Taming of the Shrew

Ever since Slobodan Milosevic was elected president of Yugoslavia, the opposition and democratic public mainly stood by the belief that the election was not an overly joyous event for Yugoslavia. We shall lay out an opposite belief here, by which the election of Milosevic as president of Yugoslavia does not necessarily have to be harmful for Yugoslavia, and could even be beneficial. This stand shall view the entire event from the angle of rights and democratic developments. In other words, we shall express the belief that the election of Milosevic as president of Yugoslavia could have positive meaning for the future development of rights and democracy in Yugoslavia and Serbia.

In order to comprehend this stand better, it is useful to shortly explain what has happened to rights and democracy in the last seven years, i.e. during the time Milosevic has been president of Serbia. There were no rights during that time, as, according to the Serbian constitution, the president was actually placed in an extra-constitutional position. For example, article 89 of the constitution of the Republic of Serbia from 1990 states that the president is legally liable. Yet that liability only relates to political liability, since the question of his liability is raised by the assembly as a political and not legal body. Moreover, even if the assembly was to decide to oust the president, it could never complete this act, as the final verdict is left in the hands of the electoral body (constitution of the Republic of Serbia, article 88), and the electoral body always adopts a political rather than legal decision, and rights exist when executive power is placed in the realms of laws. Milosevic, as part of the executive power of the Republic of Serbia, often seemed to transcend the boundaries of laws as not a single person was able to monitor him and call for his accountability. It can thereby be deduced that laws in Serbia, at least as far as Milosevic is concerned, did not exist in the last seven years.

POWER AND OBSTACLES: With regard to democracy, this went as follows: in Serbia all state institutions, primarily consisting of the president and the assembly, were operating in accordance with mechanical power relations. This method of the institutions' operations is extremely non-democratic, as all decisions which are adopted by state institutions are determined, as a rule, by imposing the will of one party over the other, totally disregarding the interests of the other party. The Serbian assembly was a marked leader in this sense over the last seven years, passing each law according to this principle, never flinching at violating even basic legal and democratic procedures along the way, the spirit of the constitution, laws or their own regulations. As Milosevic, during his seven-year-long presidency, did not make any steps to change such operations in the state institutions, but had rather backed them to a large extent, it can be deduced that Milosevic himself, along with the tremendous power he had, stood as one of the obstacles in the transition towards introducing democracy to Serbia.

Things stand differently with the constitution of Yugoslavia and the federal parliament. In principle, chances for establishing laws and transitional processes on the federal level are much higher. First, as the system of executive power on the federal level have more to do with civil servants than the president, the president is elected in parliament, and not at the elections. Once the parliament elects a state president, it can also oust him (FRY constitution, article 78). Second, the mechanical power relations in the federal parliament are but secondary, as the principle of reaching agreements and consensus are primary. Up to now, these two principles operated simultaneously at the federal level, however as the principle of reaching an agreement has its advantages in comparison to mechanical power relations, it can easily happen that the former deletes the latter. The system of power on the federal level is established so that in order to have a stable government and president, one should have a coalition which shall support both sides. Imposing the will of one side over the other, along with totally disregarding the interests of the second party, is not as easily achieved in the federal parliament as it was in the Serbian assembly. The only existing tools are negotiations, agreements and trade. So far, trade has been enacted between the Serbian and Montenegrin socialists. The subjects of that process could change in the future.

When Milosevic launched a campaign for his election as president of Yugoslavia, he faced two vital challenges. First, to procure the support of the Montenegrins for his election. Second to change the part of article 97 of the FRY constitution by which the president is appointed by the parliament, and to ascertain a new regulation by which he is to be elected by the citizens. In other words, as far as laws go, Milosevic wanted to establish the same principle on the federal level which he had enacted on the republican one. Therefore, he would have been a president who would not have been accountable to the parliament and in front of whom, the parliament would have been powerless.

CHECK MATE: However, as is known, the second suggestion was not accepted by the Montenegrin top officials and their leader Milo Djukanovic. If Djukanovic's side eventually wins in Montenegro, Milosevic shall have to deal with these consequences as president of Yugoslavia. The basic one at this moment is that, at least theoretically, he shall not be allowed to overstep the boundaries of law without being punished for it. Given the power relations in the federal parliament at this moment, Milosevic's socialists, joined in coalition by New Democracy, (who everyone supposes will continue their unreserved support for him whatever he does), still don't have a majority in the parliament. In the Citizens Council, they have 64 MP's of 138, and in the Council of the Republics, 12 of 20. In both cases that's less than half. Therefore, Milosevic's position in that role shall exclusively depend on whether a coalition can be established in the federal parliament which, as far as Milosevic is concerned, will look the other way in case of a constitutional violation.

As the constitution states that the president is elected by parliament, it follows that his position depends on whether an agreement exists or not. At the moment when Milosevic was elected, that agreement existed. However, as the socialists do not have an absolute majority, and as far as Milosevic is concerned, any Montenegrin MP represents a potential Milo Djukanovic, he would rather have foregone such a luxury in which a parliamentary majority could oust him in a matter of seconds. The fact that power relations in the parliament can, in the next day or over the next year, oust him whenever it so wishes, shows that he can no longer act in an unconstitutional manner unless he has strong backing from the Montenegrins. Therefore the parliamentary majority can hold Milosevic in a check-mate position and make him tread within the realms of the constitution, i.e. to respect the principle of laws. Naturally, we are not claiming that the Montenegrins nor any other opposition party for that matter shall make use of these policies because they are truly concerned for the laws and constitutional procedures, but rather because they are finally in the position to directly blackmail Milosevic and condition his position as president of Yugoslavia. As long as Milosevic is capable of bargaining with the parliamentary majority, he shall remain president. When he is no longer capable of it, his constitutional position shall stand on very shaky ground. This is where we see a chance of establishing laws in Yugoslavia. As Milosevic is the key political institution in Serbia and Yugoslavia today, once it becomes plain that he has been forced to tread on legal grounds, all other state institutions shall be made to toe the line in a much easier way. As we stated at the beginning, the election of Milosevic as president of Yugoslavia is not only significant for laws, but for democracy as well. In all those years, while he was president of the republic, it was impossible to oust Milosevic and his actual power arose from that legally unlimited position. Now that parliament has at least potential possibilities of ousting him, his authority and actual power can easily be thwarted and weakened. People who vote for Milosevic would not gladly accept the fact that he could be ousted by parliament. Which is why Milosevic wanted to change an article from the constitution and impose a rule by which the parliament wouldn't have any possibilities of influencing his position. As soon as it could be seen that the parliament was ousting Milosevic, all would deduce that he is not as powerful as he once was. Parliament can now oust him, blackmail him and demand various concessions from him. In other words, the parliament can humiliate Milosevic, in the same way he had previously humiliated it.

We are left with the conclusion that Milosevic's appointment as president of Yugoslavia could turn into an event which would, in the long-term, have positive effects upon laws and on beginning the transition towards democracy. First, he could contribute towards establishing the laws in case the current clash in Montenegro is completed with Milo Djukanovic's victory, who has demonstrated on a number of occasions that he is not prepared to follow Milosevic as blindly as Bulatovic. Second, in case Milosevic would continue violating the constitution, the very fact that parliament has the right to oust him can harm Milosevic's actual power and authority, thereby reducing the non-democratic and authoritarian tendencies in Serbia which Milosevic personifies and open up possibilities for a start towards democracy.

The author is an associate of the Institute of European Studies