To Boycott Or To Participate?

Many arguments are being rehashed, but no one can hear anyone any longer in a week when the Head Committees of the Democrats and the SPO should come to a decision on whether to participate or not. In the editorial office of VREME commentators are mostly for boycotting, while analysts are mostly against it. To help solve the "Catch-22" election riddle, we will list 30 questions to which the answers are pretty self-evident. Whether their sum total is a "yes" or a "no" will be decided, of course, by what we here would call an imaginary political number.

1. Is there a solution to be found in literature for this Serbian riddle?

There is, but it’s not that self-evident. A year ago, under the impression that here we behave exclusively according to models offered by famous authors who are given to sarcasm, in VREME we decided to look for an answer in Ambrose Bierce’s The Devil’s Dictionary: "Abstainer. A weak man who yields to the temptation of denying himself pleasure. A total abstainer is one who abstains from everything except abstention, but especially from not meddling in someone else’s business".

2. And our rich history, does it offer any examples?

It does, but it imposes considerable conclusions. When in 1882 Pasic’s Radicals refused their mandates after unsuccessful attempts to get at the truth by interpolation of the famous bankruptcy of the General Union, i.e. the financing of the Serbian Railway, King Milan, or more correctly the President of the Government Pirocanac decreed that in the extra elections votes given to representatives who resigned would not count — instead, the representatives next in line with most votes received those mandates. It happened that representatives with only a few votes received mandates in Parliament and hence the expression "two-voters". With the help of those "two-voters" Pirocanac’s Government later instituted several measures for restricting press freedoms and high fines for not appearing in Parliament as a means of avoiding quorums. Something similar to this was attempted in England during the 18th Century.

3. What about every day existence?

Had Partizan boycotted the match with Croatia, it would have lost 3:0 by forfeit, instead of the degrading 5:0 but it would also have suffered extra sanctions from UEFA.

4. Is a boycott of the elections at all part of the Serbian voter’s mentality?

According to some indications, it could be said yes. During the 1945 elections, in spite of strong pressures from the new Government ("Everyone must vote!" was more than a slogan at the time) the voter turnout in Serbia amounted to 77.16%, which was considerably less than in other Republics of Yugoslavia in 1945 (97.68% in Kosovo, 96.13% in Montenegro, 95.29% in Slovenia, and 97.77% in Croatia).

5. Has the spirit of Grolov’s abstention and the "blind box" of 1945 at all continued into the 90's?

In the first elections in 1990 voter turnout in Serbia was again smallest in the eastern camp — 71.5% (Montenegro 75%, Bosnia and Hercegovina 77%, Slovenia 84%, Croatia and Macedonia 85%, Czechoslovakia 96%, Bulgaria 90%). In SFRY from 1974 through to 1986 in delegates elections voter turnout varied from 82.5% to 92%, and was smaller than in other East European countries. However, every one of those statistics could be explained by specific circumstances of the day.

6. Does the citizen like to boycott?

Yes. Abstainers are among the most numerous non-government "parties", even though their numbers vary. In 1990 voters lists in Serbia, 7,036,303 voters were registered, while only 5,034,440 voted, or 71.49%. In the 1993 Republican elections about 10% of the electorate or 700,000 people more than in 1990, became passive — the percentage of abstainers in the electorate amounted to 38%. Kosovo Albanians present a significant and otherwise constant number of abstainers, even though considerable indecision can also be seen among other citizens.

7. Does the citizen respond when called upon to boycott?

With one ear only. Constant threats of a boycott perhaps affected the general rise in abstinence. In 1992 it became clear that every second voter for the opposition parties responded to the call to boycott. In the May elections for the SRY Parliament, when the opposition boycotted amid all those exciting events, the total of those who voted was 4,080,465, or 56.06% of the electorate, which at that time amounted to 7,277,471 voters. That same year, 1992, in the December elections the total number of those who voted was 4,723,711. That means that only about 700,000 voters responded to the call to boycott made in May, less than half of those who voted for Milan Panic that Autumn, the man who received the support of Depos and the Democratic Party. It should be noted that that number of "May" abstainers was 100,000 less than the number of signatures in the petition for Slobodan Milosevic’s resignation that Autumn (the Democrats claimed that they collected 800,000 signatures). Otherwise, in 1996 during the November 3 elections for the Citizen’s Council of the Yugoslav Parliament, of the 7,587,692 registered voters, only 4,605,783 voted. Numbers show that variations in the voters’ lists reach as far as half of the "organized boycott".

