More Yet to Come

Simple storyline: in the year 1992 in Belgrade, it was being decided who would be president and who the governor (trademark: Milan Panic), while now, in Podgorica, it is being decided whether Slobodan Milosevic is a spent politician (Djukanovic in his interview for VREME).

Except for the offensive mounted against Djukanovic by state media, the Serbian electorate is fairly ambivalent toward this conflict, considering it only as a merciless fight for power, even though the elements of a state crisis in its repercussions are visible.

Supported by rhetorical moderation on the part of SPO MP’s, a parliamentary opposition party which proclaimed political neutrality in the Montenegrin conflict, Belgrade’s red-black coalition (the Left and the Radicals) appointed Djukanovic’s competitor and the present federal premier, Momir Bulatovic who is Milosevic’s favorite.  This should not be a surprise — since 1992 the Serbian political pendulum has been wavering somewhere between tendencies for a strong federation and a unitary state.  SPO supported a monarchy, but it could be concluded that these parties of the political center opted for a strong federation with elements of a regional state.  DSS has been the most persistent in mentioning a regional state, with some prerogatives for Montenegro, according to Professor Jovicic’s model.  Only the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) demanded at the moment that the FRY constitution was being adopted that FRY be a unitary state.  The ruling party in Serbia, SPS, lobbied for the idea of a strong federation, but that concept was not implemented consistently, while the federal state was treated as a kind of provisional state.

CLOUDY BEGINNING: In the book Serbian Political Mosaic 1990-1996, the sociologist Vladimir Goati wrote that when the “third Yugoslavia” was proclaimed (April 27, 1992), SPO and DS pointed to the fact that the constitution of the “third Yugoslavia” was adopted without authority by the Federal Assembly of the SFRY Parliament (only 73 of the delegates of the Federal Assembly of the SFRY Parliament, which otherwise had 220 members whose four-year mandate had expired, had been elected in 1986).  Coupled with that, at the moment of the adoption of that constitution, SFRY did not exist.  SPO and DS lobbied that the constitution of a joint Serbian-Montenegrin state be drafted and adopted by a specially elected constitutional parliament, but there was no mention of this later, and the state, such as it is, was silently acknowledged.

Why does every political conflict in that state acquire the proportions of a state crisis?  Perhaps it is because of the nature of the state which the professor of constitutional law, Pavle Nikolic, calls unfinished.  The construction site of this unfinished state has remained, as we can see, fertile ground for a pure and always unsparing fight for power.  When, in the summer of ’92, Milan Panic, the federal premier at the time, provoked Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia, the latter began a war against Panic by debilitating federal institutions — he withdrew his people from Panic’s cabinet and did a lot more.

In 1992, despite their support for a unitary state, the Radicals contributed to the “rearrangement” of the new federal top by replacing Panic and the President of FRY at the time, Dobrica Cosic.  When, on the third attempt, Panic was replaced, his cabinet remained behind, which is fairly unusual for an office model.  Panic was replaced by Radoje Kontic, who demonstrated more than restraint in the use of nominal power accorded to the federal government, power which is hardly insignificant.

Last week in the Press Club of Belgrade’s Media Center, Ilija Vujacic, professor of political law in Belgrade, stated that the present crisis is merely one in the long line of attempts at disintegrating the federal state.

Vujacic believes that the leaders of the reform movement in Montenegro were harsh and somewhat incautious when they proclaimed that they would demand for a vote of confidence be taken for Milosevic.  At that signal, Slobodan Milosevic went into decisive battle directed at completely taking over the entire federal structure.  There is little remaining of what earlier appeared completely certain, which was silent coexistence and the continuation of this unfinished federation, because it appears that Slobodan Milosevic has taken the offensive, since silent coexistence will not be possible, and someone has to win.

Federal Premier Bulatovic has made public his intention to work on reaching accordance between constitutions, and this above all refers to lack of accordance between the constitution of Serbia and the federal constitution.  The Montenegrin constitution has greater accordance with the federal constitution because it is more recent, and when it was drafted it was modeled on the federal constitution, while the Serbian constitution predates the federal one.  Ilija Vujacic observes that the whole issue of lack of accordance between the constitutions of the republics and the federal constitution is of no importance — had anyone wanted to create a serious federal state from this unfinished, existing state, they would have made a move by now.  There simply was no such intention up to now.

Even without a conflict, it is difficult to strike a balance between two unequal federal units, and these can be considered unequal, both economically and demographically (the distribution of authority never corresponds to the distribution of power, and there are always extra-constitutional factors).

UNACCEPTABLE IMPROVISATION: Vesna Rakic-Vodinelic, Professor at the Faculty of Law, stated in the same Press Club that there is no question that this federation was ever constituted and that what is at issue here is unacceptable improvisation of a state.  Federal institutions have not been properly established, and so imperfectly established they never functioned properly.  If the weak institution of the head of state suddenly becomes powerful because of personnel changes, than it is clear that what is at issue is personal power.  In this sense, what is very important in a federation, that is to say in government agencies of the republics and of the federation, is being abused more than is permissible, states Vesna Rakic-Vodinelic.

According to the constitution, all court cases fall under federal jurisdiction, Vesna Rakic-Vodinelic continues.  Therefore, supremacy of the federal constitution over constitutions of the republics is declaratively established, but that is mere proclamation which cannot be implemented in a federal constitutional court.  There are good arguments for the constitutions of Serbia and Montenegro to be constitutions of independent, sovereign states.  This was tolerated while political factions agreed.  When this changed, the first legal attack on institutions of the present Yugoslav federation was carried out by justice agencies.  The presidential elections in Montenegro have been monitored up to now by unknown activities of federal justice authorities: the federal prosecutor has filed several thousand demands for protecting laws, while the federal court has accepted those demands in an area which is regulated by laws of the republics.  The activities of the federal court were very restricted prior to this — over the past 15 years, the federal court ruled, on average, on 30 demands for protecting laws, while this year it ruled on several thousand of them.

