Why is the Democratic Party on the wane?

The disintegration which has taken hold of what used to be called “the democratic opposition” is spreading from SPO to the DS.  While SPO is plainly disintegrating, amid the endless power of the conjugal Draskovic couple, and the syndrome of constant losing and cooperation with the communists, the disintegration of DS is unfolding much more quietly and with far less spectacle, even though it is no less profound.

In attempts to stop this disintegration trend, twenty respected members of DS recently wrote a letter to Djindjic asking for normalization of the situation in the party, for a return to the democratic way of operating and to some fundamental values.  Djindjic’s answer was to replace the most outstanding signatory (S. Gavrilovic in the position of Executive Council President), probably so that others would get discouraged, and to formally accept the demands while in actual fact ignoring them, as well as to cover up the rift so that it would not become public.

Some reasons for the disintegration of DS are very similar to those for SPO.  (1) After ousting and marginalizing everything which was of any value in DS, Tjindjic surrounded himself with mediocrities and sycophants, and concentrated all party power in his own hands.  (2) Party operations have been reduced to a one man show, attended by the constant breaking of DS Statutes.  (3) The breaking of Statutes is unclear or unacceptably bad party policy as it appears in public, which is making DS the object of derision.
(1) I am the Party.  During and after the Coalition Zajedno protests last winter, everyone had the opportunity to witness the fight for power between Draskovic and Djindjic, which was actually a fight for majority power in that Coalition.  But few people noticed that within DS a fight for power was also unfolding, in which the objective was not only for Djindjic to oust his insider party competitors, but also all those who do not agree with his dictatorial manners and capricious, failed policies.

There were several methods available for carrying"this out, one of which was the marginalization of TS field councils.  Practically, these do not operate for longer than a year.  Some of the DS councils had a composition which was better than the composition of similar councils of all other parties put together.  It became the order of the day for a council to discuss an issue, to table a proposal for a law or some decision, and for that to be shelved or denounced the next day by completely contrary statements by Djindjic, or one of his sycophants.  Along with the councils, all those who composed them were also marginalized.  In any case, of what use are councils to him when in a B92 interview Djindjic stated that “he holds ideas which are superior to everyone else’s”.

For individuals who held important party functions outside party councils, Djindjic had a different approach.  For instance, Djindjic explicitly demanded from one of the then DS Vice-Presidents to state in a press conference that he (Djindjic) was not holding secret talks with Milosevic at the time of the Coalition Zajedno protests.  After a couple of days, Djindjic contradicted him, announcing that he did meet with Milosevic.  Similarly, another respected party member who attended international negotiations, was denounced by Djindjic the next day with statements that were completely contrary to previously agreed ones inside the party, and to those made with international negotiators.  It is superfluous to point out that in this way, leading DS people lost public credibility and credibility as negotiators, and that they became passive within the party once Djindjic repeated similar behavior.

The places of those respected DS members were taken up around Djindjic by sycophants, mediocrities and yes-men who had no questions to ask.  And if they dared, they would certainly have occasion to ask.  For instance, where do such policies lead, what is happening with party funds, or why the constant contacts between Djindjic and key regime figures: “I fail to see why I should not meet with Jovica Stanisic, Milorad Vucelic or Marko Marjanovic...”, stated Djindjic in the Dnevni telegraf daily (December 31, 1997; p. 3).  What did DS stand to gain from these Djindjic contacts?  Of course, maybe Djindjic profited by them, but DS only saw significant political and other type of damage from them.  Were that not the case, then we would have heard something about profit by now, while those talks could have been attended by someone else, beside Djindjic, from DS who enjoyed untarnished reputation and credibility.

Perhaps these Djindjic contacts explain his moves which are irrational and harmful to DS, as well as why in the last DS meeting, the declaration that this party cannot cooperate with SPS and the communists was barely passed.  Participants in that meeting did not have enough imagination to suggest a declaration against cooperation with the Radicals.  Perhaps they were incapable of imagining such irresponsible behavior toward voters, who were not told that DS would cooperate with Radicals when they voted for this Party in the 1996 local elections.

(2) Breaking the Statute.  After he dispersed or marginalized nearly everyone who was worth anything in DS, there is no one left to criticize Djindjic for breaking the Statute.  It need not even be mentioned that the Statute is for a party what a constitution is for a country.  From many examples in which Djindjic simply stamped on the Statute, I will only cite several.

First, the DS newspaper Demokratija, which after a stoppage again went into print in 1996, became the property of the DMR company, without a single DS agency playing part in that decision.  Who sold the newspaper, and for how much?

Second, no DS agency made a decision that DS and its officials would lobby for Djukanovic and Biljana Plavsic.  Of course, here the question is not one of political profit or not, but of whether fundamental political decisions ought to be passed through responsible party forums.  On top of breaking the Statute, it was grotesque to watch how Djindjic — although without any state office — offered himself as Serbian support to Djukanovic, who at that time was the Premier of Montenegro, and to Plavsic, who was President of RS.

Third, the DS Presidency, on Djindjic’s initiative, had made the decision on the distribution of federal mandates in 1997, which is outside its jurisdiction.  Decisions on distributing mandates are made by the Head Council at the advice of the Executive Council.

