Resisting Barbarity

Attempts at resolving hot spots through dialogue, before the war, and at beginning a process of democratic reforms were obviously not successful; had they been, there would not have been any war. However, if something did not succeed, that does not mean that there were no attempts made. It only appears that way, when those attempts are ignored for whatever reasons. In order for things not to remain like that, it is worth asking what the organizers of the first discussions on the "Kosovo knot" wanted and achieved, and what experiences are relevant for future dialogues and searches for peaceful solutions to a very complex problem.

WHAT WE WANTED AND ACHIEVED: First of all, who are "we"? We refers to the Association for the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI) which was founded by critically minded intellectuals in February of 1989 in all the bigger cities of Yugoslavia, with the objective of influencing the democratic development of the country with analysis and political action. The basic goals were a free press, legalization of party pluralism, free elections, and the resolution of things through the parliament, and not, as was then threatened, through war zones.

It is quite understandable to all, except the instigators and protagonists of violence, that among the priority themes for dialogue, the "Kosovo knot" presented itself as one of the hot spots. This theme was already then "too hot to handle" because of the excess of nationalist sentiments which seized on Serb populism, and which identified the expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo as "ethnic cleansing", and also because of manipulations of the same theme by remaining nationalist oligarchies. Counter to those extremes, we attempted to discuss expulsions on the basis of results of scientific research, and to subject ideological and propaganda campaigns to critical analysis. Members of the Communist and Socialist Federations along with members of the newly founded citizens’ federations and political parties were invited to discussion of a subject thus conceived. No one refused the invitation, but many did not show up; some tried to obstruct discussions with ultimatums for the other side to state its position, even before discussion began (the group Bozur did this at the beginning of discussion in Pristina).

The first discussion was held in Mostar (February 28 and March 1 of 1990) on the topic of "Let’s Try Once More — Democratically", the second one, in Pristina (March 30 and 31, the same year) on the topic of "Human Rights and Democracy in Kosovo and Yugoslavia", and the third one, in Belgrade (June 9, 1997) on the report prepared by an independent committee chosen in the meeting in Pristina (including Srdja Popovic, Tanja Petavor, Dejan Janca). The direct organizer of discussions was UJDI, with the Yugoslav Forum for Human Rights and the Legal Protection of Citizens participating in the organization of the third discussion.

The main results of the discussions and analyses were published in the book The Kosovo Knot: To Cut or To Untie? (Chronos, Titograd 1990), whose authors were Srdja Popovic, Ivan Jankovic, Vesna Pesic, Natasa Kandic and Svetalan Slapsak. According to the assessment of the reviewers, this "analysis can be included among the most accomplished achievements of Yugoslav social sciences in recent years" (Rastko Mocnik), that is to say, "it is a very careful analysis which is with not paralleled in its objectivity". (Zarko Puhovski)

According to the findings of the independent committee, those in power in Serbia consider "Serbian nationalist interests" as a function of their attempts to keep the given models of domination (which have not changed in Kosovo for centuries). Not even the opposition differed from such an understanding of "national interests". "As long as the Serbian opposition does not realize that unqualified support for repressive policies in Kosovo is harmful for authentic Serbian interests", the report concludes, "this situation will not change. That is to say, by supporting this policy, which is destined in the long term to failure, the opposition is working against itself by freezing democratic processes and helping perpetuate a one party monopoly which it wishes to end. The undemocratic policies of the regime, which are a direct result of this, thus become an added argument in Albanian secessionism, which is further used as the justification of repressive policies".

Those who participated in discussions, with rare exceptions, expressed their concern for human rights and the Helsinki Declaration on the Injustice of State Borders. The direct organizers of those discussions — Zeljko Rebac, Novak Jaukovic, Zarko Puhovski and myself — placed their trust in "the growing tendencies for establishing political democracy in Yugoslavia" in the context of which real discussions about Kosovo (as well as about other problems) are expected and are being initiated, along with democratic solutions in the future, freely elected parliament of Yugoslavia. Everyone supported this turn toward democracy.

The discussions were an achievement in themselves. It became apparent that it is possible to escape ideological exclusionism. The conducted analyses and the published book left an indelible mark. The tendencies for the dialogue to continue did not succeed, at least not in "the short term", while it is uncertain what will happen in "the long term".

AT THE EDGE OF THE PRECIPICE: A turn did occur, but toward greater terror and not toward democracy. In the chaos of violence, a state was created, and new states are being created. There are many graves and invalids left behind, refugees and people expelled from their homes, destroyed communities and roads, destroyed land and the bared specter of fear, hatred and aggression, all in the name of a "final solution" to nationalist questions and the "postponement" of democracy. The internationalization of local problems is moving the center of decision making constantly further away from domestic players, with a growing involvement of foreign military might.

Whoever stepped outside this chaos, risked, at the very least, marginalization and public mudslinging. It this way, the participants in the discussions of the "Kosovo knot" were branded nationalist traitors. The media vied in the campaign of "public lynchings" of national "enemies". Repression causes victims to succumb to a specific martyr psychosis and a tendency to see themselves as moral "watchdogs". This certainly does not interrupt the continuity of violence. New attempts at dialogue do not have any hopes of success as long as they ignore the experiences of previous dialogues: under such conditions, every gesture appears as a "pioneering" beginning from "point zero".

A critical assessment of the initial dialogues should certainly take into account the extent to which analyses and initiatives were conducted, as well as the extent to which the "pioneers" themselves (who are trying to resist the temptation of barbarism in the wake of uncontrollable vanity or barbarization that is flooding in with the force of numbers) have resisted. It is worthwhile, for example, to exam the reduction of the subject under discussion. For instance, in those years, Serbian nationalism was at it's most aggressive, but that is not a good reason for avoiding discussion of other nationalisms (without forced symmetries). The unexplainable tendency of Albanians to not discuss the violence conducted in their name against other nations, along with their hiding from their own people the fact that critics of nationalism exist in other nations, also remains; the systematic denial of those facts aids in the nearly complete denial of the existence of even a weak opposition (for instance, the exiled Premier of the Albanian Government of Kosovo, Bukosi, states in an interview for Bundestag in 1993 that the Serb opposition is, at best, barely visible and visibly given to "onanism").

A part of the experience consists of the actions of the initial participants in discussions in their own territories, especially if they accepted a heightened nationalist discipline or resignation ("hibernating" until the end of war). A part of the experience is the double standard in the assessment of nationalism — benign and virulent, aggressive and defensive — and the view that only nationalism in "one’s own society" is worth judging, while nationalism in the "neighbor’s yard" is overlooked, or altogether denied. For the present, the slipping of certain fighters for human rights toward the drawing of maps of states and the participating in territorial conflicts remains beyond critical consideration. There are no analyses of the reasons behind the non-participation of Albanian parties in the attempts of the Serb opposition to strengthen democratic changes in Serbia, and to untie the "Kosovo knot" within those processes in a democratically elected parliament.

Certainly, the biggest contribution to future dialogues will be the results of analyses of the war itself. The idea is tempting that only a new war, in Kosovo itself, could bring to their senses those that want war, and could spur those that want democracy. But even after that, dialogue and understanding will be necessary. The resistence of barbarism is only a part of the resistence of barbarization.