He Came, He Spoke, He Won

MOSCOW: The only sensation of the working visit by the Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to Moscow is that he, who is known for avoiding press statements, appeared before journalists after negotiations in the Kremlin.  In all other respects the results of the negotiations were predictable: first the 50 minute private meeting with President Boris Yeltsin, then the more than three hours with the Russian Chief of Diplomacy Yevgeny Primakov, Minister of Defense Marshal Igor Sergeyev, and Chief of the Intelligence Service General Vyatcheslav Trubnikov.

According to the joint statement signed by Milosevic and Yeltsin, the former agreed to everything to which he already agreed:

• - unhindered return of refugees
• - free access to foreign diplomats and representatives of international organizations
• - to the continuation of negotiations with Kosovo’s Albanians

He presented the key requests by the Contact Group, the European Union, and NATO to stop military operations, ethnic cleansing, and to withdraw troops and special police units, as marginal and without foundation.  Both in the joint statement, and especially in answers at the press conference, Milosevic presented actions by security forces as attempts to control terrorism and protect civilians.  There is no ethnic cleansing — he stated.  On the contrary, Albanian terrorist are not killing only Serbs, but also their own countrymen who are loyal to the Yugoslav state.  The army must be present in all parts of a sovereign state, even in Kosovo, and special units can only be withdrawn only according to the degree of reduction in terrorists activities!

(UN)QEUSTIONABLE SUCCESS: Moscow officially assesses the result of the Yeltsin-Milosevic meeting as its great success, because the Yugoslav leader, who proved a tough cookie for the West, agreed to sit down at the negotiating table with Kosovo’s Albanians in the Russian capital, along with a list of other obligations — as is being presented here.

The joint obligation really is a success, if it is considered that shortly before Milosevic’s visit Belgrade’s and Moscow’s presentations, as well as the nature and theme of the meeting in the Kremlin, were diametrically opposed.  The Russians did not hide the fact that the Kosovo drama is the only key issue, given everything that has happened in the region, especially in Yugoslavia, and despite demonstrations of power by the “Determined Falcon.”  However, our side had placed emphasis on bilateralism, hoping that everyone else would see in Milosevic’s visit “a strong impulse for further strengthening of friendly relations and cooperation.”

As far as Kosovo is concerned, it was marginalized, even though it was known that it could not be avoided as a theme, and it was suggested that this crisis will be considered “in the spirit of the known Russian position that the use of force in its resolution is unacceptable.”

Of course, this was a facade, but it was well known that Moscow will press hard, given that it had voluntarily accepted responsibility for a delicate and by no means easy mission to persuade the Yugoslav leader to make concessions.  Yeltsin personally made this commitment in front of his western partners, above all in front of American President, “his friend Bill” Clinton and his other friend, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

PRIMAKOV’S ROLE: The principal act in this drama, by contrast with the theater, was Act I — Milosevic’s meeting with Russian President Yeltsin.  On Tuesday, from 11 o’clock in the morning until a little before noon, they closed themselves and talked “privately” in the host’s cabinet.  The only witnesses were Yeltsin’s official translator and Milosevic’s brother, a former diplomat now working in Moscow (in the private sector), otherwise reputed for his exceptional knowledgeable of Russian.  What Yeltsin and Milosevic spoke about is not known, except for the fact that they shook hands warmly at the beginning, “I am very happy that you came,” said the host. “I am very happy to see you again,” stated the guest.

The nature of the negotiations is partly indicated by Yeltsin’s description that they were “not in the least simple.”

Since the host already had a scheduled meeting with Moscow’s mayor in the afternoon to discuss division of property in the state capital, negotiations were continued in a “broader forum”.  Milosevic had with him our minister of foreign affairs, Zivorad Jovanovic, and our ambassador, Danilo Markovic, while across the table sat Primakov, straddled by a marshal (Army) and a general (foreign spy), whose information about the actual situation on the ground was supposed to play a supporting role, if the arguments of the chief of diplomacy proved insufficiently convincing.  And they did prove insufficiently convincing, because the discussion lasted considerably longer than planned--it took up the time intended for lunch and for a press conference.

Primakov was supposed to “break” Milosevic’s adamance, so that Moscow could present things as if the guest had agreed to significant concessions, as was done in the text of the joint statement.

NO ROOM FOR OPTIMISM?: From the introduction to this text it is clear how it looks, and it became even clearer when the press conference began in the famous diplomatic villa “Spiridonovka”.  It was scheduled for two-thirty, and only Primakov was supposed to show up in front of journalists.  Negotiations were scheduled to terminate at that point, after the session with Yeltsin, and the ensuing lunch, but the temperature required some wasting of time.

