Divorce of the Unmarried

Some see it as a talent for squandering. The Serbian opposition today is still doing what it had been doing for the last six and a half years - repeating its below the belt squabbles and creating combinations of losers. On the eve of the session of the parliament of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during which the president of the republic will be chosen, the coalition Zajedno has waged war on a few front lines and separated.

The president of the Democratic Party Zoran Djindjic and the president of the Civil Alliance Vesna Pesic dispatched an invitation to Vuk Draskovic last week, following a two-month-long delay, to attend the session of the presidential meeting of the coalition Zajedno. He sarcastically responded that he would call a meeting when his coalition partners grew in stature and expanded in width.

Zoran Djindjic and Vesna Pesic held a meeting of the "lopsided construction" and later announced that there will be no more talk about the relationships within the coalition Zajedno, and that they would rather concentrate on mobilizing democratic forces for the upcoming battle over election conditions.

Draskovic's answer sounded like an accusation aimed at Djindjic - that he had flown in Milosevic's plane with the Socialist Party of Serbia's (SPS) vice president Milorad Vucelic; that he is now executing all that he had secretly negotiated at the time of the three-month-long demonstrations with the President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic; that he is responsible for the collapse of the coalition Zajedno and that he is trying to establish a coalition with SPS. Djindjic retaliated that none of those accusations were true, that he never flew in Milosevic's plane, that he is not counting on a collaboration with the SPS but on the disillusioned SPS sympathizers and that he had negotiated the reform package with the Montenegrins, which is something that will soon be made public. Along with that he accused Draskovic of giving out statements which support changes in the federal constitution, which would strengthen his direct opponent Slobodan Milosevic... The quarrel continued the next day, Tuesday (June 24) which then contained open claims on the end of the coalition, refusals to be held responsible for all that the thus-far coalition partner had said and done, etc. etc...

CONTROVERSIAL MANDATES: In the background the dispute was conducted on a number of fronts, including over the city government in Novi Sad. Sparks were flying in both Belgrade assemblies as well. The current conflict was based on whether the opposition MPs should verify their mandates in the federal parliament - meaning 22 mandates of the coalition Zajedno federal MPs which lie hidden in a dowry chest from a marriage dissolved on the wedding day. According to the coalition agreement, the Serbian Renewal Party (SPO) should have some 10 mandates and owing to the fact that the coalition Zajedno had won in the majority of the electoral units only one seat, and that in the cities where SPO's candidates were on top of the list, this party now notes eight mandates more than they have been granted by the agreement. Now SPO does not wish to relinquish those mandates, since it is no longer willing to continue giving out "credit to Djindjic".

Refusing to verify the mandates of the federal MPs represents, according to SPO: a) a means of putting pressure on the regime; b) a possibly more important tactical issue and ultimate means of laying pressure on Djindjic to keep him from demolishing the government architecture which was constructed with a huge amount of difficulties in the "liberated" cities.

The story of the continued boycott of the Assembly of Serbia looks somewhat different. The Democrats and the Civil Alliance (GSS) have announced that they would gladly enter the assembly where they would obstruct the assembly by submitting hundreds of amendments, thereby, using the statutory "catch" in the working mode during an extraordinary session, disable the assembly to be dissolved in the near future. Thus far, the opposition has made use of obstructive speech - the most vivid example being at the time of the Politika debate in 1992 (Paroski spoke for an hour and thirty five minutes), and the obstruction of the Radicals in 1993 at the time of the debate on confidence in Sainovic's government, which resulted in the assembly's dissolution.

SPO does not accept the tactics which its coalition partners are employing and announces that it will not enter the assembly and that it will not conduct any talks with Prime Minister Marjanovic, labeled as a "trap" by Draskovic. The Democrats entered into talks, then abandoned them due to the exclusion of non-government media at those meetings. Boycott as a political means so far hasn't shown itself to be constructive for the opposition possibly because they had used it far too many times. The last time that the MPs of Depos, the Democratic Party (DS) and the Democratic Party of Serbia ( DSS) had left the parliament was in 1995 because parliamentary debates in which Seselj was destroying the atmosphere anyway stopped being broadcast on TV stations. The Socialists refused to be daunted by the opposition boycott and practically chased them out of parliament, after having submitted them to various types of abuse and other inconveniences and, as a rule, finally saw them off with scorn often harsher than the well-known sentence uttered by Zoran Lilic, then parliament speaker: "And close the door on your way out!".

