Outfoxing a Fox

Judging from the discoveries made by certain domestic and foreign super sensational newspapers, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic have traveled ever so much in the past year: Byelorussia, Russia, Hilandar, Greece, the Ukraine, Belgrade, Herceg Novi, etc.  Some of these news items fall into the category of sheer sensationalism; some of them, into psychological operations of fishing for facts, generating smoke without fire and creating misinformation.  However, it is difficult to believe that either Karadzic or Mladic traveled just like that beyond the territory in which they are more or less safe.  As paradoxical as it might seem, the two of them are still most protected in Eastern Bosnia — despite SFOR patrols and helicopters — for the simple reason that the price in human lives for their arrests is prohibitively high, therefore politically unacceptable for superpowers.  Of course, this does not meant that the game of cat and two mice will not continue; the very fact that the two most influential exponents of Pale politics are forced to hide and to live under conditions of the strictest security has twofold significance.  First, it liberates political space for the Banjaluka alternative (Plavsic-Dodik) and compromises Krajisnik and the extremists as exponents and protectors of partisans who are hiding in the woods; second, continuing to live under such conditions unavoidably effects the nerves and leads to the consideration of a dilemma — where is life easier: in the mountains of Eastern Bosnia, in fear, frustrated and bored, or in Sheveningen, near Hague, in comfort and without uncertainty.  The key part of that dilemma is the possibility of striking a deal with the Tribunal: cooperation with the investigators can yield considerably reduced sentences.

It has been certain for some time now that such thoughts have been passing through the disheveled head of the psychiatrist from Pale, Ph.D. Radovan Karadzic.  According to some sources from Pale, Karadzic has hired two Greek and several other lawyers under the direction of Nick Kostic, an American lawyer of Serbian extraction.  Negotiations with the Hague Tribunal for War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia are supposedly entering phase three; it is said that Karadzic’s conditions include his control over cuisine while in prison, because he is afraid of psychotropic substances, and the serving of the eventual sentence in some Orthodox, Slavic country.  What can Ph.D. Karadzic offer in return — assuming that he really wishes to make deals with the Hague Tribunal?

The answer to that question can be sought in a small, blue book from the pen of Kosta Cavoski, Senator in Republika Srpska, entitled The Hague Against Justice, which has recently been circulating among Bosnian Serbs.  In short, Ph.D. Karadzic could deliver General Mladic and President Milosevic over to the Hague Tribunal.  Namely, this book by the renowned Belgrade lawyer is considered as the strategic blueprint for Karadzic’s defense in front of the Hague Tribunal — that is, if he ever shows up in front of it.
The book offers elements for the conclusion that Karadzic wishes to transfer the guilt for war crimes by the Serb side on to Gen. Mladic and President Milosevic: it contains copies of written orders issued to Ratko Mladic to stick to rules of war, to offer free passage to humanitarian convoys and the Red Cross, to disband paramilitary units and to arrest soldiers of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) who commit war crimes.  An entire chapter of the book is devoted to the fall of Srebrenica in July of 1995 and to the slaughter of civilians which followed.  Cavoski writes that Karadzic lost control over VRS headquarters at about that time (which is true), and that this army was practically under the control of Belgrade, that is to say the headquarters of the Yugoslav Army and Slobodan Milosevic.  “While earlier Ph.D. Karadzic had a certain degree of control over senior officers and commanders of VRS on the ground, at the time of the operation in Srebrenica and shortly after it, those commanders on the ground completely revolted against civilian control...  At that time, Milosevic sided with Ratko Mladic and was against Ph.D. Karadzic,” Cavoski writes.  “Armies never have two commanders, so that if Serbian forces in Srebrenica were not under Ph.D. Karadzic’s control, that means that they were under the control of another commander.  That other commander... could not have been anyone else but Slobodan Milosevic.”

