Victims of Possible Compromise

In the long line of failures, misunderstandings and ineptitudes of western diplomacy in the Balkans, last week another characteristic case was added to that list.  American Special Envoy Robert Gellbard visited Pristina and Belgrade, and what he told Milosevic, Rugova and others sounded pretty clear and logical, while what followed was the biggest bloodletting to date.  He condemned terrorism and asked the political chiefs of Kosovo Albanians to do the same, which was only partially successful.  He also condemned police aggression directed at the Albanian population, and called on Serbs not to boycott elections announced by Albanians.  He also expressed his opposition to any kind of secession, promising Milosevic a small reward for putting up patiently with Milorad Dodik.

Where did he go wrong?  Nowhere in particular, except in his assessment of the situation — namely in believing that his job was done.  A real problem results from the fact that there is no convincing and objectively evident force behind his diplomacy.  Let us remember that his predecessor, Holbrook, was building the foundations of what later became the Dayton Agreement during pauses between NATO Air Force bombings of Bosnian Serb positions.  Not even Milosevic was deaf enough not to be able to hear the force of such arguments.  Gellbard probably believed that the time had come to test how Milosevic reacts to flattery, and the test results came in negative.  The patient did not respond.
Of course, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that Gellbard had made an unconscious error.  Perhaps he suffers from involuntary spasms, and while speaking to Milosevic about being against aggression, his eyelid might have involuntarily blinked, with the result that the latter interpreted this as conspiratorial winking.  Here everyone is on the lookout for such secret messages.  The uncovering of hidden meanings and the discovery of evidence that everyone, especially some foreign diplomat, always thinks the opposite of what he or she says, is a favorite pastime here.  It is considered that when someone important shows up here, they have something new and different to say, instead of repeating something that we already know.  Besides that, “prodding and winking” has been the fundamental technique of statesmanship here, ever since the time of Prince Milos Obrenovic.  Falling back on this tradition has brought considerable success in keeping power for Milosevic, as well as misunderstanding and trouble with representatives of other schools of communication.

As far as the Albanians are concerned, one part of Gelbard’s message could have inspired their national desperadoes to continue as they have done thus far.  Not the part about unacceptability of force, but rather the part about the ever-present small reward, that is to say reduction in Milosevic’s punishment.  It turned out that connections were made between things that strictly had to be kept apart.  Milosevic was rewarded for his posture toward Bosnia, and not toward Kosovo, and these are two completely different situations on which Milosevic himself holds completely different views.  That is to say, he has not adopted a general, internationally accepted principle of behavior, but only admits to having lost a war in Bosnia, and to not yet having begun one in Kosovo.  However, the Albanian extremists could also have understood that America, on which they had placed so much hope, is turning toward Milosevic, and that there is no time left for waiting any longer.

Still, I am inclined to believe in the theory that Milosevic is actually making preparations for fundamental concessions and significant moves in Kosovo, for which he absolutely needed these casualties.  He has already applied this morbid scheme in the past.  Perhaps he has been caught unaware by the unusually ecstatic, virtually unanimous support of the Opposition .  Everyone was impressed by the decisiveness of his dealing with terrorists, which means that eventual initiation of a political initiative could meet with a certain amount of resistance and interference.

In general, the relationship between Serbia’s Opposition  parties and the leaders of Kosovo Albanians is fairly interesting and insufficiently analyzed.  The regime occasionally treats both with equal impatience, but this never gave cause to either for yielding to the temptation of coming closer and finding common interests.  On the contrary, the Serbian Opposition (not only its radical wing) has been stricter and sharper, as a rule, toward any demands made by Albanians, whom they unfailingly denigrate with the name Shiptars.  Milosevic could calmly abuse, make arrests and persecute both the one and the other, never fearing that they will stop accusing and resisting each other.

The Opposition has always criticized Albanians for helping Milosevic survive their boycott of elections, while Opposition chiefs did not even dare to call them to participate in those elections, fearing that they themselves would be open to accusations of national betrayal.  While the Albanians kept repeating that there is little difference for them between the regime and the Opposition in Serbia, thinking all the while that securing international support is actually easier as long as the blacklisted Milosevic remains.
At one point, during the winter protests, a significant gesture was made by both sides when Adem Demaci addressed demonstrators with very encouraging words, while Vuk Draskovic asked for a moment of silence in honor of the imprisoned Albanian battered to death by police.  But that was it.  That was the biggest leap for both sides, with nothing solid to hold onto once it was made, with nothing to fall back on in that direction, and everyone reverted to the same old animosity.  Now it is a conflict between two peoples, a terrorist people, and a people of brutal policemen.

Very soon, in the several days or weeks to follow, it will become clear whether it is maybe too late for any type of positive action in Kosovo.  The question is who has the next move.  Even if Milosevic were to concede to outside pressures, which will certainly increase enormously, and, let us say, were to allow Albanian children into schools, it is still questionable whether it would be possible to stop the wave of OVK reprisal actions.  What if those attacks stop being selective?  What if the target stops being predominantly the police, and extends to civilians in general?

Albanians do not have to risk all out war.  It is enough for OVK terror to increase, and the remaining Serbs will slowly begin to relocate.  The police are incapable of halting this process.  Over time, arms superiority will become less and less important when compared with the psychological conditions of a conflict that is a semi-war, and the Albanians have a distinct advantage in this.  That is to say, police mostly need to be brought in from elsewhere, while Albanians are at home in Kosovo, regardless of the fact that Serbs might think that that this home is actually theirs.

Some of the political factors in Serbia, which had not completely lost all sense of responsibility, would need to start from basic facts which are generally known: that no attempts at changing the ethnic makeup of Kosovo has succeeded in favor of Serbs, and that that makeup is slowly shifting against Serbs.  The idea of renewed ethnic cleansing ought to be cast away immediately for absolutely every possible reason.  Therefore, what remains is to think of making significant concessions to Albanians with the objective of creating a completely civilian state in the hope that they will one day become loyal citizens of that state; or, that Kosovo be handed over to Albanians, either as a whole or in part.  I do not see a third alternative.