Vesna Rakic-Vodinelic, whose specialty is civil law, observes sarcastically that Bulatovic, who announced ratification of laws which are regulated by civil law, is not aware of the fact that civil law is already regulated by federal law (family law is the only part of civil law which, besides small claims courts, is under the jurisdiction of the republics): “Premier Bulatovic should be told not to build a federal state there where he already has one.  He should build it there where it is absent.”

The presidential campaign in Montenegro, the present pre-election campaign, statements by replaced ministers and political messages from both sides all suggest malignant spreading of corruption and the use of public offices for personal gain, so that in a normal country a federal prosecutor who was the least bit upright could easily convict most of the actors on the political scene.  Can such materials provide the stuff of which even a half-serious state is built?

Ilija Vujacic fears that those in power in the federation and in Serbia in 1992 created a state in the same illegitimate way in which they are now trying to reformulate it.  He thinks that a serious state can only be created in a constitutional parliament and through reaching a consensus for building a state.  Vesna Rakic agrees that state institutions cannot be built from such materials, and that a constitutional parliament is the only mechanism for establishing common, decent, civil institutions.  But no groundwork has been laid in Serbia in that direction, and there is no authority which could carry out such groundwork within a reasonable period of time.  Therefore, the undemocratic side is the one which is preparing this society for something else: when authoritarian power becomes strong, there is a change into totalitarianism, which means the end of Yugoslavia.

ROUND TABLE: Speaking in the Press Club of the Media Center, Srdjan Darmanovic, Director of the Center for Developing Democracy of Podgorica, described the situation in Montenegro as still democratic, because there is still no basic political consensus, but rather something which could be considered as a significant step in the direction of democratic reforms.  He describes the pre-election agreement between DPS and Darmanovic’s opposition as a Montenegrin round table which comes seven years too late.  The main reason for hope for democratic change, according to Darmanovic, was the rift in the ruling party.  This is a typical post-communist situation — without rifts and splits in the ruling party, it was impossible to carry out democratic reforms in any of the post-communist countries.  In Serbia, the ruling party has remained monolithic and subject to the will of one individual.  However, because of the sharpness of conflicts in the oligarchy between two irreconcilable opponents who are personified by the two main political personalities in Montenegro, there is still a looming question mark there.

The drama of the situation is increased by the fact that Montenegrin elections are not only a Montenegrin matter, and by the fact that the head of the ruling regime in this country, FRY President Slobodan Milosevic, is involved in different ways in the elections in Montenegro — from media support to making important moves on the state level, such as changing the federal government.  The drama of Montenegrin elections is also increased in large part by the battle between two state structures, the Serbian-federal one and the Montenegrin one, which are using all means at their disposal.

Darmanovic believes that Slobodan Milosevic did a disservice to Bulatovic — for instance, in several election meetings, a question was heard: “And what will we do when all of you get up and go to Belgrade!”  Darmanovic thinks that Djukanovic managed to score when he dubbed the new federal government one of exiles.
It seems that assessments by the regime’s heads were different.  They calculated that by giving Bulatovic power, they would win a certain number of voters who always give their support to those in power.  Bulatovic has been presented as the protector of Yugoslavia, while Djukanovic has been placed in the position of not recognizing the legitimacy of the election of the federal government, while at the same time, defending himself form accusations of separatism.  Bulatovic, who supports a strong federation, even though in Montenegro they suspect that he might also support a unitary state, personifies Slobodan Milosevic’s intention of concentrating power and people of personal confidence at the federal top.  He did not succeed once in this intention when he tried to change the federal constitution so that he would strengthen the position of the head of the federal state with the approaching elections.

ROYAL INFORMATION: The Montenegrin response to Bulatovic’s speedy appointment as chancellor was negative, but also elastic to a degree.  They do not acknowledge the individual makeup of the government, but state that they will honor the constitution and will not question every decision reached by the federal government, but only those which are harmful to the interests of Montenegro.  Thus, for now, it is not clear whether there will be a total blockade of federal institutions, but Slobodan Milosevic can threaten voters with such a possibility, and in this way he can gain Montenegrin supporters of stability in the federal state.  The new premier brought three of his people, and replaced three ministers loyal to Djukanovic.  In this way the latter has been cut off from an important source of information about the operations of federal agencies, even though it can be imagined that he has information coming from circles that are near to royalty.  Bulatovic’s second move was to announce the unification of security forces.  Vujacic thinks that the announced creation of a federal security force, which was disbanded once in 1992, only indicates that behind this stand the political moves of Slobodan Milosevic which are directed at his strengthening of his power, and that it is also connected to the uncertainty of the elections in Montenegro — the ground is being set for having more instruments of authority available in the event of a victory by Djukanovic.  That is an attempt at consolidating a regime which has been shaken by events in Montenegro.

Srdjan Darmanvoic essentially sees two possible paths: eventual warmongering in Montenegro or an eventual occupation of Montenegro which would be an end to the state, which is not likely, not just because the main actors have not lost their senses, but because of the hurdles which stand in that direction — the readiness of the Montenegrin government to fight is visible, and international support can also be expected.

According to Darmatovic, agreement between Milosevic and Djukanovic is no longer politically possible, but it is possible that the balance of power will be such that neither of them could depose the other.  Can the situation of one government against another be beneficial for democracy?
Ilija Vujacic stated that no government was constituted because someone wished for it to be constituted, but because of a balance in fear...  Vujacic observes that there were many such events, that they will reoccur, and that judging by everything, the crisis will move in amplitudes — we will still struggle with problems in this state.