Fast Homogenization

Announcing that the police have responded drastically to attacks by Albanian terrorists who have been shooting for many long months in Drenica and all over Kosovo, the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, has sent the massage that the problems of Kosovo and Metohija may be solved only in Serbia, and that terrorism directed toward internationalizing the problem will bring evil to those who reach for such means.

Zoran Lilic, vice president of the federal government by special authorization, stated on Monday in the Federal Assembly that in "the escalating situation of the disputes in Kosovo" all means which a legal state can and must undertake are certainly allowed, but that the army will not get involved, because its function is to safeguard the borders of FRY. A similar statement also came from the minister of defense, Pavle Bulatovic, probably as a response to American warnings that the Army should not be engaged in Kosovo.

The fact that the current offensive of the state’s highest level is not colored by war trumpets, and that it is still combined with some positive offers, may be considered fortunate circumstances. A statement from the meeting which Milutinovic held with the minister of education Todorovic, issued on Tuesday evening, says that negotiations with the "3+3" group on the return of Albanian students to schools is advancing, and hope is expressed that the negotiations will be successfully concluded despite terrorist actions in Kosovo.
Before giving any concessions, the president of FRY, Slobodan Milosevic, is trying to demonstrate that he controls the situation on the entire territory and that he is strong enough to discontinue the "intifad" (??) of Kosovo, an attitude which is supported by the parliamentary parties. Gorica Gajevic, secretary general of Slobodan Milosevic’s party, has stated that "Serbia will undertake all necessary measures at the disposal of a state in order to pull up terrorism from the roots, because the entire world does the same."
"The entire world", on the other hand, asks Slobodan Milosevic "to solve the Kosovo problem", but this leads anyone who has ever walked through Kosovo (and this reporter has been a correspondent from Kosovo for ten years) to think that those mediators, as well as some NGO’s here, who are obviously flirting with "small nationalism" while at the same time "very worried", in fact have no idea what they are talking about. What is the meaning of the phrase "the solution to the Kosovo problem"? The Serbian political public is not preparing at all for that which some Albanian politicians from Kosovo are hoping for, as it seems based on voices they hear from European offices (Kosovo - the third Yugoslav republic, or autonomy based on the 1974 Constitution). According to the 1974 Constitution, whose suspension is blamed on Slobodan Milosevic, though in fact it’s suspension had been slowly prepared for even before 1981, Kosovo in fact had the status of a state and the right of veto in the federation of that time, and Kosovo's politicians then could also control some institutions like secret police, security forces, territorial defense... and participate in the army command. It is highly improbable that anyone in Serbia will consent to this under any circumstances, since not only during the rule of Slobodan Milosevic, but also during the entire decade before him, the belief that this power was discretely used for separating Kosovo from Yugoslavia and for physically pushing Serbs from this region has been firmly established among the Serbian political public (in 1981 the information was published that 624 towns previously inhabited by both Serbs and Albanians had been ethnically purged of Serbs). "A third republic" would mean giving greater authority, and also that Serbs are willingly giving Albanians control over the means for a future war for secession, that they are offering them all that as a gift. This would also mean redefining the constitutional framework of the community, convoking the constituent assembly and the agreed splitting of the country, and there is no readiness for this. The Serbian political elite and the general public do not seem to be ready for big concessions, regardless of their current susceptibility to the idea that something must be done about the Albanians - there is a belief that Kosovo may be lost, but there is not a belief that it should be given.

The homogenization of Kosovo in Serbia will probably facilitate the forming of the new Serbian government, as last Monday in the Assembly of Yugoslavia, in the Council of Republics, it could clearly be seen that Kosovo was quickly homogenizing the political forces in Serbia. 25 representatives voted for the budget, only 5 were against and four abstained; had this failed, it could have meant new elections. Along with the representatives of SPS, JUL and SPO, all representatives of SRS voted in favor of the budget, though during a previous discussion which lasted several hours, they were strongly opposed to it. For example, Jorgovanka Tabakovic, representative of SRS from Kosovo, said that although the problem of Kosovo is big, it cannot be a reason for accepting a bad budget proposal; she also added that the Assembly of Serbia should deal with the Kosovo problem, but Tomislav Nikolic (SRS) later said that "since Serbia is in an unfavorable position due to the problems in Kosovo and Metohija, and it is necessary to solve these problems as soon as possible, and since new elections would lead us several months further from this solution, here we have got a new budget." Ph.D. Vojislav Seselj, who often reacts most quickly and openly in situations like this, said that the situation in Kosovo is Serbia's problem, not Yugoslavia's; that it remains yet to be seen if it is about the beginning of a war or not; that terrorism has to be exterminated, and that the action which began with attacks by Albanian terrorists and which has for the first time in a long period been met with an appropriate reaction by the police must not easily be abandoned without completing the job; that terrorist activities have obviously been synchronized with political actions, and proof of this is the demonstrations in Pristina. Although the language is somewhat more restrained, the development of events is described as the advancing drama. Vuk Draskovic, leader of the SPO, expresses his fear of a tragedy, and asks that terrorism be suppressed, followed by a package of reforms coming from Belgrade, which should also include a fair offer to the Albanians from Kosovo; in the case that they refuse this, they will carry the blame. Milan Bozic, federal representative of SPO in the Council of Republics, has expressed SPO's serious concern about the events in Kosovo, asking at the same time "are we facing an organized civil war helped by the utmost radical forces from the area". He warns that in case of war, all of Serbia will rise and react, which "will in no way be to the benefit of not only us here in Serbia, but also of the Albanians from Kosovo"...

The Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of Serbia, and the Democratic Center support flexibility, but first of all they ask that Albanian politicians distinguish themselves from the armed forces. Professor Micunovic notes that it is highly perfidious that someone causes incidents, and then asks for international intervention.

European offices became alarmed at the news of bloodshed, but before that they were sending signals that Kosovo was on schedule, which may have also urged Albanians to try to use arms (which is considered to be in their mentality) after a period of Ghandi-like resistance. The Serbs know them as a people of arms, and this is where the story becomes cruelly simplified - they live in a country which they hate, and the country treats them as disloyal citizens.

The restrained and almost euphemistic appeals by European and American politicians involved in the Balkan crisis, that Albanian politicians condemn violent methods, do not have any effect. This makes the latest diplomatic activities in Belgrade an almost certain failure. On the other hand, this failure is met by dissatisfaction on the part of the strong ones, and the bill will most probably be collectively paid once again, here in Belgrade.