 Thus we come to the gist of the matter.  What is at issue is a very complex set of political, intelligence and psychological circumstances which tie together these three dramatis personae — Milosevic, Karadzic and Mladic.  We all remember well (except for those who worked very hard to forget) how the war in Bosnia was being prepared, worked up and begun; we also remember how it ended.  From the very beginning and the sudden promotion of General Mladic to the very top of VRS there was friction between him and Dr. Karadzic as the Commander in Chief.  Friction broke into fire on several occasions: Mladic could not understand why Karadzic and the Pale clan systematically ignored the army in favor of the police; it was not clear to him why Karadzic and Pale refused make certain moves which were logical from a strategic military point of view; regarding all this, Mladic spoke publicly, sometimes using very sharp language, even though he spoke more frequently (and more harshly) in “statements” to officers on the ground.  It is not that either of them — Karadzic or Mladic — were highly principled: on the one hand they confronted each other politically on their Chetnik-partisan differences, while on the other, they called on both traditions when it appeared necessary to them.  But they never did agree on one thing — on the status and role of the Army of Republika Srpska: while soldiers and their families froze and went hungry, policemen were partying it up, and Karadzic and his clan of “businessmen” and private entrepreneurs were striking it rich.  That which always happens in such cases finally did happen: he who is able to kill, deport and rob his neighbor only because he is of another faith is also capable of doing everything else.  When the number of Croats and Muslims available for robbing decreased, they extended their operations to their own people.  Under such circumstances, it was small surprise that in the summer of 1995 relations between Karadzic and Mladic broke down.  Karadzic did not indicate any understanding for Milosevic’s urgent need for the war in Bosnia to simmer down; Milosevic saw more and further at the time, and was clear that this war would be lost.  His only serious ally was Ratko Mladic.  Sanguine, impulsive and hotheaded, such as God made him, Mladic at the time was busy in Srebrenica and Zepa, while the Croats and Bosnians were taking Grahovo, Glamoc and Kupres away from him.  Inept at politics, he believed propaganda and sycophants: on the one hand, the undefeatable Serb army, on the other, the undefeatable General Mladic, then the bombing of London and Washington — and along that line.  When the moment of truth came and when the whole of Banjaluka packed to flee in the same direction as all the people of Krajina — it was already too late.  As quickly as you could say “Srbinje”, the Dayton Agreement was signed; as quickly as you could say “Serbian Sarajevo”, Mladic was replaced and found himself in Han Pijesak, where he is still, most probably, today, surrounded by several hundred reliable professionals.

That is how two opponents and two allies found themselves in the same position: Karadzic in Pale and the environs, with fewer and fewer reliable people around him, less and less money, and fewer and fewer sponsors to pay them; Mladic in a somewhat better situation in a huge building of the former command center of the Yugoslav National Army near Han Pijesak.  How did the difference in position and security come about?  From basic criminal thinking: Mladic is a more valuable witness.  Admittedly, Milosevic’s initial doctrine of protecting friends and allies (first Reuters interview in 1990) is still active, even though everything has an end; on the other hand, even though he betrayed him and called him various things, it would hardly be acceptable if Karadzic were to begin defending himself by transferring all responsibility to Milosevic; therefore, what is important is that he never gets to the Hague — at least not alive.  Mladic is somehow closer to Milosevic (inasmuch as the shirt is closer to the body than the coat), and he also never slandered him.

The superpowers are following the same logic, which can be seen from the case of Major Erveill Gurmelon, who, it was learned on Wednesday, spoke to Radovan Karadzic under orders, with the objective of persuading him to give himself over, even though the gallant allies in SFOR were not informed of this, nor was the Ministry of Defense...  In appears that an assessment was made that Karadzic is softer, more scared and deserted than Mladic.  It is indicative that there was never talk of Mladic handing himself over, nor that his security is dwindling — as we have been hearing about Karadzic for months now.  No senators are rushing to Mladic’s defense, nor is there any campaign being waged for his salvation among Serbs.  It appears that from this perspective also Karadzic is construed as a high risk case.

The whole thing is beginning to look like an American movie in which the FBI is haggling with mafiosi according to the principle “divide and rule”: be a snitch and we won’t indict you...  However, there is one uncontrollable variable in this picture, and that is the Capo dei tutti capi.  The sudden, premature death of either Karadzic or Mladic would be very harmful; however, their cooperation with the Hague Tribunal would be even more harmful — but there is a third way out, and that is the status quo: both of them remain beyond the reach of justice.  As long as this lasts, as long as the political price for the arrest of either one or the other, or both remains as high as it is, Milosevic is at peace.  He merely has to keep that price high enough.

Admittedly, in this scenario also, there is one uncontrollable variable: nerves.  Neither Karadzic nor Mladic have had the reputation so far of cool headed people with great self-control; as far as abilities for objective assessments of political and military events are concerned, it is not even worth mentioning (otherwise now they would be in a different situation, very different).  The two of them are people who are in hiding, people who are under the reliable protection of bodyguards who answer to a third party.  Up to a certain point, interests are shared; after a certain point, they diverge.  For now it appears that Radovan Karadzic, who from the outset has proven smarter than Mladic, has understood this.

Speculation and guessing about where exactly the two of them are hiding is absurd: it makes absolutely no difference whether Ratko Mladic is in Han Pijesak, Belgrade or Herceg Novi; it makes just as little difference whether Ratko Karadzic is in Trebinje, where he is protected by “23,000 soldiers” (as Bozo Vucurevic put it), in Sokoc or in Prigrevica near Apatin; as long as both are under the protection of the Service.  Until the death of Gojko Suska, the most secure place for both of them was Western Herzegovina (Siroki Brijeg, Ljubuski, Grude), but now, even this is no longer a certainty.  Thus, things remain as they have been thus far: SFOR is running recognizance missions, Karadzic and Mladic are hiding, Milosevic is hoping.  The only question is which one of these four players will be the first to lose their nerve.