Following the opposition's attempt to constitute a so-called parallel assembly in the assembly of Serbia in the winter of 1996, the assembly civil servants prohibited the MP's from entering the assembly with the humiliating and lame excuse that they had placed rat poison throughout the building; at the time of the MP hunger strike in the autumn of 1996, they once again sprinkled rat and insect poisoning all over the building. As a consequence, such strategies brought about a final demise of the assembly's reputation. The opposition didn't know how to use the assembly as a polygon and tried to fight for fair conditions with different means.

On the other hand, it remains questionable whether anti-election agitation has any effect in the battle over election conditions, which is now occasionally mentioned. Prior to all previous elections (1990, 1992, 1993 and 1996) the opposition spent a large part of their campaign threatening that it would not participate at the elections. The result was an increased number of abstainers among which one could definitely find a part of the opposition electoral potential.

And finally, each election turnout was accompanied by mergers and dissolution, charges and retreats so that the current events only show that there is a large chance that the game which has been going on for six and a half years shall continue with no ending. The question remains open as to how the electoral body will evaluate all of that. Draskovic's election headquarters are for now obviously playing on the moral branding card ("The DS and GSS have betrayed the coalition" - Ivan Kovacevic).

Djindjic's arguments - Draskovic's ambitions are unrealistic; the monarchy-oriented and chetnik strategy are not efficient and a winning strategy must be devised; the coalition Zajedno is not monopolized by anyone, and Draskovic is not showing any intention to negotiate the strategy with his coalition partners...

The arguments of Draskovic - Vuk has been around for a long time, the chetnik and monarchistic orientation of SPO has never been disguised and had to have been known in August of last year as well (when the coalition agreement was drawn up) and last winter when SPO sympathizers carried Draza Markovic's pictures at the demonstrations, as well as during this spring and summer.

Draskovic is on one track, with his highest ever result of around 800.000 voters, which could be reduced by the votes of Raketic's group which broke off, enlarged by their local government participation in a number of cities, reduced by the general impression of bad personnel policies... Djindjic on the other track, with his best ever result of 400.000 votes, which could be enlarged by the publicity which Djindjic has as the mayor of Belgrade, reduced by the votes which Micunovic took with him, enlarged by his new partners.

In this division, the chances of the Civil Alliance could be minimized in case Djindjic finds some calculation there, as this party no longer plays the role of the deciding factor. Vesna Pesic can be saved from an easy write-off only by the good international rating which GSS has, which could be of use to Djindjic as well.

Seselj's chances are enlarged in this four-member model and he could rate somewhere between his records, i.e. between 700.000 and one million one hundred thousand votes, in case the Socialists don't comprehend that the "general" is whisking off one part of their voters.

In this new situation, each one measures their own strength. The opposition will certainly lose in the presidential elections; however, the position of the president of Serbia is losing in importance anyway. All still isn't lost since there is still time before the elections and the inconsistency of all the actors is immense; it is possible to enter into coalitions even after the elections, though there isn't much coalition potential amongst SPO, DS and the Radicals - chances are increasing for the Socialists to acquire yet another mandate, which all together means a continuation of the unchangeable government regime.

As far as exhibiting government skills goes, which is probably very important for the voters, the impression following this newest opposition act must be catastrophic. The actors enter into agreements without giving them much thought, have a weak sense of obligations to observe them, minor capacities for advanced thinking and a bad perception of their own power. Therefore, who will allow them to rule? What they should expect is a loss of their international credibility, won over with a lot of difficulty, the disillusionment of their voters, reduced election chances and possibly the citizenship's general conclusion that the current opposition parties are no longer a public issue. Serbia therefore presents an unusual picture: the regime is collapsing and the opposition is disintegrating. One more thing should be added here: our story's heroes owe 300.000 pairs of winter shoes whose soles had been worn through during the snowy revolution which we now remember with a combination of love and bitterness.