The New Europe and Yugoslavia

The book about the new Europe depicts the result of a persistent, toilsome, occasionally even chaotic, but ultimately successful process of economic and political integration in a significant part of the European continent.

In this sense, it is possible to forecast a trend, a general line of evolution. On the other hand, it would be more difficult to speak about Yugoslavia, for I believe that we have not yet reached the point of total disintegration. Therefore, there are not enough arguments and postulates for promoting an idea of a new Yugoslavia.

Bearing in mind that the economic policies in most parts of the former Yugoslavia are not in accord with trends within the EC, what are you exactly defending and advocating as the Yugoslav ambassador to the EC?

I became the ambassador at a time when the idea of Yugoslavia's associate-membership of the EC was very topical. That was a time of mutual optimism concerning the future relations between the EC and Yugoslavia. Hence, after decades of running away from Europe and searching for political allies in Africa, Asia and Latin America, Yugoslavia finally turned politically to the region with which it had always the strongest economic ties - i.e. with the European continent.

That very year of 1989, Yugoslavia, the first of the socialist countries to take this direction, based on the two decades of cooperation with the EC, was willing to take another step forward. At that moment, the EC was in a dilemma. It seems to me that this dilemma, which had genuine grounds (for Germany was not a hint of what it was later to become), made the EC miss the opportunity to influence the course of events in Yugoslavia with its most appropriate means: economic and financial. When this chance was missed, the EC was forced to deal with the problem through political cooperation.

Meanwhile, Germany had become more powerful, while political cooperation, as a method of coordination, had not developed sufficiently in the EC. That is why Germany's great pressure has easily produced the desired result, and, in a sense, formulated the EC's political position towards Yugoslavia. Some republics have been recognized as independent states, and I, practically, represent only the name of Yugoslavia. Agreements have been canceled one by one, and now both the remainder of Yugoslavia and the newly independent states are in the same position in relation to the EC as any African country.

Does the time when the said opportunity was missed coincide with the Mr. Markovic's stabilization policy in Yugoslavia?

Yes, it was. Despite the fact that nationalism is deaf to economic arguments and that it, as a model of reasoning, represents an antipode to economic thinking, I believe that a well directed financial injection could have influenced at least a somewhat different course of events. I am not claiming that it would have been all wine and roses, or that no major problems would have appeared. In short, the EC did not do what it was expected to do.

How does what you have said about Germany's new role fit in with the fact that Germany is Serbia's biggest foreign trade partner?

I tend to accept the view that Germany has only exploited the self-disintegration of Yugoslavia, i.e. that it has not deliberately orchestrated everything from behind the scenes. Until June of 1991, everything indicated that Germany's interest must eventually fit in with the EC's interests. Then the Federal Army made its move in Slovenia.

The fact that the Army behaved in such a way has dissuaded many EC member-states from a solution different to the one advocated by Germany (recognition of the independence of the Catholic part of Yugoslavia). That was also an ideal test of Germany's political ability.

The contradiction which you have mentioned is a fact. It is somewhat bizarre that Serbia, which has the largest territory amongst the ex-Yugoslav states and the most developed economic ties with Germany, especially Bavaria, got involved in such a fierce animosity. I strongly believe, though, that it can be surmounted.

You said once that the EC is equally pressuring Ljubljana, Zagreb and Belgrade to cooperate with each other in the economic area. How do you see the chances of this pressure succeeding, without thousands and thousands being killed beforehand?

Everything now depends on the outcome of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If B&H is set ablaze, everything will be postponed for an indefinite period.

B&H at this moment virtually represents the key to peace and the future forms of the EC's cooperation with the Yugoslav territories. The EC is not led by a mythical desire to reconstruct Yugoslavia, but by plain economic reasons - from normal communications through Yugoslavia to the fact that it is easier to negotiate with a single partner than with five or six of them.

It is not possible to give an exact answer, at the moment, to whether the EC will succeed, but the chance is there for sure. I would also like to stress that during the Conference on Yugoslavia, which started last September, much was said on the cease-fire agreements which have not been observed. It is only now, at the beginning of April, that an economic document, which everyone has agreed to, has appeared. Even the Slovenes were forced to agree, though they have been hesitating and leaving the negotiating to the others, saying that they are already half way within Europe.

Does that mean that a tariffs union and the transformation of the National Bank of Yugoslavia into a clearing bank for different national currencies are possible?

No, it has not gone so far yet. That is, only the principles of economic cooperation, such as the elimination of economic and other barriers, have been discussed. I believe that is enough for a start.