Radovan’s French Friend

Does Radovan Karadzic have a “French guardian angel”, inquired Liberation in its provocative style after the Washington Post discovered that last summer NATO gave up on arresting the former head of the Bosnian Serbs due to suspicions that one French officer in the structure of SFOR neatly forwarded information about alliance plans to him.  The mole was Major Herve Gourmelon, officer and spokesperson for Unprofor, who was returned to France at the beginning of the year.  The French minister for defense and diplomacy acknowledged that Gourmelon had “relations that might seem controversial with persons suspected of war crimes,” but it is determinedly denied that it “might bring into question Karadzic’s arrest and in general the behavior of French soldiers in Bosnia.”  The scandal, however, didn’t go away. Neither the denials of the High Commander of Allied Forces for Europe (Sharpe) nor of SFOR, who are assessing the Washington Post’s allegations about tight relations between General Clark, France, and the lack of respect between American and French forces as “funny,” could stifle the scandal.  Even the State Department hastened to say that it would welcome good collaboration between the Americans and the French in Bosnia.

From the above mentioned it is easy to conclude that the French found in this confusing situation a weakening of their reputation amongst their allies in Bosnia, where the French were far more present than others and where 71 French soldiers died.  But, this is the best moment for attack. Believers in conspiracies immediately came out with the theory that the CIA staged the whole affair.  Based on anonymous military sources, Le Monde states that the French own sensitive dossiers about Americans and others who also violated standard rules of behavior in Bosnia and who were returned home because of that, but behaved like gentlemen.  But, the problem is with military and other intelligence officers for whom Bosnia became the promised land due to its high concentration of foreign troops and interests.  Another problem is with Karadzic’s arrest, which the Americans and French toss back and forth like a hot potato.  For three years, Paris and Washington didn’t demonstrate exaggerated urgency when it was a question of this arrest, accusing each other of passivity, even of collaboration with the “enemy side.”  From the time the Hague Tribunal issued the warrant for Karadzic’s arrest, his hiding was very relative.  As noticed by Figaro, in Pale or other sectors under French military control, Karadzic was often noticed—sometimes right under SFOR’s nose.  It isn’t just about whether the French hesitated in arresting the former leader of the Bosnian Serbs.  The Americans didn’t hurry too much for fear that violent action might cost the lives of their soldiers.  At the moment last summer when American magazines carried scenarios for Karadzic’s arrest, the White House and the American high command were clear:  it is out of the question that NATO power be used for this purpose.

The Gourmeon affair testifies to the level of confidence that rules amongst the forces of NATO in Bosnia.  The Americans evidently watched what the French did.  The French, if they already acknowledged that they have sensitive dossiers about others, did the same.  One can only suppose about what was happening in the Gulf war if what happened in Bosnia could provoke such an interest in intelligence information!

The Shabby Affair:  So is Major Harve Goumelon protagonist for French unpleasantness or is this a very shabby military/spy affair?  This officer, connected to SIRPI (French military outfit for relations with the press) arrived in Bosnia two years ago.  He occupied two roles:  he was spokesperson as well as an officer under the command of General Jean Hernrich, the second SFOR man to get too close to Karadzic.  As a reminder, General Henrich came to Bosnia in order to occupy the post of Director of Inteligence Service (DGSE) (Main agency for exterior security) which he directed from its foundation in 1992.  But, according to Parisian dailies, Gourmelon didn’t work for DSGE, already probably a service which depended on French military headquarters, just as are the Headquarters of Military Intelligence (DRM) or Command for Special Operations (COS).  In past years,  COS commandos have been seen in Albania in preparation for operation Alba.  According to Liberation, French intelligence are in Bosnia in charge of not only the operation for the eventual arrest of persons suspected of war crimes, from the list of the Hague Tribunal (amongst them is of course Karadzic), but also for a special “psychological operation”  targeting local citizens and their media.  Therefore, it was in Gourmelon’s job description to infiltrate Karadzic’s circle.  As he spoke Serbo-Croatian, contact was quickly established.  He was seen partying with them in one restaurant in Pale.  According to Le Monde, Gourmelon’s hosts knew to appreciate his anti-American outputs.  The attraction was mutual.  Gourmelon was known in Sarajevo for his pro-Serb attitudes which he didn’t hide in front of the press or in front of other officers.  In the corridors of the press center it was known to see him with documents stamped in Pale, praising Radovan Karadzic, which irritated other officers, especially American and British.  Where did he make a mistake?  According to the first version, Gourmelon got so close to Karadzic that he began to negotiate with him, which didn’t come out of his job description.  According to the second version, one Sarajevan woman destroyed his career when she filed a complaint against him because of “causing physical violations.”  The news seized the Americans and British and finally the media.  The continuing story was known.  He was returned to France without successfully retrieving notes from his apartment.  Another officer was returned to France by urgent procedure  because he attempted to retrieve the notes.  The question remains whether or not Gourmelon worked under someone else’s orders , and whose, or was he a free agent working by his own hand?  In both cases different departments of the French military remain to inquire of themselves and of officials if everything is in order with their coordination.  This affair once again revived the polemic about pro-Serb sympathies of the French.  Examples are not lacking—from that of Mitterand’s, “that (the French) will never wage war against Serbia,” through the fall of Srebrenica for which British and Dutch sources accuse President Jacques Chirac due to his refusal to send air support for Dutch forces on the ground, to his refusal that French soldiers testify before the Hague Tribunal.  Jacques Chirac’s rise to power, irrespective of above mentioned accusations, designated a sudden change in French attitudes in Bosnia.  Serbian aggression was condemned with the American president’s determination to send air intervention at the end of the war.  Some in the French military had such an “antipathy” toward Bosnians as Muslims, perhaps it’s an old, mistaken anthology with the traumatic experience of the Algerian War.  This attitude is not shared by the entire French military just as unconditional sympathy toward Serbs, founded upon the prevailing myth of the First World War.