The Kingdom of Reality

A high degree of understanding in principle on the general direction for resolving the Kosovo crisis has been reached by everyone the least bit involved in the matter.  Only the Serbs and the Albanians are still stalling on the issue of increased autonomy.  What is too much for one side is too little for the other.  But, since America, Russia, and Europe believe this to be the way out, it will probably be so.  It’s not that there is no justice in this; I simply fear that any such arrangement will show even less will for survival than post-Dayton Bosnia.

But, we will leave this for later.  At the present moment it is certainly necessary to pacify and isolate militant extremists, which is easier to do on the Albanian than on the Serb side.  Among them there are rebellious peasants, desperadoes and illegal immigrants from the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK), whose popularity would have to drop appreciably once politicians reach some compromise.  The problem on the Serb side is that the main extremists are heads of state, hence those who uphold the legal system.  But, for some reason, Milosevic is getting quite a different treatment from Adem Jasari.

If for just a moment we gloss over this insurmountable barrier to the Kosovo crisis, what remains are real fears of two peoples and their conflicting ambitions for the same territory.  Once again it appears to me that the problem is smaller on the Albanian side.  If they get less than they bargained for, everyone will get more than they had in the last ten years, which would have to be enough to protect them from the caprices of the legal system of this state.

However, Serbs will have a sense of defeat which will arise from their firm belief that autonomy is a step toward the secession of Kosovo.  And the bottom line makes it more so than not.  But it does not have to be inevitable.  There are examples of resolutions to such problems which were adopted and which did not lead to the shifting of borders.  Now, of course, with the support of the international community, the whole process could be slowed down, leaving time for finding the best formula.

Those who do not believe this to be at all possible, those who think that every concession to Albanian demands inevitably leads to secession, should at least ask whether Serbian policy up to now has been efficient?  Has intransigence, strictness and the martial law regime made Kosovo more Serb, or has it brought Serbia closer to a state of martial law?  In other words, in the ten years of Milosevic’s rule, has the ethnic makeup of Kosovo changed in the Serb favor and have democratic standards advanced in Belgrade during that period?  What I wish to say is that it is high time, now when sanctions are once again on the horizon, that someone in Serbia begins thinking about change, and not merely abandoning themselves to anger or despair.  This means that if out of fear of secession autonomy is refused, something else will have to be chosen, and consequences will have to be weighed.  It would be unacceptably stupid, not to mention damaging, to get the same punishment for the same transgression.  No other conclusion would be possible than that here we have exceptionally worthless people who are incapable of learning anything from the greatest personal tragedies.  I think that this would be the end, the real end of Serbian history.

New nations have been born, but I know of no example of a nation committing suicide.  Here it is claimed that such a message had been long ago imprinted into the Serbian ethos.  What is at issue is the myth of Kosovo and opting for the Kingdom of Heaven, which today could perfectly apply to one of those scenes of mass suicide of some fanatical religious sect.  I only know a couple of Serbs who look like those religious madmen, while others who speak this language are, as a rule, crooks.  But crooks are capable of participating in a scene of collective self-sacrifice and, until just before the very end, can maintain the appearance of actual fanatics.

The countdown is nearing the end, and judging by all indications a decision is being made in Belgrade at the present moment.  Diplomats and ministers of great powers are visiting Belgrade and Pristina in typically last minute fashion: assuaging their conscience and trying once more to turn the tide of events or to at least completely understand the message they are getting from here.  Because I do not take Milosevic for an authentic suicide, I believe that he will concede, but I fear that he likes to toy with the idea, to come to the very edge and to remain there for as long as possible.  That means that he could possibly slip, and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that with the years he is being sucked in more and more by the gaping hole.

To the extent that what he is doing can at all be classified as politics, it could be said that in Kosovo he is trying to get back Montenegro, where Djukanovic is fearlessly undermining his power.  It already became clear during voting on the budget that Montenegrin MP’s do not have enough sense to resist when an atmosphere of war is created.  This means that Milosevic is calculating that, were he to manage to succeed in maintaining the present level of tension in Kosovo, Bulatovic’s Party could win in the elections in Montenegro.

This calculation, although characteristically beastly, no longer appears very likely, but he has nothing better.  In fact he never had any other answer to the whole business of reforms, privatization, democratization, and relations with the rest of the world.  He only knew how to press the button of nationalism, and let come what may.  For the time being it seems that the Montenegrins are hardly reacting, as if they completely see through this drivel.  They agree that Kosovo is a problem for Serbia and there must not be any shooting, but they do not agree to jointly bare the burden of sanctions with Serbia.  There they are getting ready to lag behind a little and are hoping that the world will tolerate this.

Therefore, if Milosevic remains hard-line and really decides to accept sanctions, this could easily result in further distancing Montenegro from Serbia, and even in ultimate dissolution of the federation.  This means that the head of the joint state is not only gambling with Kosovo, but with Montenegro and his chances are poor at best.  I cannot see who today would be ready to blame Podgorica and cannot imagine how Milosevic would succeed in surviving all that.  But if this is the only way of getting rid of him, then it’s worth considering.

On the other hand, if at the last moment he concedes and avoids sanctions, Montenegrin reformists will be forced to take the more difficult, and perhaps slower road, together with Serbia, in hope that she will manage to reach higher ground.  In any case, it would hardly be correct or even wise to abandon themselves to maliciousness and to plan their future on someone else’s doom.  In any case, they are not doing that or at least are not giving any public indications of doing that, which is more than can be said for everyone else, from Slovenia, right on down to Kosovo’s Albanians.

However, if we consider how many more times Slobodan Milosevic is capable of causing such a crisis, perhaps it might be best for him to close himself off totally, and then the whole process might be sped up.  He himself is very prone to this kind of reaction.  In this sense, international envoys and mediators only stand in the way and are merely contributing to keeping him alive artificially.  They are not allowing him to peacefully bare down on his ultimate doom.