Price of Madness

In the past several weeks some progress has actually been achieved in Kosovo.  Not in the sense of military prizes, nor in the direction of peace, but at least there is no more mention of that referendum.  The historical NO has been forgotten and practically annulled, and in record time has been put into the great book of Serbian obtuseness and folly.  Of course, the whole matter passed unpunished, like everything that preceded it.  In any case, what was at issue was the will of a nation — is it not so? — and when a nation commits a mistake, a wise government is there to quickly make amends.

Besides the fact that the referendum was carried through, this instance of plebiscitary support of the people for this regime did not fundamentally differ from earlier instances of the same.  As Slobodan Milosevic put it, this is a national government.  That is why he always took care to keep the people handy, all the way from war and back to peace — even if only though telegrams of support, or through the famous TV opinion polls.  The referendum was conceived as an improvement and as progress in comparison to those initial meetings from the time of the Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution, even though the operation of covering up and mixing the order of events has remained unchanged.  The impression had to be created that political decisions, especially the most suspect ones, were coming from the people themselves, and not the other way around.

However, this referendum should be well remembered — because it proved itself so quickly and so clearly as such a huge mistake, while it also represents a perfect example of fixing the will of a nation and after the fact explaining many earlier tragedies.  This time, without any reason Milosevic succeeded once again in meriting the sharpening of sanctions.  Again we had a period of patriotic resistance against the entire world, which, by comparison with previous ones, only lasted several weeks.  This time, that was sufficient to satisfy the madness of the leftist and rightist extremists, and to totally discredit the Serb population of Kosovo.  Thus, once again, foreign powers have received a cart blanche to do as they please.  Despite Milosevic, it has been left to their mercy to take into account Serbian interests.

The fact is that Milosevic is incapable of being an equal partner, which is just as much the problem in the internal organization of the country, as in relations with the rest of the world, while Kosovo is a watershed for both of these problems.  He did not know how to seek an agreement with Albanians on his own, sticking to the anti-democratic principle of “all or nothing”, so that he arrived very quickly at nothing.  In the same way, he tried to exclude all foreign intervention, so that now he himself has completely withdrawn, deciding to let Richard Holbrooke do what can still be done.

At this moment, all possible solutions and results in Kosovo are on the table: continuation of war; autonomy within Serbia, Yugoslavia, or both; a republic; independence or division.  The solution which would be most acceptable to the rest of the world — a high degree of autonomy, and some type of Albanian self-rule — is the least acceptable both for Albanians and for the Serb side, at least as long as it is being represented by this kind or regime.  It could be imposed temporarily through outside pressures, but both sides would sabotage any kind of cooperation and would only look for opportunities to jointly break such a life together.  That is how it will end up, unless it turns out that the big powers still have the will to impose new protectorates in this region.

From the point of view of quality of life and internal stability, independence and the separation of Kosovo would be a less disadvantageous solution for Serbia than is believed, and would be less advantageous for Albanians then they would like to think.  But that is something which is not worth proving to either side.  Division is only one sub-variant of separation toward which, I believe, Milosevic is gravitating.  It is quite likely that at the top of the Serbian government, things have progressed quite far with calculations in that direction, and that wagers are being placed on territorial percentages instead of serious constitutional considerations being made on the status of Kosovo.

Finally, the possibility of a combination of two solutions has not been ruled out yet, solutions according to which the Kosovo border would be slightly moved in the favor of Serbia, just as insurance (such a solution would be worked on), while the reminder would get a high degree of autonomy, or a status of a republic, just so that state borders would not have to changed on impulse.  The down side of such a solution, as well as of any bordering off, would be hardest felt by those Serbs and Albanians who would be separated from their motherlands.  To them, every “How are you?” question would sound like “What are you still doing here?”, and they would try to distance themselves quietly — that is, if they are not driven away outright, which would be more likely.

If it is actually being considered what kind of solution should be sought for and what can be gotten in exchange, it would be better for Serbia, instead of territorial compensation, to get rid of Milosevic, Seselj and JUL.  Perhaps, under such conditions many Serbs could settle for losing our national cradle, Kosovo.  It could be explained to them that they should overlook the past in favor of the future, which is something no one has the right to ask them as long as they have no future to look forward to.  Let them at least have the past instead!

However, the present regime believes that this would be an unfair trade, because this kind of national government costs a lot more, and they would not give in until at least a half of Serbia goes down the drain.  In the Kosovo crisis, Milosevic could only sacrifice Seselj, who would certainly do the same thing if he was in his position, so that he is bound to understand.  It seems to me that plans are already being hatched for this.  Milosevic had already taken in and abandoned Seselj, when he waged war and was busy withdrawing, and this is beginning to look very familiar.

Seselj is saying that he would not meet with Holbrooke under any circumstance, while Milosevic is saying that he would, and that he will.  It appears that Holbrooke is irreversibly stuck between these two coalition partners, and I am wagering that he will push out Seselj, who has a hard time putting up with American proximity.  But that is why there is Vuk Draskovic who is always ready to sacrifice himself for the salvation of his people.  In any case, the development of the situation in Kosovo will inevitably affect the balance of power and government structures in Belgrade.  This will be educational, perhaps even entertaining to watch, but those who want to get the most fun out of this will do well not to burden themselves with any kinds of principles, ideas or ideologies, or national interests.  Otherwise the whole spectacle will not be sufficiently comical.