8. Is there any other form of elections boycott?

3.4% of voters voted in the first elections in Serbia, in 1990, by braking elections rules with crossed out ballots (2% in Slovenia, 3.4% in Croatia). Vladimir Goati believes that crossed out ballots, or incorrectly filled out ones were "more than a mistake" in "the elections without choice" from 1974 to 1986, when that number oscillated between 2.5 to 4 percent.

9. How many people do not vote out of concrete reasons?

According to some research, on the average about 7-8% of voters do not vote because of illness, jobs that cannot be postponed or are incorrectly entered in the voter’s list (is seems that our statistics coincide with those in Great Britain, for instance). For other voters, it could be said that they abstain out of protest because of ambivalence or because of indecision.

10. Have the boycott threats of the elections shown themselves as credible political weapons of the Serbian opposition?

It could be said that they always brandished that weapon, with more or less a pathetic effect. On October 1, 1990, the opposition, which legitimized itself as the United Opposition, placed demands on the regime through the voice of its spokesman, Leon Cohen, to insure fair election conditions in the space of two days, and under threat of boycott.

In 1992 Depos wavered until the last moment between participation and abstention in the elections, between whether election conditions are sufficient or not — the decision was made with a close majority of only one vote. In 1993, Kostunica was dithering until the last moment on whether to join Depos II, and whether to participate in the elections...

Since 1992 Seselj "counters" such cacophonous indecision by always stating that he will participate in the elections, which is obviously attractive for a segment of authority-oriented voters.

11. After every election there were fights about who acted the "traitor" and jumped first at the sound of the starter’s pistol?

In 1990 Draskovic was attacking the Democrat, Micunovic (Djindjic at the time was stating that not participating would mean a choice of revolutionary tactics), while in 1997 Djindjic’s Democrats and GSS are accusing Draskovic that by participating in the elections he will legitimize Milosevic’s elections, while the latter is accusing the Democrats and the "Citizens" that by "having coffee" with Marjanovic they ruined the game of forcing the regime to accept "Gonzales’s round table"; he is also accusing Djindjic of having secret talks with Milosevic.

12. Was there any real cooperation so far between the Government and the Opposition?

As far as Seselj is concerned, it is beyond question that in the role he has played, he has acted as the extended arm of the regime at least in the six of the seven years of the opposition. Despite occasional conflicts, others decided on tactical cooperation in certain periods — in 1993 Djindjic gave two ministers to Marjanovic’s Serbian Government without much protest, while in 1992 he gave two ministers to Panic’s Federal Government during the Meeting on St. Vitus’ Day (commemorating the battle of Kosovo), when the Citizens’ Group also gave two ministers to Panic’s Government. After the 1993 elections Draskovic closed his eyes to the joining of New Democracy to the Marjanovic Government, he gave silent support to the Dayton turning point, and it could even be concluded that after short dithering he avoided the offered joining of SPO to the greater coalition.

13. Who will do what now?

If he enters the race, Draskovic will have to fight for the best possible result and to seek for a chance in forcing the Socialists to enter the so-called greater coalition, in which, besides the customary trophies (government positions), he could demand other political services. And for that, he would need the support of the voters of those parties which are closer to a boycott. Djindjic, if he stays outside the race, must discourage Draskovic from entering the race; he must keep power in the cities, and must organize pressure outside the country, banking on a short-lived, newly elected government. It is a big question whether after the rift which the elections will reawaken, it will be possible to maintain power in cities, and whether "the street" will work in his favor, in the favor of Seselj, or in the favor of some extremist, more extreme that Seselj.