Fourth, the DS Presidency, once again at Djindjic’s initiative, and outside the Statute, had suspended the decision by the Executive Council on founding Regional DS Councils.  The occasion for this was that the majority of regional council presidents’ positions were filled by people who were not to Djindjic’s liking.

Fifth, at Djindjic’s initiative, the DS Presidency dissolved the Community Council in Jagodina, even though it had no right to do that.  Only the Head Council has a right to do that.
Sixth, the DS Kosovo platform was released to the public, again at Djindjic’s initiative, even though it was only considered by the DS Policy Council, which concluded that more work remained to be done.  Instead of more work and proper party procedures, the Declaration was released to the public, where it was advertised mainly as a Djindjic product.
Even though, because of these and other breaches of DS Statutes, Djindjic is held accountable by a number of party officials, he does not appear to care much for that because he has the support of other officials, such as Zoran Zivkovic, DS Vice-President and Mayor of Nis, who states in DS forums that “he hates the Statute”; such as M. Perisica, who states that the Statute “should not been seen as an anchor”, and people like a third official, the future president of the Executive Council, who states that the Statute should be interpreted “creatively”.  What is the difference between that and the “creative” interpretations of the law made by Josip Broz’s or Slobodan Milosevic’s people?  And who is going to convince voters that protest from within DS against such regime practice carries any weight, when DS officials are doing the same thing?
(3) Party policy.  By removing the unruly and stamping on the Statute, Djindjic demonstrated that he is not subject to rules, and that he politycally let his arms loose.  If it wants to be part of the democratic opposition, DS would need to be a party whose policies cluster around some type of market democracy, as its party platform documents put it.  Instead of that, by privatizing DS, Djindjic had created a party about which, even with a high reward at stake, it is hard to say what its policies and strategic objectives are.  Simply put, Djindjic thinks one thing, says another, and does something completely different.  Here are several illustrations.

On many occasions Djindjic stated that he is for “the rule of law”, but that he is against the delivery to the Hague of Karadzic and the others indicted.  For a while he spitted the Pale ox, but recently signed a declaration of Serbian intellectuals against delivering Karadzic.  These two things are incompatible with “the rule of law”.  If someone is for “the rule of law”, then he must also be for delivering the suspected, because international law is part of jurisprudence.

Furthermore, Djindjic states that he is for privatization and private property, but recently he personally supported the bringing of the law with which privatization carried out thus far was abolished.  At the time of the Coalition Zajedno protest, from the microphone he frequently threatened foreign buyers of Serbian Telekom that he would carry out the nationalization of that company when DS came to power.  Of course, nationalization and de-privatization are incompatible with private property.  Djinjdic states that he supports liberalization and a free market, but in a recent interview for TV Palma he stated that a free market is not specific to our people.  He says that he supports democracy, while in his party he behaves like a dictator not bound by the Statute, by procedures or by rules.  He states that he supports Serbia’s orientation toward the West, while his party forums are full of hard-core nationalists.

His actions speak even louder than his words.  Executing local authority in Belgrade, Djindjic and the DS could not be differentiated from the “old regime” on any one point.  They did not begin with rationalization and development of city authority, they did not allow entrance of private operators into city transportation and other municipal services, they did not privatize Studio B, they did not try to establish order in the sphere of urban residential services, they did not discontinue the practice of political rackets, etc.  Djinjdic is only remembered by constant squabbling with Draskovic, especially on the issue of who would put the “eagle” on the Municipal Government building.

Let us come to the point.  Djindjic always claims that in principle he supports that which a party like DS should support, but, with specific statements and actions, he very successfully contradicts that.  The result of this is a lack of credibility and seriousness — both his and that of the party he represents.  Even at the time of the Coalition Zajedno protest, Western journalists, intellectuals and politicians privately said that “Djindjic is not a democrat”.  That at the time, out of opportunism, they exclusively spoke in private has now become general opinion in media, and scientific and political circles in the West.  In the entire civilized world, it is notoriously stated that Djindjic (as well as Draskovic) are not democrats at all.  Of course, a party which is dominated by such a man can hardly be expected to be serious, responsible and democratic.

The conclusion is self-evident.  Zoran Djindjic is a spent politician.  All that remains is to remove his remains from DS.  If that should prove unsuccessful, then DS will also become a corpse.  That removal will not come easily, because Djindjic is not only left with no place to go, but he also has significant economic interest in remaining.  He controls the party financing without anyone else’s influence.  Besides that, his nationalist-socialist masters perhaps think that he has yet a few more regime tasks to perform.
This degeneration and disintegration of DS can perhaps be put into a larger context.  The dispersion in parties of the so-called democratic opposition is unfolding in a situation in which the political and economic crisis in Serbia is once again taking the direction downward.  If the democratic opposition does not establish itself so as to be able to get at least a third of the votes in Serbia — a democratic option of emerging out of the crisis will not even exist.  I believe that there is no need to mention the consequences of such a situation.

(The author is an expert associate at the Institute for European Studies in Belgrade, and member of the DS Economic Council in waiting)