The press conference was moved up by an hour, then by one more, and was then brought into question, and when it was finally announced that it will be held, the surprise was that only Milosevic would show up in front of journalists.  This caused all of the 21 TV cameras to be fastened more firmly to their tripods, as more than hundred journalists strained to hear and see up close the personality who is the cause of so many headaches of the world’s biggest leaders.  (The interest for Milosevic was truly great: our embassy received 14 requests for an interview, but when told this Milosevic supposedly answered, “I have at least one hundred such requests in my drawer.”)

Milosevic appeared calm, collected, and self-composed, followed by two ministers of foreign affairs, Primakov and Jovanovic, and by the two already mentioned translators.  However, we were witness to the honor of Milosevic himself chairing the press conference,  of deciding who got to pose a question, to which he readily answered.  (It appeared that he would never tire of it, so that it is quite incomprehensible why he is avoiding interviews and press conferences when he appears so skillful at it. Moreover, no one could provoke him to say something he did not want to say, and everyone had to listen to what he had to say.)

Perhaps the secret lies in the conclusion: when questions entered dangerous territory with the intent to get more concrete answers, Primakov reminded Milosevic, in the spirit of good hospitality, that Patriarch Alexei was already waiting for him for some time in the Saint Danilov Monastery.

VIRTUALLY THE SAME POSITION: Regardless of how the questions were posed and to which aspect of the crisis they referred, Milosevic explained precisely that there is no fault in Belgrade’s actions and attitudes.  Whether they asked him what arguments Yeltsin used in persuading him to make “concessions”, or whether they wanted to hear if he was more convinced by NATO’s demonstration of force, or the call to Moscow as a sign of support, the chief of the Yugoslav state pointed to views expressed more than once in statements made on the occasion of this or that decision by the Contact Group, by the European Union, or by the famous Military-Political Alliance of the West.  Nothing could shake his confidence or the strength of his arguments.

This probably had the greatest influence on those commentators in Moscow who concluded that Russia, in fact, “suffered diplomatic defeat”.  This is a very harsh judgment, given that it could not be realistically expected that Milosevic would make a 180 degree turnaround.  Milosevic did not make concessions demonstrably, but he did show readiness to act in the way that is expected of him, under the condition that the other side (Kosovo’s Albanians and the West) permit him to do so: he cannot withdraw Serbian special units, “enemy forces”, because that would allow terrorists, bandits, guerrillas, or heroes (call them as you like) of the “occupied territories” to roam freely in the region.
It must be that even the staunchest authors of the ultimatum must have acknowledged something when they did not refuse point-blank to consider the Yeltsin-Milosevic Agreement.  They can claim that it is only a small step, that the main work still remains, but the fact remains that they are taking it into consideration.  Whether it is because of Moscow’s prestige or because it really does “create significant opportunities”, is no longer of any consequence.  In any case, if he did not manage to put off all threats, Yeltsin at least managed to loosen the noose around Milosevic’s neck.

WINNER AND LOSER: From this perspective, Milosevic appears as the winner in the Moscow stage of the “development of the situation” in Kosovo, while what remains for Russia is the role of the loser.  Milosevic placed the condition for withdrawal of special units on the stopping of activities by OVK, whose propagandized “readiness” for negotiations with Belgrade he refused as absurd, while he formulated the possibility of OEBS presence in Kosovo as a parallel process — negotiations of its simultaneous return to Kosovo and of return of full membership to Yugoslavia, which was skillfully stripped of this membership six years ago.

By standing behind such positions on Belgrade’s part, Russia in actual fact took on the responsibility of persuading the otherwise reserved West that Milosevic did actually make significant concessions.  In this way it had become his accessory, which could lead it into confrontation with its partners in the Contact Group.  That is why the first commentaries in the Moscow press are relying far less on the optimism and pleasure which the Russian officials expressed, including Yeltsin himself, than on his comment, whether accidental or because the old political fox knew that he should protect his back,  that everything will be made public, because, to use the expression used by Milosevic’s host after the meeting in the Kremlin, “the world should see what we discussed, so that there won’t be any going back later.”

However, this does not mean that there won’t be any “going back” at any price.  Russia demands that the West look at the Kosovo conflict as an internal Yugoslav issue, but things have gone too far for this to be accepted.  Even if one day it came to a vote in the Security Council, and everything agreed upon still remains unfulfilled, Russia will certainly not exploit its right to veto.