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September 20, 1997
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 311
Stojan Cerovic’s Diary

Cleaning the Cobwebs

This nightmare of an electoral campaign is slowly coming to an end. I was in fear that the first thing I would see when I woke up in the morning instead of the ceiling, the blue skies and the smiling face of Duke Vojislav Seselj; that in the bathroom, instead of a mirror I would see Zoran Lilic with his fist, and when I open the wardrobe, Vuk Draskovic would launch straight out of it at me.

All of them are working on the assumption that to pack and display the product in an attractive way and eventually recommend it kindly and unobtrusively, heeding the taste, the wishes and the needs of the buyers-voters is not enough. Instead, they are pushing each other, trying to be louder, as if they were at a flea-market, obviously not believing for a moment in a basic civic consciousness and common sense of the people whom they are addressing. All of them are selling exclusively universal cures and miraculous potions, whilst proving that their competitors are offering pure poison, that is, that Serbia, as usual, is making a choice between a salvation and a ruin. Since that is how things are, the result, as usual, will be a tie. In other words, nothing that can realistically be expected to take place in the elections looks as if it is going to bring about a big and unexpected change in any direction. The Socialists are going to continue to dominate the parliament, whereas the presidential elections will not create the situation of a two-man rule. Concerning the opposition parties, there will probably occur some reshuffling, rises and falls. Some might turn out to be disappointed with their participation, others with the boycott of the elections. But no one will allow this to be noticed. Since the electoral results will be known soon, we postpone the story about them to the period after the elections. Instead, just because I am neither anxious nor hopeful concerning the elections, I can calmly let myself take a pleasure in casting a look backward and forward, for which there are good reasons to be done at the moment.

It will soon be ten years since the endeavour of returning the Serbian people its dignity had commenced. Those rounded figures always tend to seduce one, making him believe that life unfolds in accordance with mathematical rules. In this case, it means that the idea crosses our minds that the process has been completed. As we know, it had two stages. Firstly, the dignity of the Serbs was returned. Then, they had to return the surplus. The question is whether the balance has been struck, or still more has yet to be returned.

This is also the moment when the Serbian problem with borders, territories and space can be viewed in the same manner. We will recall that the issue of dignity was linked with the issue of space at the very beginning, so that there was the give-and-take again. One ought to look back now and see where all that has led, whether the fragmentation has come to an end, how things stand with Republika Srpska, Montenegro, Kosovo, Vojvodina...It is most important and most interesting, I would say, to establish whether Belgrade can still draw on that mysterious energy to rebuff and where it springs from.

Many more similar and equally difficult questions could be posed. But, it seems to me, that all those questions can be derived from one all-encompassing problem resting on the time and the space dimensions. Everybody can stray sometimes and mix up these dimensions: groups and communities are perhaps more prone to this than individuals. Thus, the Serbs and Serbia have their weak spots, characteristic topics and words that move them, make them jump on their feet, and, naturally, lose their minds and lead them to commit evil. But, never did they have at the helm for such a long time someone who is that capable and extraordinarily gifted to recognise and feel those weaknesses, triggering and augmenting them to extremes.

This is a key for the story of Serbian straying over the last ten years, that turned out to be graver and fuller than it ever was, precisely because it looked as if it had been a faultless aiming at the great goal. At the beginning, something resembling a national program did exist, which gave a feeling to the people that all the costs and losses had been carefully planned and calculated. There was a national elite whom the people trusted and who testified that it would conduct itself justly and honourably, that they will not seize what belongs to someone else or spill innocent blood. Finally, the leader was proven to be violent and merciless. Those who accepted and supported him wanted him to be exactly the way he was, which means that they well knew what sort of jobs were ahead.

This is what the beginning was like, andnow, skipping the middle, we are looking at what has been left and note that only the leader is around. Everything else was shattered, spent, discoloured, forgotten and disappeared, as if he was more real and more capable to survive. It turns out that no serious plan and programme existed, that all initial assumptions and assessments were completely wrong. Arbitrary and groundless interpretations concerning the wishes and goals of the Serbs, their strength and others' weakness about the outside world, the West and Russia were accepted with foolish ease. It turns out that there was no national elite. And that which looked like one was a collection of infantile people who had ill-will, fear and lust for power in common. They were supporting and irritating each other; they were assuring each other that they, i.e. Serbs, were fed up, that they lost patience, that there is no reason to wait any longer...Whoever was about to say something cautious concerning possible undesirable consequences were excluded from the company not to spoil the mood. But gradually all of them lost the will to speak and eventually they silently dispersed.

The leader remained alone, as if everything apart from him was unnecessary: the all-encompassing Serbian programme, the war aims, the expansion of Serbia, and the elite Serbs. But, if all that proved to be unnecessary, why is then Milosevic still around? The question can be reworded: how can he be rendered unnecessary? Or: what ought to be changed in Serbia so that he goes away? Or: what will this country look like after him?

I don't wish to sketch out a new national programme, but I believe that the answers to these questions can help one find his way in time and space. Milosevic is surviving on the scene largely thanks to the uncommonly rich concoction of popular delusions, prejudices, disagreements, lies, vain hopes, illusions and fears, both old and new, that were nurtured with special care over the last ten years. I do not know when and in which circumstances will Milosevic let go of the power to which he is so firmly holding on, but it is certain that his heritage will be a burden for Serbia for a long time to come. That is the reason why it is best that the preparations and the analysis of that heritage begin at once, which, could, by the way, speed up his departure.

