were actually Croatian spies. Vecernje Novosti, Politika Ekspres, Pobjeda, Revija 92, Intervju and Duga launched a campaign which we now know was inspired and nourished by a concoction of false and true facts from inside, from General Boskovic's service, via Colonel Dr. Knezevic and his men. The "Labradors" were out on the street, and they couldn't attain their rights in accordance with the Law on State Security Services which guarantees protection, social and pension rights to all their active employees and to the associates of all services. Finally, part of them ended up in a private jail in the air force building in Zemun. Those were the people who had risked their lives out of their honorable political beliefs; that the pro-Yugoslav political belief was defeated in the meantime meant nothing from the Service point of view - whose very task was to maintain that Yugoslavia. Loyalty is the most highly esteemed virtue in the Service; those people were loyal to the very end, until they were throw out into the street or into the jaws of cynical investigative officers. Other countries and armies collapsed before; however, the structures of the services and contacts were closely guarded since their establishment demands the utmost consideration, caution and time. This was the first case when due to immediate and petty political benefits an entire service which had been established over the decades was destroyed. Namely, during the campaign against Vasiljevic, Tumanov, Rakocevic, Sabolovic, "Opera" and "Labrador", all means were employed. Seeing that the court proceedings were not moving ahead as planned, General Boskovic visited Ilija Rapajic, the editor-in-chief of Duga magazine, demanding that the magazine publish certain articles - if not, he would stop printing the weekly Vojska (Army) at the BIGZ publishing house (100.000 circulation, which generated the wages for 3000 employees). Rapajic didn't need to be convinced twice; at the beginning of 1993, i.e. at the moment when the rigged proceedings against KOS were falling through at the military court, General Boskovic made desperate moves. Duga's journalist Branislav Matic received his editorial assignment from Ilija Rapajic to turn certain documents into journalistic articles: secret service analyses and reports, plans, etc., i.e. top secret material, which he would receive from certain gentlemen who were present and who work for the military intelligence service.

General Boskovic was ousted and forced to retire on April 16, 1993 when Slobodan Milosevic announced in Batajnica that there have been too many scandals which have caused serious damage and which work for the Croats and against us. Following that, the top officials of the service developed an interest in Boskovic's press campaign. A number of informative talks with Boskovic's journalists ensued in which the latter justified themselves by claiming to have been writing such things out of best intentions and on the basis of information which they believed to have been authentic. Certain sources of information were uncovered by the offered photographs, as though all were talking about pickpockets. We do not know whether the conversation included issues such as consequences upon the Service, the trauma of the persecuted people, their families and friends and the overall meaning of the entire story.