14. Could anyone profit suddenly?

Seselj is not hiding the fact that he would love for no one to participate in the elections, and for himself to share power with the Socialists. Seselj’s sudden success in the vacuum created by the boycott, as in 1992 (this must be said, because "the worse, the better" psychology is once again taking root here), could come to haunt the citizens of Serbia in the period of a new xenophobia in which the Socialists and the Radicals would deal, with a firm grip on power, with "German flag-wavers". Power is too dangerous a thing to be handed over to "those who sold their souls to the Devil".

15. Had the Coalition Zajedno justified its name, would its pressures on the Government have been more convincing, and would a positive conclusion have been more likely?

Yes, even though the results of the November 1996 elections showed that that would not have been enough. In those elections Zajedno had only received 969,198 votes, which amounts to 23.82% of those who voted, or less than 15% of the total of registered voters. The victory in local elections in the biggest cities, analyzed by numbers presents more of "a mistake in steps" on the part of the ruling party — the Socialists were caught napping in the second round, and then from one mistake to another they entered into elections fraud, which awakened the moral conscience of citizens.

16. Why did Djindjic and Draskovic drift apart?

They lacked a million votes, and two million German marks; Djindjic did not acknowledge a winning performance in Draskovic, and they could not agree on a third party.

17. Was there another solution?

One was reached in Bulgaria. In the preliminary elections rounds, the opposition parties, in a kind of eliminations match, decided who will be the challenger. And they won.

18. With a change of elections laws the Socialists mathematically multiplied their chances of winning. Was there another message in that for the opposition?

Preventing obstructions, along with kicking the Democrats out of Parliament, the Socialists demonstrated their customary arrogance in power, and simply forced one party into boycott, because they actually wished to strong-arm some of the players into the out zone; however, they unconsciously sent a message that the opposition is no longer ready to act upon — that is, to quickly unite and make use of their power in the cities to achieve a result better from the one in November. In such a way, the election laws would turn against their codifiers. That was not all that impossible given that Zajedno appropriated some political infrastructures by winning in the cities (i.e. media, power networks, some minor positions of power), and had brought into a passive position the most active nuclei of the Socialist membership. For instance, in 1991 SPS had the highest number of representatives in Belgrade (58,254), in the Nis region (40,075), in the city of Nis itself (8,860), in Novi Sad (5,467), and in Kragujevac (4,851). They obviously do not fare that well when they are the opposition.

19. What are the hopes of the "boycotters" pinned on?

On a mathematical operation which shows that the sum of earlier abstainers and Coalition Zajedno voters is greater than the present sum of Coalition Zajedno voters; on some questionnaires in which they are highly placed; on the assumption that in May of ‘92, only six percent of the registered voters was lacking for a successful boycott (450,000 voters); on the strength of moral pressures, and on the dynamics of revolt and grudge bearing.

20. What are the chances of success of the "abstainers option"?

It is a big question whether the achievement of and absolute majority in the electorate (for there to be three million abstainers instead of the present 2.8 million) is at all easier than achieving a relative majority from among those who come out to vote (to get 1,5 million votes instead of 900,000). That means that a high number of voters loyal to the Government would have to be convinced to accept a boycott as a form of resistence.

21. Will anyone enter the race other than the mentioned candidates?

In all likelihood at least another five to six smaller parties will participate in the elections, as well as a multitude of minor ones.

22. What is the key argument of the "boycotters"?

Milosevic’s "defective elections" will not be recognized by the international community, just as his "defective Yugoslavia" is not recognized. Not to mention the fact that advice is coming from abroad of the sort given by the Oracle at Delphi. For instance, in the statement made by the Presidency of the European Union, on the one hand it is stated that all parties should participate in the elections, while on the other, that the remaining parts of Gonzales’s Agreement must be respected, which some people (for instance Kostunica) interpret in a way that since Gonzales’s advice has not been fully acted upon, the opposition should not participate in the elections.

23. Does that approach have any traps?

It does, because the government has three objectives: a) to insure that a number of parties boycott the elections, while others participate; b) to marginalize those that boycott the elections; and c) to present a copy of the election conditions as some kind of new Pasic’s communique to Austria. The Government’s correspondence with OEBS shows that in its call to OEBS (through President Tomic) it places restrictions aimed at achieving diplomatic goals and some sort of simulation of sovereignty (ruling out those states that have not acknowledged SRY, and preventing the fulfillment of Gonzales’s recommendations).

