Political Jungle

The similarities between the two are so few that we will have difficulties getting used to the change, with Milosevic himself experiencing the most difficulty adapting to the new job. He will have to appear on all official occasions, to receive official guests, and to send postcards and condolences in cases of international disasters, which he did not do even when the disasters were a lot closer to home.

We will always compare him with the dignified Lilic, and I fear that the change will not be a satisfying one. I think that Milosevic’s lack of experience in doing such things will be all too easily overlooked. How sure can we be that he is ready to take on such a job? To date he has not demonstrated any sense of protocol or of decorum. To date he has only demonstrated the ability to work heavily masked behind the scenes, to set traps, to orchestrate frauds, to whisper, to hide his real intentions, to threaten, to bluff and to say the opposite of what he means.

Such skills will only stand in his way, as in the new job he is not supposed to have any intentions, nor is he supposed to think about anything. Someone else would enjoy such a job, but Milosevic, who has for years been surrounded only by policemen, conspirators and schemers, could fall prey to the temptation to include a few nasty words about Djindjic, Draskovic or Djukanovic in a birthday postcard to the British Queen.

Therefore, it is understandable that Milosevic is trying to make his job easier by getting used to foreign territory. Fearful of making a mistake while cutting the ribbon, while making honorary visits or during various public occasions, he would prefer to keep the old habits, to surround himself with the same people and to continue behaving in the same way he has been behaving up to now. It would be simplest for him if he merely swapped positions with Lilic, who would become President of Serbia. Perhaps he might even be dreaming about occupying the same quarters, about not moving the furniture he has grown accustomed to, and about merely exchanging name plates.

Thus, if such an exchange were achieved, if Lilic or someone similar were to come to Milosevic’s position, and the latter to the insignificant position of the chief of state, we would be facing two equally difficult problems. First, how to prevent Milosevic from appropriating the authority of others, and second, how to convince Lilic (or someone like him) to reach decisions independently. It would really be illogical and unnatural that someone yearning for power were to end up without any, and that another someone who does not know what to do with it, were to end up with that power.

Luckily, both sides of such an exchange remain uncertain. As far as Milosevic is concerned, his problem with the Montenegrins resembles the situation in Coalition Zajedno: just like Draskovic, he considers himself the prime candidate, while Djukanovic thinks otherwise. Both candidates are pressuring and blackmailing their partners and accusing them of causing the collapse of the coalition, and, by analogy, of the state. Besides that, both are ideologically locked in the past, and it would be best if they decided the question of historical blames and national peace somewhere far from daily business; should they come up with something remotely related to reality, they could then let us know.

The problem with Milosevic lies in the great and confusing discrepancy between his virtuosity at governing and between the budget balance. For this reason many people could not accept that he was responsible for the present situation, and they accepted the explanation that without him things would be even worse than they are. However, his killer instinct for self-preservation is evidently closely but paradoxically related to his suicidal policies.

This has, in a way, become apparent to everyone, and even he himself should know that he has been badly defeated when he, who has helped create Djukanovic, finds himself in a position not of threatening, but of begging, asking to be put in the place of Lilic. Djukanovic, for his part, never appeared more convincing than in his present role of uncovering the schemes of Milosevic and Bulatovic. Were the idea of the upcoming elections a serious one, I think that Djukanovic himself would be capable of destroying Milosevic.

However, that is merely an old negotiations tactic. According to the Constitution the idea of strengthening the federation is one that the Montenegrins would say they have wanted to discuss all along, but that they do not wish to have Milosevic according to this or any other constitution. Thus it would come out that the negotiator Vucelic does not have any instructions to further support the strengthening of the federation under such conditions.

Thus Milosevic could get from Montenegro, in the best case scenario, approval for becoming a careful and assiduous functionary in Lilic’s present position. That also will have to be paid, and in this case the only available currency comes in the guise of Miomir Bulatovic. He will agree to calm down, to withdraw and to stop threatening to set the north of Montenegro against the south. If that threat is at all serious and dangerous, Djukanovic could, in the interest of stability, cede on the question of Milosevic; if it is not, he might not.

Ultimately Serbia itself should find a way this year of repaying with gratitude its leader and his family for all their care up to now. Why would that entire job fall to Djukanovic alone, beside such an active opposition? However, there is a political jungle here in which lurk various beasts whose tempers are hard to figure out. If, for instance, a newcomer were to cast a glance at the present situation he might think that in Serbia everyone is in some sort of coalition, federation, and formal or informal agreement with everyone else. However, when one takes a closer look, it suddenly appears that everyone is in some sort of conflict with each other. But then, that does not seem entirely correct either.

Through the years many party combinations were tried, and none of them were soundly formed or ultimately broken apart. Such jobs are never carried to their conclusion here, and everyone somehow prefers to keep all their options open. The biggest promises, pledges and the most serious insults are exchanged with ease, and forgotten with even greater ease, just like at an oriental bazaar. All that life and color only creates the appearance of dynamism, because there is no actual presence of movement.

There is no objective or goal beyond the game itself which the participants evidently find very amusing. At the present moment, nearly all main actors, the leaders of bigger political parties, are sitting on two chairs to a man, each one looking at what everyone else is doing. Milosevic could wish for and even look for a partner in the opposition, which everyone is fearing, at the same time wanting to know everyone’s price. Seselj is, of course, always willing and able, but wishes to raise his price and is meeting with Draskovic and Bogoljub Karic. Draskovic is raising his price in the same way, at the same time not leaving Coalition Zajedno.

They could both make some deal with Karic, if he had the kind of money they think they are worth. Djindjic is causing the greatest concern because he likes to hide and to mystify his plans. All of them together are lowering the price of Serbia, which is perhaps still overpriced. Only Kostunica is not participating in anything, appearing more as a lonely weirdo, while Vesna Pesic, in the little political space remaining, is trying to remind everyone that Milosevic is still among us.

Except, of course, for Seselj, all of them will realize once the elections approach who it is they are dealing with. They will know how to evaluate their real strengths and to see who is making what deals with whom. That they look so shaggy and self satisfied is the result of the excessive attention we have devoted to them under the circumstances. The summer is coming, so we will all take a break from each other. In autumn everyone will have to work overtime to attract interest and attention. It is everyone’s good fortune that this regime does not know how to right itself, while it is the bad luck of this country that its leaders and politicians are the most backward looking. Whoever prefers to forget can do so, but what the opposition has demonstrated in the last three months are certain signs that they will not know how to govern the country. For, after all, who can govern a nation when they have no control over themselves?