End of a Dangerous Game

The fixing of a court case is no simple matter even when top lawyers are fixing the game for harmless people, let alone when amateurs and the inept are trying to indict experienced hands from a powerful and distinguished secret service. In the criminal case against the chiefs of intelligence of JNA (Yugoslav National Army) — Generals Aleksandar Vasiljevic and Simeon Tumanov, and Colonel Slobodan Rakocevic — and other officers and secret associates, it could be said that what was at stake was an ad hoc political process, quickly slapped together and made to order for those at the top. When the political imperative of chopping heads of chiefs in JNA and KOS ceased in 1993, Slobodan Milosevic held a speech in Batajnica in front of airmen, saying at the time in an off-hand fashion that there were many affairs of that nature which sullied the reputation of the Army, and many things to that effect...

At that moment Genl. Vasiljevic was already spared from the first degree Court Marshal sentence, the charges against Gen. Tumanov had been dropped, and the case against other charged officers and secret associates proved that the "biggest spy affair", announced a year earlier by Dr. Branko Kosit, lacked any substance. The Chief Court Marshal eventually freed almost everyone involved, dealing out minimal sentences to a very few, only to save face. The principal charges of terrorism, of releasing of military secrets, and of undermining of military authority and national defense were all dropped.

We said that the fixing of a case is a difficult business; the panic exhibited by the "fixers" during this entire criminal case — right up to the sentencing — is perfect proof of that. Gen. Nedeljko Boskovic and his commanders did not refrain from serious criminal acts, such as the illegal stripping of rights of many detained in a private prison in Zemun, or the releasing of military and official secrets to the "patriotic" press during the campaign. When the case entered the hearing phase people were detained for months "so as not to influence the witnesses", while the witnesses were not heard, creating conditions of indefinite incarceration. In the case of Lieut. Col. Ivan Sabolovic, only two witnesses were heard in the first 106 days of his detainment, while in the case of Radenko Radojicic, in the first 90 days of his detainment not a single investigative measure was taken, nor a single witness heard. In the case of Gen. Vasiljevic, in order for the three month period of incarceration to be prolonged, for 21 days hearing was denied to the two remaining witnesses. Witnesses were all available to the Court Marshal during that time, some of them having even been illegally arrested on the territories of other states (RS and RSK) and taken to Belgrade for "further questioning".

Patience was lost when it was most needed, as Generals Domazetovic and Boskovic were retired a week following the release of Gen. Vasiljevic, and before their regular retirement term in JNA. Domazetovic was refusing to step down and to leave his office; Boskovic was asking for a prolongation of active duty for himself and Domazetovic up to the end of the year; Branko Kostic unsuccessfully intervened with Slobodan Milosevic to obstruct Boskovic’s retirement. In this way the tandem of Boskovic-Kostic fell apart in the wake of "the biggest spy affair in post-war Yugoslavia"...

However, the real, hidden purpose had been achieved. During that year of fixing, rigging, arrests, mistreatment and molestation of a group of thirty officers and associates of the JNA Security Service, the regime managed to have the army "reduced" to politically harmless proportions, and managed to marginalize the military State Security Service.

The recent pardon of seven member of the "Labrador" Ring in Croatia, based on the Croatian Law of Pardon, raises several questions. Namely, some individuals fared equally in both states. As one former "Labrador" member says: "Whoever cooperated in the rigging of affairs ‘Opera’ and ‘Labrador’, and consented to serve as witness, fared well both here and in Croatia. Whoever refused cooperation and stuck to the truth fared badly both here and in Croatia".

The Law of State Security guarantees equal access to pension, social and accommodation funds for all associates of state services who suffer through no fault of their own; in other words, a guarantee of being taken care of once released. That is the legal obligation. Is there a moral obligation toward those who honestly and loyally served the former sovereign and internationally accepted SFR of Yugoslavia? Toward those who at one time were destroyed, compromised and sacrificed in a short political power game in which, as the saying goes, the baby was thrown out with the bath water? The new state SR of Yugoslavia claims that it continues from where SFR of Yugoslavia left off, from the state which those people served. Will this state finally decide to take these people under its wing and help them out? Dozens of them are suffering under refugee status, without documents, without income, without status or citizenship.

Will the outcome of the criminal case against retired Gen. Nedeljko Boskovic affect such a decision? The case is proceeding: President Milosevic accepted two letters from Gen. Boskovic, but it appears that he referred the case to the legal authorities of JNA. It seems everyone would rather forget about the whole matter...

How good is that for the state and the army?