Caravans Are Traveling

In a recently published analysis of the tactics of both sides in the war in Kosovo, a reputable Slovenian publication, Obramba (the former Nasa obramba), reached a conclusion that incidents on the Albanian-Yugoslav border up to now were mostly diversionary tactics, that is to say, the attraction of attention and drawing of forces to a previously arranged spot, in order for the real and serious transport of arms and military equipment to occur unhindered.  The best example for this theory would be the attack on Orahovac: fighting around this town coincided with an attempt at smuggling a greater quantity of arms in the region of Djeravica.  In other words, the hidden caravan is waiting for the shooting to begin at a given spot, and only then begins to go across the unprotected part of the border.  As an argument two circumstances are cited: the constant strengthening and broadening of actions by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which requires an ever greater inflow of arms and military equipment; the arms which come into the hands of the Yugoslav border patrols is outdated and cheap.

The first argument is strong and logical; the second one can be criticized on the basis that “he who does not have a horse goes on foot”, that is to say that an armed insurgence such as this one in Kosovo has to depend on what it can get.  This, on the other hand, is not so little or so outdated: KLA has in its possession automatic rifles of the type Kalasnikov (of Chinese or Yugoslav origin), semi-automatic rifles using the Simonov system (a Chinese modification), hand held rocket launchers of the type RPG-7 and -8, 60 mm caliber mortar guns — all these as the most basic and most popular arms, but also some other exotic arms in this region.  It should be added that there is also a collection of outdated and trophy arms from the Second World War.  When it is all traced to the countries of origin and to the arms available on the black market, a clearer picture comes into view.

SOURCE OF INCOME: Namely, in regard to accessibility, the Republic of Albania is absolutely at the top of the list.  More precisely, one year ago, at the time of the power crisis in Albania which ensued following the massive unrest of citizens defrauded in financial operations of the type we saw here with “Defina and Jezda”, around 1.5 million pieces of arms of all types were taken from police stations, army barracks, and warehouses.  Some of the arms were voluntarily returned by the population, some were appropriated by the police, and the Albanian authorities and international organizations, which have come to its aid, estimate that only 600 to 650,000 pieces are missing...  These arms could be bought one year ago at a price of 10 to 25 German marks a piece, and it is considered that intelligent and resourceful people invested considerable money in buying and warehousing these arms — until better days.  This was facilitated by the continued state of chaos in the country, and especially to the Northeast, along the border with FR Yugoslavia, in the regions of Bajram Curija, Tropoje, and Kukes, right down to Peskopije in the South.  These territories are either under the control of the semi-mutinous supporters of Salij Berisa, or under no control whatsoever.

Better days soon came for enterprising people in Albania, as soon as KLA reached a decision to begin its battle for the liberation of Kosovo.  Namely, the Albanian emigration from Kosovo — otherwise financially strong and united — made available considerable funds to KLA for the purchase of armaments.  Albania was the logical place: they are both numerous and poor, and see a possibility of handsome profits in the war in Kosovo.  In circles which monitor firearms, which is now one of the more significant international issues, it is considered that the profit margins of the Albanian dealers in stolen arms in transactions with the KLA range in the neighborhood of 500 to 1000 percent.
Thus, Albania is the main source or arms and military equipment for the KLA.  These arms are mostly of Chinese origin, because since 1956 the National Republic of China exclusively supplied Albania with all kinds of armaments.  Part of those armaments, especially the older ones, could also be of Soviet origin, because the USSR also supplied China until 1956.  Such outdated armaments have already been met with and appropriated in the territory of Kosovo, but it could also have come from the former Yugoslav National Army, which had enormous amounts of Soviet armaments dating back to the Second World War.  As far as outdated armaments are concerned, the presence of German and Italian arms from the Second World War in Kosovo can be traced back to three sources: what was left behind with the population, from reserves of SFR Yugoslavia, and from reserves of the National Republic of Albania.

The more recent armaments which can be found in Kosovo, and which does not come from any of the mentioned sources, represent the most interesting part of the story.  The greatest part of the modern (and new) armaments comes from the Yugoslav black market: automatic and semi-automatic rifles domestically manufactured (M-70 and M-56 PAP), hand held rocket launchers M-80 (“zolya”), probably also RPG-7 and 8, sniper rifles M-76, hand grenades, ammunition and such.  One part comes from the international black market and such examples are ever more frequent in recent times.  At issue is the appearance of hand grenades, rocket launchers and mines of more recent date of manufacture which come from former Warsaw Pact countries, as well as rifles, automatic rifles and anti-tank armaments from NATO countries.  Uniforms, belts, boots, and other non-lethal equipment can be easily bought wholesale because it is not subject to control in the world, so that it is not worthy of attention.  The fact that recently the “Heckler und Koch G-3" rifles have begun appearing in the hands of KLA, along with handheld rocket launchers “MBB Armbrust” and modern telecommunication equipment, indicates that KLA buyers are quickly making contacts with the big players in the European and World black market of armaments and military equipment, where purchases are strictly wholesale.  Namely, those who have “Armbrusts” for sale, for example, are not interested in small amounts, so that it should be expected that such devices will appear ever more frequently in Kosovo or at the border, in attempts at smuggling.

Waging a war of the sort that is being waged in Kosovo, and under conditions which are in place there, sets certain demands on KLA which are of crucial importance.  Above all it is necessary to exploit the sudden and undeniable popularity of armed revolt, and to mobilize, arm, and equip a great number of volunteers; then supplies of ammunition and everything else, which are quickly used up in this kind of very active phase of the war, need to be taken care of; then, and this could become most important, stores of clothing, footwear, equipment, ammunition, and armaments need to be secured for the winter period when the border with Albania will become practically inaccessible because of deep snow.

Because of all this, suggestions cited in Obramba are not to be taken lightly.  Namely, to a large extent the war in Kosovo is being fought over supply lines, over the maintaining accessibility in what Western observers on ground are already calling “Ho Chi Ming’s Road”.  At issue are more than several roads from the Albanian border to the center of the country; from North to South, those are the directions: the region of Djeravica-Junik and Decani; the region of Morine-Gramocelj, Ponosevac; the region of Prusit-Djakovica and Orahovac; the region of Gorozup-Prizren and Suva Reka.  All these destinations practically surround Metohija and Drenica, two regions of the most intensive fighting in the last several months.  The objective of KLA logically suggests itself: to ensure accessibility of supply lines through the center of Kosovo, in the West-East direction and from the North to Mitrovica, and to keep them accessible until the winter.  Their ambition is probably to ensure transportability by trucks, even if only at night, and not only through smaller transport options (people, donkeys, terrain vehicles, cars) which are available at the present.

Because supplies appear as the principal tactical objective in this phase of the war, it is logical to expect that KLA will invest everything to ensure that as much armaments, ammunition, and equipment as possible cross the border for distribution in bases across Kosovo.  If this does not succeed, the only alternative will be battle and sacrifice in attempts to take armaments and ammunition from the army and the police, which would be very expensive and politically detrimental for KLA.