24. What about the role of the foreign factor?

Diplomatic offices would most probably not acknowledge elections in which democratic parties did not participate, just as they do not recognize the state. But they will continue, judging by a recent statement by the American State Department, a contact with Milosevic as a signatory of the Dayton Agreement. They will not recognize the state, but will recognize him. One need survive such conditions.

25. Who are the main "boycott ideologues"?

From earlier they were Nikola Milosevic and Kosta Cavoski from SLS, Vojislav Kostunica from DSS, and now Djindjic from DS and Dragor Hiber and Aleksandra Posarac from GSS. And from the younger roost, Cedomir Antic from the Student’s Cultural Club. Party spokesmen are not included.

26. Have the Socialists with their change in the number of electoral districts in their interest changed election rules for the first time in an election year?

The contrary seems to be the case — election rules were frequently changed in the election year because election laws were instituted out of political blackmail. In her survey "The Electoral System in Serbia", Mirjana Pajvancic cites, for instance, a fact about very frequent changes to electoral laws prior to the first 1990 elections — almost every new Government Bulletin cited a new elections rule (SGRS 2/90; 3/90; 6/90; 9/90; 12/90). That year elections were held in the middle of December, and the last elections law change was made in the month of November, after threats by the opposition that they will boycott the elections. In 1992, for instance, after the round table in which the government and the opposition participated, special parliamentary and presidential elections were held despite the fact that on September 11 of that year a referendum on the amendment to the Serbian Constitution allowing for early holding of elections in Serbia was unsuccessful (45.55% of adult citizens voted, of which 43.5% were "for"). Elections were organized based on the package of election laws adopted on November 2, 1992.

27. Has President Milosevic accepted up to now to discuss election conditions?

It seems that he did not directly do so. One Depos delegation communicated to President Milosevic in 1992 the demand made by participators in the St. Vitus’ Day Meeting for him to submit his resignation and to organize a round table of the government and the opposition. Nebojsa Popov who knew Milosevic from before spoke with him with out "parliamentary etiquette", addressing him with the familiar "you": "When I saw that he would not accept a resignation, I tried to convince him (...) to at least accept early elections whose conditions would be determined at a round table between the government and the opposition", Popov would write later. Milosevic did not resign and only accepted to discuss the elections, but insisted that political parties need not speak to him, but to the Government. Later, Dacic and Percevic would be sent to the round table.

28. Have the arguments in favor of fair elections conditions changed in the last seven years?

No. In a book by Lile Radonjic, Our Case (Stubovi Kulture, 1996), this is clear from a transcript of the conversation held in Studio B’s NTV Package, seven years ago and before the 1990 elections where Mihiz, for instance, states: "At the present moment when the Serbian Parliament, on the one side, is refusing to accept the opposition’s demands, and the opposition, on the other side, is refusing to participate in the elections, we are entering an unacceptable situation. And in such a situation it should be know what each participant must do. The opposition and the government must in the shortest time sit down to a round table. Given that they already failed that test, a remedial exam should be held. In the shortest time we must have a corrected, agreed-upon elections law. In the event that the opposition and the government are unable to deliver on that, it would be advisable, reasonable, considered, and responsible that such a task be given over to non-party experts, specialists, and individuals with personal authority and social integrity who would do that job and would draw up an elections law, and would thus do a great service to our entire people: achieving intelligent, reasonable, free and correct multi-party elections, with which we would accomplish a great national task — the emergence of Serbia into freedom".

29. Are the goals of competing participants close to this population?

Yes. Draskovic, Djindjic and Vesna Pesic are all seeking fair election conditions, open media and a modernized state. With their promise of freedom, they want power in return, they want a free media well disposed toward them, and an organized state — with a divvying up of the political trophies.

30. For the outcome of the whole story, is it important whether President Milosevic sticks to his promises?

Experiences in 1991, as well as in 1992, along with testimony of some foreign mediators indicate that he sticks to his promises — when forced to do so.