Waiting For Spring

The end of the year in Pristina elapses with triple expectations. The first relates to the protest of Albanian students, announced for December 30, just prior to the New Year's festivities. The second announced event is of more far-reaching importance: it concerns general elections for the organs of the Albanian "Republic of Kosovo", which Ibrahim Rugova, as president of this unrecognized state, has announced for March 13, 98. Although these two events are not directly connected, both threaten to complicate further in a particular way the already serious and intricate situation in this district. Along with these (the politicians and the students) there is a third element emerging on the Albanian political scene - "The Liberation Army of Kosovo" or UCK. Although it hasn't announced anything yet, it can hardly be expected to just sit doing nothing.

The least reason for fear is brought by the student protest organized by the Independent Union of the Albanian Students, whose goal is to force the return of school and university buildings to Albanians, from where they were expelled in 1991. The students have had enough of lectures in sheds and shacks, they wish to remind both the Serbian and the Albanian leaders that their position has not changed a bit since October 1995 when Rugova and the current president of FRY, Slobodan Milosevic, signed the "historic" agreement on the return of Albanians to the educational system. During last autumn, the students successfully organized mass protests in the streets on two occasions. The first demonstrations were dispelled by police (on October 1), while the second, in November, were carried out with no violence. In the meantime, it turned out that student leaders have started demonstrating the same symptoms already seen among their Belgrade colleagues: their entire energy was exhausted by organized "strolls", and when they were over, disputes and arguments started about how and what to do next, who is inclined to this or that party and who has traveled abroad at someone else's expense. Therefore, it is quite possible that the demonstrations of December 30 will pass with no violence, sinking in the overall festive mood. The unknown factor is the behavior of the Serbian police, who would be wisest to behave as last time, letting the students say what they have to say and then split up harmoniously.

The March elections, the first after five years, are much less predictable. Rugova, who decided to schedule the elections only after long and intensive pressure from "the base", has the most reasons for anxiety. Namely because, the predominant impression over the past few years has been that the Kosovo Albanian leader has been exploiting the fact that the parallel "Parliament" (in which his party has an enormous majority) could not meet, with the conclusion that the "government" in exile must therefore usurp the parliament's function and consequently that he had to make all decisions alone or in a narrow circle of his closest associates. Charges of this sort have come first from circles of Rugova's formal competitor, the leader of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo, Adem Demaci, and have been heard lately from within Rugova's party, the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (LDK), especially from Bujar Bukosi, the Prime Minister of the "government in exile". Bukosi, who is living in Germany, and who is said to be inclined toward the extremists of UCK, first started retaining part of the income gathered through the "voluntary patriotic tax" from the Albanians working in Germany, to finally force Rugova at the end of this year to schedule in-party elections, which are still under way. As the results so far show, it seems that more and more affiliations of LDK, especially of those from abroad, are shifting into the hands of Bukosi's people.

In this particular election, Rugova's opponent will be Demaci, for whom, however, it is not believed there will be much greater chances than there were for Vuk Draskovic in Serbia. Mahmut Bakali is also a possible candidate, who, as a member of the former communist nomenclature, currently has no official function, but has an indisputable reputation among both the people and among Western diplomats. There is no doubt that, to the West, especially to the Americans, Bakali would be a more suitable leader of the Albanians than the predictable but stubborn Rugova or the dynamic but unreliable Demaci. However, it is believed that LDK, the strongest Albanian party due to it's developed party machinery, will retain it's dominant role. According to this scenario, Rugova will succeed to nominally keep his position, but he will in fact have to hand over the executive power to Bukosi (and what is more important, the keys to the treasury), and to a certain extent, to Demaci.

There's still UCK which succeeded this autumn in gaining almost complete control in the area of Drenica. Although the Serbian government persistently strives to negate this fact, the latest news from the area of Drenica (municipality of Srbica), in an almost comical way, gives evidence which testifies as to who really controls the territory. So after an acknowledgment by the local Serbian authorities that election stations could not be opened in Drenica and that the officials from the Public Revenue Administration do not dare visit that area, the Association of Hunters (Serbian) of the municipality Vucitrn has asked for police protection for it's members who are afraid to go to the Drenica hunting grounds. We leave it to the imagination of our readers to envision what the results of granting such a request would look like: there goes the young hunter, with police transportation vehicles and helicopter around him...

It would be even sillier were it not that the UCK, (which, thanks to Rugova's inertness and Serbian repression is gaining more and more sympathizers among Albanians), hadn't been so ambitious lately to become the dominant factor of the Albanian movement. The anonymous representatives of this organization have already announced that they will not recognize any agreement with the Serbian regime unless they participate in negotiations, which additionally undermines Rugova's position. After the Draconian sentence in the trial of the group of alleged terrorists in Pristina this month, there is all the more fear in Kosovo that UCK will respond with some spectacular action in the near future.

Nevertheless, the greatest concern is the complete unreadiness of the Serbian regime to start resolving the Kosovo problem through negotiations. Even several months ago, any agreement between Milosevic and Rugova would have been considered a legitimate agreement of the leaders of two nations; now the situation has drastically changed. From the Serbian camp, it was recently announced unofficially that, now that the Serbian elections are over and Seselj is no longer breathing down Milosevic's neck, finally talks about some concessions to the Albanians can start. The problem is that the concessions today must be much greater than yesterday, and tomorrow much greater than today. It is impossible to imagine that Rugova, shaken both from the outside and the inside and with the coming elections on which his destiny depends, would today accept to give up his dream of an independent Kosovo for the alternative of some misty cultural autonomy which Milosevic is ready to offer. Such an offer would not have been accepted enthusiastically before either, but then it could have marked the beginning of a dialogue. Today, however, it is too late for partial solutions and a policy of small steps.