Is a Replacement Being Sought For Karadzic?

With a clearly defined task, Mr. Cyrus Vance in a short period of time had talks with all, or almost all, the key figures in the current war, including the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, whose military involvement is no more desired than that of Milosevic. Giving his impressions of the mainly bilateral talks in Bosnia and Serbia, Cyrus Vance said worriedly that the road out of the crisis would be a long and difficult one, that resolution should move within the guidelines of the Sarajevo Document, in which the Bosnian national leaders agreed to the founding principles upon which the transformation of B&H should be constituted, keeping in mind that Mr. Cutilheiro's interpretation somewhat differed from that of Karadzic, which probably presents a basic problem.

The Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic said the basic impression of his talks with Mr. Vance was the possibility of the army beginning to behave in a different way. The same evening (April 16), on returning from Belgrade where he had talked with Blagoje Adzic, Fikret Abdic (a B&H Presidency member) clarified, to a certain extent, this foggy formulation. According to him, the biggest problem is centered on the Army's attitude that "The Army will respond energetically to attack". "I suggested that in such cases the army shouldn't respond, but that a mixed committee be sent to investigate and file a report, on the basis of which certain measures would be taken", to which Blagoje Adzic did not consent, instead "promising" to hold back for as long as possible and, as reported by Abdic, opening fire only under extreme provocation.

Simultaneously with these intentions of the Army (inasmuch as they are sincere), Milosevic has also shown signs yielding slightly. This impression is supported by his talks with the president of the B&H Reformists, Mr. Nenad Kecmanovic, who along with Mirko Pejanovic (DSS) has been undecided as to whether to enter the Bosnian Presidency or not. The consequences of this very important discussion could be of two kinds. The first logical conclusion is that Milosevic is looking for a new partner to represent the interests of Serbs in B&H (to say nothing of his own definitely different interests), in order to remove Karadzic, whose political role is obviously nearing its speedy epilogue. The second possible political consequence is that Kecmanovic is merely a sophisticated version of Karadzic, which primarily depends upon whether Milosevic has changed his general aim with regard to B&H. This supposition is supported by Kecmanovic's behavior, who for his entrance into the Presidency made several demands, emphasizing that most probably "his place was not in that company", because the present Presidency has "compromised" itself. Apart from this, the actual influence of Nenad Kecmanovic on the people he pretends to represent in the Presidency is questionable, particularly considering the fact that Karadzic has surrounded himself with an arsenal of weapons, which, in an essential turnaround in the Serbian policy in B&H, could present a big problem. In our attempt to get direct information from Kecmanovic himself on the content of the talks with Milosevic, he first agreed to an interview with previously delivered questions, of which some were directly based on his talks with Milosevic. However, at the appointed time of the interview, Nenad Kecmanovic suddenly denied his meeting with Milosevic, which could bring into question whether there was any such discussion, though this kind of vacillation could be prescribed to Kecmanovic's business calculations which the public here are getting used to.

A few clouds on the slightly clearer Bosnian skies were caused by the news that general mobilization had been announced in "Serbian B&H". Because, as we all know, the Serbs in B&H haven't "defended" themselves yet.