Agreement on Mutual Lying

Do you remember Adem Jashari?  He was allegedly the “leader of the so-called Liberation Army of Kosovo” who was killed at the beginning of March in the village of Prekaz.  At that time victory and “liquidation of the main terrorist base” was being proclaimed.  Well, it seems that this leader merely stood in the way of his army, which has multiplied and activated itself considerably since his death, with many new bases being discovered daily.

I am not pointing to this merely as a joke, nor do I think that what is happening in Kosovo is funny.  I only wish to say that in Belgrade, both propaganda, as well as politics and war are being based once again, or continuously, on premises of “wishful thinking”.  Propaganda men are the only ones who have an excuse for this because lying for socially advantageous and desirable reasons is part of their job description.  However, politicians and soldiers ought to base their decisions on somewhat more reliable and trustworthy information.

The fact that they live in a kingdom of wonderful illusion can be seen from the ease with which they enter into local and global conflicts.  If they are not expecting a swift, complete and glorious victory, one would think that they might hesitate slightly, that they might attempt to avoid war, or at the very least indicate that they are not too happy about developments in the situation.  However, domestic analyses indicate that first and foremost Kosovo does not have nearly as many Albanians as everyone seems to think, that it has more Serbs than we are being led to believe, that the former are cowardly while the latter are heroic, that the majority of Albanians accepts Serbia for its own state, that they do not have weapons and that in any case they do not know how to use them, that there is not a single Serb who will not rush to the aid of his nation at the mere mention of Kosovo...

The same foggy premises serve as the basis for impressions of the rest of the world according to which Serbia is solidly supported by Russia and China, and also by Germany, France and even England, if only out of spite for the Americans.  Even the Americans are dithering and realizing more and more how naive and deluded they are.  This means that real sanctions are completely out of the question, and even if they do occur, they will do less harm than good.  All in all, Serbia can simply chose the way in which it wants to win.

Harboring illusions is hardly rare in politics, especially when things begin going downhill.  But here it is simply an error in a system which came about partly because things never started going uphill.  More correctly, this entire, closed, inward-looking system is an error, while self-delusion is its unavoidable rule.  It is part of the game.  An agreement within the Family on self-deception and covering one’s tracks.

Such a system functions precisely on an assumption of limited awareness of reality.  Illusory problems get illusory solutions and all is fine and good, as long as no one opens the window.  That is why this system, as a rule, cannot endure any opposition or a free press.  If it is unable to completely do away with them, it at least always holds them on the outside, beyond official reality, and under threat and suspicion.  That is why, in any case, such a system only profits from crises such as the one in Kosovo.  At such moments both the opposition and the press become smaller, more quiet and crestfallen.

Therefore, when all this is kept in mind, it would seem that there is no hope for Kosovo, for as long as the present system, headed by Milosevic, is in power in Serbia.  As a personality he already has some prior history, a problem which is perhaps impossible to overcome, even if by some miracle he were to decide to change his policies.  However, I do not claim that he will continue quite the way he has begun, with war operations, the referendum and earplugs.

Namely, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the real formula is finally working, with American threats and Russian support, but also with identical demands for negotiations to begin and for some type of mediation to be accepted.  If not even this stops him, then Milosevic has really decided to last it out right up to the end, his end, of course, in which case it would be best to merely observe his final steps and to wish him to make a champion’s plunge, with the least possible waves.

However, the Serbian view of the Kosovo problem is saturated with illusions that are older and to a certain degree independent of Milosevic.  Because I personally harbor the illusion that someone is actually interested in reality, especially a negative one, here is how I think things stand.  Kosovo is a part of Serbia in the sense that most of the authority there is in Serb hands; the police is Serbian, as well as all government agencies.  At least that is how it was until recently.  However, the fact that parallel Albanian institutions have functioned for years indicates that Serb authorities never really got off ground, and that it has been impossible to curb Albanians even with a state of martial law.
When Milosevic managed to significantly limit the autonomy of Kosovo, it was more through force than through democratic means in regional parliament, even though there was a kind of voting that took place.  Still, I would not call the regime which has been in Kosovo up to now a kind of occupation, because the regime does in fact have continuity with its predecessor.  Milosevic did significantly change the status quo, but what Albanians are demanding are even bigger changes, which I don’t doubt would mean liberation for them.

Of course, now when there is shooting and people are dying, legal arguments are losing out to arguments of force.  It seems that this process favors Albanians more, even though the present regime, and probably the majority of Serbs, think otherwise.  Simply put, more soldiers and police can under no circumstance replace a lesser population.  And I don’t think that there will be anything there which is similar to the Croatian “Storm”, except maybe in the attempt.

In the meantime, I think that an immediate stop to all swearing by the Serb holy land in Kosovo would be in the interest of the general state of health of our people.  In any case, holiness is not highly regarded these days, except in a way in which it comes under the category of the kingdom of the profane.  In this way, Kosovo is most holy for those who do not hold anything as holy.

Serbs also like to say that Kosovo has been Serbian for centuries, but it might be easier for them if someone were to explain to them that this is not the case.  Kosovo was Turkish for centuries, as was Serbia itself.  In reality, ever since the Balkan Wars, when it became Serbian, right up to today, it has become clear that assimilation of this territory and of Albanians who live there was simply not successful.  Kosovo has remained somewhat of a foreign domain in Serbia.  Hence the process of Serb emigration was always more natural than the process of immigration, and all stories or evidence of pressures are of little use.

Finally, it is said that Kosovo is a cradle for Serbs, a mythic place and an idea which touches into the deepest crevices of our national identity and ethos.  I am ready to admit the reality of this myth.  National feelings are always tied to certain myths, but only the worst and most malicious kind of politics is based on myths, or claims to emanate from them.  Today this is more clear in Serbia then ever before.

A regime which demonstrates on a daily basis that it is not interested even in the most basic problems of its people, which instigates and loses wars, which displaces the population, defrauds it and exposes it to international sanctions, such a regime wishes to convince the whole world that Kosovo is holy and a myth on which there is no room for negotiation.  Such exploitation of a myth cannot lead to anything better from that which we have seen up to now.

Still, despite the destructive influence of the Milosevic factor, the impatience of Kosovo’s Albanians has still not been sufficiently considered.  If it is not necessary to explain to anyone why and from what Albanians wish to flee, it is still far less clear how and where it is they want to get.  The question of “what next?” does not appear to worry them in the least.  Just as, in any case, it does not appear to worry Serbs.  War has begun and that is the end of the story, and after all that, some loathsome representative of international justice will no doubt come to say what’s whose.