First, one ought to face and come to terms with the fact that almost all changes dating from the Milosevic period are final. There has been a vast amount of destruction and ruin in vain; there was a lot of damage, injustice and undeserved losses. But, if Vuk Draskovic is wasting time dreaming about the restoration of the monarchy, it is equally useless to hope that the results of the 8th session or the last congress of the Communist League of Yugoslavia can be changed.

Everybody has the right to regret the fact that former Yugoslavia did not survive, but hopefully it is clear that that is once and forever. Nor can the outcome of the war be changed, nor can defeats turn into victories. In the foreseeable future, the Serbs will not be in a position to rely on the force of arms hoping to win a war victory. The way things stand now the Serbs will have to resort exclusively to civil means and methods to achieve anything that they might happen to wish for. Knin will never be Serbian again, nor will Macedonia ever become Southern Serbia. No one should cherish hopes or illusions in this regard. Much more energy could be saved and redirected towards feasible and real goals.

Besides, it would be useful to learn the lesson: keep your money away from those who are talking about dignity, honour and glory. Thieves and crooks are easily dealt with. They can never rob so many people as sweet-talking politicians. This is exactly a key experience with Milosevic. The extent of his success as a demagogue is comparable only with his failure as a statesman. He and those around him got rich on his success, while the people lost out due to his failure.

No one should think that Milosevic is one and only. If someone fares so well as he did, there is bound to be a herd of imitators, which means that local politicians will perform his manner of big words and brutal deceptions for a long time. Only the lack of confidence by the citizens can break this habit. If they keep money in sight and ask about the price of every big promise, a large number of present political entrepreneurs will look for another, more lucrative profession.

The biggest and costliest deceptions are those that man, even the people, have concerning themselves. It is particularly demanding to preserve a real image of oneself in a situation of a great victory or defeat. In the course of Milosevic's work on the national question, the majority of Serbs experienced the feelings of victory and defeat in a short span of time. It appears to me that this is the reason why many people are now prone to abrupt changes of mood. Besides, there are still many fans of the myth of "the heavenly kingdom", who would like to see a proof of glory and greatness in the defeat.

Concerning this, I believe that some humility would be rather refreshing. I cannot see the reason for people to take pride in victories or defeats, or anything else they might be doing, so that I recommend the reading of the Bible, that says that everything is vanity. But, I harbour no illusions that the Serbs will be able to regain self-respect easily and find good measure in assessing themselves.

They have been told quite recently that they are much bigger and better than they turned out to be in the end. Moreover, nothing is finished yet, and it is still not too late for the space to which they are entitled to be fragmented and reduced. Who knows what will eventually happen with Republika Srpska, Kosovo and Montenegro? One could escape from this horrifying perspective only into national minimalism, the determination of absolutely indisputable size of Serbia, however spacious it might be. It is the change of the starting point not that concerning the borders. It simply seems to me that an average Serb is somewhat saturated with constant, monotonous putting together of what was Greater Serbia, so that he might like to see a reverse process: for example, the discussions about the status of Vojvodina, the negotiations with Montenegro...

In any case, only when the question of borders is completely closed and energies are directed to smaller issues, Serbia will be able to begin to resemble the rest of the European continent at the end of the century. But, all troubles concerning Milosevic's heritage do not end here. This is where the issue of relations with the outside world, where he conducted the policy of conflict with real powers and the policy of friendship with imaginary powers, falls into. Naturally, this concerns the West, America and Russia. One ought to admit that Milosevic did not invent the theory concerning the "Decline of the West". But, this theory has always been popular, especially with the local public that is prone to orthodox mysticism. That story is by and large banal and boring, and it can be discussed with no end in sight, since one can prove with equal certainty that some decline has already taken place, just as that it will never happen. A childish fascination and belief in the irrelevance of the West has been on the rise here accompanied by the feeling of its unattainability.

But, whatever one might think about the West, the West was not perceived as a real power until recently. Whoever wished to do so, could gather speed and threaten America to their heart's content, without fear that someone would persuade them to do otherwise or prevent them from doing it. Russia represented might, and it was not a joke. But, the Americans have come closer, and the Russians have left for good. America of today certainly does not resemble the former USSR, but it is certainly better if such a big power stays away from your backyard, but, if it is already here, it is safer not to tease it without a major reason.

It is equally senseless and ridiculous for some here to decide to be shrewd and ingratiate himself with the West with humility and flattery believing that this is the only way that the orthodox soul can be saved from that devil. But, our souls hold value only for us, and the people in the West are apt to feel pity for us for being so preoccupied with souls so that they often think that we are actually souless. I fear that everybody here will soon convince the West not to demand or expect anything else of Serbia but to make trouble in the neighbourhood. An odd merchant might wander to these areas from the West, but not to buy souls, but I doubt that he will accept the currency.

As far as Russia is concerned, one would be certain to find people there who would be sympathetic towards the stories told by the Serbs, but it would be useful for Serbs to note how Russia completed its imperial mission, abandoning its centuries-old aspirations and is currently searching for an optimal proportion between stability and the size of the state. It is difficult whether Serbia benefited from Russia's presence in the Balkans or not. In any case, that is finished as well. Only a fool can now build a foreign policy strategy on waiting for Russia to become stronger and come back. But this is exactly what Seselj is saying, as if he was reading the secret thoughts of Slobodan Milosevic.

These are but few characteristic examples, but not a complete list, of strange ideas on which an even stranger regime in Serbia relies. The majority of those ideas are older than the regime, and will certainly outlive this regime. But, if nothing is changed in that respect, if the old cobwebs are not removed, there will be no use of the change of the regime. In that case, it might well happen that Serbia might remember with nostalgia the happy and glorious times of Slobodan Milosevic.

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