TV News Hostages

The depth of this political conflict has almost no counterpart in modern political history and because of this Serbia at the beginning of the nineties is a very gratifying theme for political and communications analysis.

The main point of strife is the persistent endeavor of the ruling party (i.e. the nucleus of its leaders) to maintain complete control over the main means of information - in particular Radio Television Serbia and the daily "Politika".

In order to understand this persistence, it is worthwhile looking at the power of their influence. In the middle of October 1990, at the height of the pre-election campaigns, the Second News Broadcast of TVB on the territory of Serbia proper was watched by 2.5 million people, which is more than 50% of the estimated population of Serbia, and this number at the same time in 1991, i.e. at the height of the war in Croatia, rose to 3 million, or 60% of the population of Serbia over the age of 10. If we add to this around 800,000 viewers in Vojvodina, we can see that this news program was watched at the end of 1991 by not less than 3.5 million people.

The significance of this is made clear if we remember that, according to the same research, almost 30% of the viewers have absolute faith in the information given them by TV Belgrade; around 45.6% are sometimes beset by doubts, while 12.1% hold that "it often isn't quite as it seems". With regard to the Second News Broadcast, absolute trust is shown by 33.7%, relative trust by 48%, and doubt by 13%. As proof of this trust is the fact that 65% of the viewers feel no urge to confirm the information they see and hear on the News by checking on other public media, 18% feel they should but don't, and 12% do so. So it is that our case substantiates the rule established on the basis of much research in the USA and Europe that "trust in the television dominates over trust in the other two media in a quantitative relation of approximately two, maybe three, to one".

It is evident that what is seen and heard in Serbia on the News can hardly be corrected by the press. Empirical research done by the Institute of Social Sciences shows that 30% of the adults in Serbia (without Kosmet) - even in the course of the pre-election campaigns for the first multi-party elections of 1990 - don't read the daily press at all, 26% read it sometimes, and 44% read it regularly. On the other hand, the circulation, and therefore influence, of newspapers which carry the sign "independent", is very limited, and, because of the general economic situation, falling constantly: the daily "Borba" since the end of April 1992 doesn't print more than 45,000 copies, and the weekly VREME prints 30,000, which, even if the coefficient of their being read is 3 or 4, are very modest figures in comparison with the television auditorium of 3 million.

In the case of independent television programs, their range and influence is still of a local nature. Due to the limitations of the transmission network, ITV Studio B is watched only in Belgrade and its surrounds. According to research carried out in 10 Belgrade districts in May 1991 at the request of Studio B itself, the total numbers of viewers of ITV Studio B and the First Program of RTB are almost equal. Important to our analysis is the approximate distribution of viewing on the territory of Belgrade, primarily of informative political programs: TVB First Program News is watched by 85% of the Belgraders interviewed, and NTV Studio B by 95%, while the percentage of viewing of current political programs is identical - 86%. However, according to RTB research in October of the same year, the number of viewers of the central information program of NTV Studio B "Days in the Week" doesn't exceed 100,000. Though both facts should be accepted with reservations due to different methods and possible bias, it is almost certain that the influence of NTV Studio B is around 10 times less than that of state television.

From the above it is clear that control over the TV News and other RTV Serbia informative programs is crucial to the influencing of the public. And that the ruling party has known how to use this is proved by many studies. For instance, according to one piece of research, in the last week before the elections in Serbia, the most frequently mentioned names in the TV News and two radio information programs - i.e. outside the time set aside of campaigning! - were those of representatives of the ruling SPS party - S. Milosevic (133 times for a total of 37 minutes), B. Jovic (46 times - 3 minutes), R. Bozovic (43 times - 7 minutes) and S. Radmilovic (30 times - 7 minutes) and all, it must be understood, in a positive light!

As the number of those who regularly read the daily press shows a preponderance towards the newspapers from the house of "Politika" (of the 44% mentioned, 30% read "Politika" and "Politika ekspres" and 10% read "Novosti"), which are, by general consensus, quite biased in favor of the ruling party, SPS is capable of controlling nine tenths of the media space in Serbia. For instance, an analysis of the contents of "Politika" on 10 March, directly following the famous March events, "all eight pages (review of the March events - A.S.) were dominated by information in which the events were presented exclusively as 'a destructive raid' carried out by 'the powers of chaos and folly'. Of the 51 articles published, 49 supported the government and condemned the opposition, and only 2 were neutral. The following day the complete contents of all articles were devoted to the condemnation of the events in Belgrade on 9 March."

In the field of information, Belgraders are quite privileged compared to the rest of the inhabitants of Serbia. In the first place, information given by the official television is easily compared to that of the rival independent TV stations; the main independent and opposition newspapers are printed and distributed in Belgrade, it is the center of the political, economic and cultural elite in a framework where information is easily exchanged and then dispensed; Belgrade is the political headquarters of the main opposition parties, where their actions are carried out before the eyes of those living here, etc. All in all, Belgrade should be the center where the domination of the main official media is significantly limited, giving the opposition the chance to fight on a more equal footing for the favor of the voting public.

And indeed, a comparison of the inclination of the voters in Belgrade with that of those in the south of Serbia shows a more favorable position of the opposition in the eyes of the better informed Belgraders:

FORECAST OF VOTING RESULTS IN MARCH 1992 (researched by the Institute for Political Studies - IPS)

Belgrade Southern Serbia

SPS (Socialists) 15% 51%

SPO (Serbian Renewel Movement) 11% 5%

Democrats 15% 9%

SRS (Radicals /Seselj/) 17% 11%

Other parties 13% 6%

Undecided, abstaining 29% 18%

A true picture can only be got by comparison of the changes in the voting mood of Belgraders themselves from the introduction of political pluralism at the beginning of 1990 up to the present:

PARTY COMMITMENT OF BELGRADERS

Party Apr. 1990 Dec. 1990 Mar. 1991 Mar. 1992

(IPS research) (Elections) (IPS research)

SPS 37% 34% 29% 15%

SPO 7% 15% 17% 11%

Democrats 4% 11% 22% 15%

SRS 17%

Other parties 26% 17% 14% 13%

Undecided, 27% 23% 19% 29%

didn't/won't vote

Noticeable is the steady fall in popularity of the ruling party, which from April 1990 has lost a whole 22% of the voting body. However, this fall has not automatically brought about a proportional rise in the popularity of the opposition parties. The Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) and Democratic Party, taken together, have not won a single percentage since the elections (they have only exchanged places), so they have not been able to retain the sympathy won as a result of the March 1991 events. The small parties have continued to lose voters, but the newly formed Serbian Radical Party (SRS) has made an enormous breakthrough, making it the strongest party in Belgrade. Finally, the number of undecided voters, or those who do not wish to vote, after falling to its lowest point straight after the March events, has drastically increased and at the beginning of 1992 reached its highest level yet.

All this shows that the voting population in Belgrade - although it has abandoned the SPS - is still outside the domain of the opposition. They have either gone over to Seselj's party, which many, with reason, see as crypto-communist, i.e. the "socialist reserve party", or they have become neutral and will not vote.

So, in spite of the catastrophic economic and political results of the SPS which are noted by the voting public (half the inhabitants of Serbia, according to the research carried out in March 1992, consider the economic, foreign, social and taxation policies of the Serbian government to be completely unsuccessful, and 57% view the work of the government negatively), and in spite of the fact that Belgraders are far better informed about the policies and actions of the opposition than the rest of the population in Serbia, they still would not give the majority of their votes to the opposition parties that are the strongest critics of the regime.

The author is a research assistant in the Institute for Political Studies in Belgrade