Transfering Power

Late this May, Mira Markovic, directorate chairwoman of the Yugoslav Left (JUL), told Greek reporters that her husband Slobodan Milosevic won’t try for a third term as Serbian President and added that "it’s too early to talk about" his nomination for Federal President. On June 3, JUL leader Ljubisa Ristic said Milosevic will head the candidate lists for the coming presidential and parliamentary elections in Serbia. He said that does not mean Milosevic will be the leftist coalition’s presidential candidate and added that the issue hadn’t been discussed "because it’s too early for that".

On Friday, June 5, a statement issued in Podgorica said Milosevic will be nominated for FRY President. A high-ranking SPS delegation (Milorad Vucelic, Dusan Matkovic, Dragan Tomic and Milomir Minic) went to Montenegro that day to discuss two issues with Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) chiefs. The proposals were: 1) Milosevic’s nomination for FRY President and 2) changes to two articles of the federal constitution (97 on the election and 98 on the impeachment of the Federal President) so that the President could be elected in elections not by parliament as is the case now.

Zoran Lilic’s term in office as Federal President expires on June 25. Under the rules of the federal parliament, a new President has to be elected within 30 days of the end of the previous President’s term and the session to discuss nominations must be called within 20 days of the expiration of his term in office.

The SPS is trying to stage a repeat of its 1990 constitution-and-elections formula which was implemented speedily and with total success. The changes to the federal constitution depend on the Montenegrin ruling DPS now but just their approval isn’t enough. The two republics in the federation (Serbia and Montenegro) have to vote on changes to a total of seven constitutional articles: articles 1 (the federation), 2 (its members), 3 (its territory), 7 (the right of the republics to international relations), and 140 and 141 (amendments to the constitution). Even the initiative to launch those changes depends on agreement.

The SPS can easily launch a formal initiative for constitutional changes through its 30 MPs in the parliament Chamber of Citizens and 20 MPs in the Chamber of Republics, through the federal government or the signatures of 100,000 voters.

Constitutional changes of the kind being proposed (which do not delve into the position of the federation members) require a two thirds majority in both chambers of the Yugoslav parliament.

The Chamber of Citizens has 138 MPs and a two thirds majority is 93. The SPS-JUL-New Democracy (ND) coalition has 64, the DPS 20. That means their 84 MPs can elect the federal president because that requires only a simple majority of 70 but their numbers are not big enough to change the constitution even if the Montenegrins agree.

The SPS could possibly count on the Serbian opposition voting for the one man-one vote principle for at least part of the federal elections. In 1992, when the FRY constitution was adopted, there was criticism of the Montenegrins being privileged in this election system since it takes 16 times less votes to elect a federal MP in Montenegro than in Serbia. The Chamber of Republics is made up of 108 MPs from Serbia and 30 from Montenegro, but if the principle of an equal number of electoral districts had been implemented it would have only 6-7. A privileged position for the weaker members is a known practice in various federal systems in terms of the senate, or upper house, of parliament (similar to the Chamber of Republics) but everywhere that balance is a matter of political relations. In Germany, the federal units are not proportionately represented.

Pavle Nikolic, a professor of constitutional law, told VREME that he thinks that it’s unusual for the principle of inequality of voters to be implemented for the Chamber of Citizens and that the principle even runs counter to the rules of federal systems.

So is the opposition going to be motivated enough to vote for the constitutional changes and strengthen the position of its main opponent while weakening its own?

The Serbian opposition hasn’t gotten involved in the problems of the federal state so far: it boycotted the first federal elections in May 1992; opposition leaders didn’t recognize the FRY for a long time, seeing it instead as a state with genetic flaws. They never focused on its problems in their election campaigns. So far, it’s obvious that they’re not sure how they want to name the state; FR Yugoslavia or Serbia and Montenegro.

Some pollsters were right last autumn when they said the federal elections are the weakest link in the opposition’s strategy. The impression now is that the opposition sighed with relief once they heard Milosevic was transferring to the federal level.

SPO leader Vuk Draskovic and his party spokesman Ivan Kovacevic said he has nothing against directly electing the Federal President by secret ballot because their party feels that it will be easier to harmonize the interests of the democratic opposition, that an opposition candidate could defeat Milosevic and that direct elections could eliminate Milosevic politically.

The Serbian Radical Party (SRS) has a different opinion. Some of the press has reported that Milosevic met with Seselj four times in May, allegedly to ask him to support his nomination for President in return for several posts in the federal government and some profitable posts. But was there any truth to those rumors? SRS support isn’t necessary under the current constitution since the DPS will support Milosevic. Montenegrin politicians are only opposing the constitutional changes because they would marginalize Montenegro; they are asking Milosevic for a statement about his intentions to implement reforms.

SPS officials said the constitutional changes are their goal but added that they’re not counting on those changes happening now. The SPS has spoken about strengthening the federal state in all of its declarations over the past year and Milosevic’s closest associates have been moved to the federal level in the past six months. The fact that the SPS has decided to attack the weak post of federal head of state first instead of the simpler method of establishing control over the federal government indicates that the strengthening of the federation could cause old-style crises.

That course was perhaps set by Milosevic’s weakened personal position internationally where he is incompetent to do business. His recent talks with the US State Secretary resulted in an extension of the outer wall of sanctions for six months and Albright’s statement that he’s living in a dream world.

As usual, he needs an easy victory. Since the Serbian electorate sees the President as the embodiment of the State rather than the guardian of the law, the leftist coalition’s election staff can be expected to succeed.

Pavle Nikolic said in his book From Breakup to Despair and Hope that the system of power in the FRY is characterized by a new federal-confederal order; just like the warped federalism of the former Yugoslavia. He said the semi-confederal order in the FRY was established in the 1992 constitution with actual centers of power in the member states while the federal government is practically under the control of the republics.

Nikolic also wrote that the FRY has a parliamentary regime with a very weak federal president, because "a strong president (elected from one of the two republics) would certainly upset the balance of power in the federal units in terms of his influence on the federal authorities".

That weak position is a consequence of his limited jurisdiction. He practically can’t influence any policies or the legislature, and has no authority over parliament and the government, while parliament can impeach him is it feels he has violated the constitution.

The change in the way the Federal President is elected could cause some strengthening of his formal powers, Nikolic said, and added that the head of state would then become the chosen of the nation. He recalled that the Serbian President violated both the Serbian and federal constitutions despite his wide-ranging powers and said he can be expected to do the same in his new post.

Nikolic said the Serbian President didn’t use the greatest of his powers (declaring a state of war and taking over parliament’s powers) but nor did he veto undemocratic laws such as the 1993 law on electing federal MPs.

Political expert Vladimir Goati has a simple explanation; the change in the way he is elected is important or else he wouldn’t be insisting on it so much.

An example of the meaning of electoral changes like this are the changes in the French constitution which made De Gaulle the key figure of legitimacy when he was elected. It makes an elected president virtually unchangeable.

Goati thinks the presidential system is not suited to countries in transition since it imposes a majority system which makes some minorities feel like majorities and makes it hard to reach a consensus on democratic rules.

There are two schools of though on Milosevic’s political intentions: one was defined by Kosta Cavoski: the power of this politician comes from his vast powers and he will try to expand them; the other by Dusan Mihajlovic (ND) who said there’s " a wide-spread incorrect belief that Milosevic’s power comes from his constitutional authority".

From the outside the whole things looks like a paradox: a man with great power says he’s taking a post which is slightly more than a figurehead for the state and wants to change the constitution to that end.