Running Around in Circles

Ratko Markovic, the Serbian Vice Premier and head of the Serbian team for peace talks on Kosovo, went to Pristina again last Tuesday to meet with ethnic Albanian representatives, but once again they didn't show up. This scenario has happened about ten times in the past month or so.

If Markovic had bothered to listen to the radio that day, he could have saved himself a lot of time and the state some money that it paid for his traveling expenses A few hours before Markovic set off to Pristina, the leader o f the ethnic Albanian delegation, Fehmi Agani, told Belgrade's B92 Radio he had no intention of meeting with the Serbs until the Serbian authorities withdrew their troops "responsible for civilian casualties" from the southern province. Agani also said he would meet with the Serb delegation only if Christopher Hill and a Contact Group envoy were present at the talks. Naturally, the Serbian side snubbed Agani's terms and asked him to bring his delegation to "unconditional peace talks aimed at bringing a just, human and peaceful solution to the conflict". Agani then wrote a letter to Markovic asking him to "stop playing word games", at least until the basic conditions for dialogue are met.

Serbs and ethnic Albanians have been playing this game called "Running around in circles" for months. They seem to be quite indifferent to the fact that human lives are at stake.

Ethnic Albanian leaders won't talk unless Kosovo's independence is accepted as the basic framework for the peace talks, playing deaf to the major powers' clear message that independence is out of the question. The Serbs, on the other hand, keep interpreting Agani's words as a demand that Serbia withdraw all, and not some, of its troops from Kosovo, but it is a fact that Agani has never said anything like that. Whether the Serbs are misinterpreting his words deliberately or not is a mystery. The whole story is getting ridiculous. Markovic's valiant efforts to blame the ethnic Albanian side for obstructing peace talks went down the drain when the other Serbian Vice Premier, Vojislav Seselj, said that it wasn't in the Serbian government's interest to rush peace talks because its present international position is less than favorable.

In fact, it seems that the ethnic Albanians too are not in a rush because  of the very apparent rifts within their political structures. Ibrahim Rugova's five-man team that was formed in the wake of the Serbian offensive only appears to be multi-party. Fehmi Agani and Fatmir Sejdiu are both veterans of Rugova's Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (DSK) and resigned formally. The other three, Ilijaz Kurtesi, Tadej Rodici and Edita Tahiri are members of parties widely regarded as DSK satellites in Kosovo.

The KLA representatives and all parties left and right of Rugova, "hard-liners" and "the moderate ones" alike, stayed out of the coalition. They now joined forces against Rugova's team to deny its legitimacy and credibility. Adem Demaci, Rugova's former ally and one of the most prominent ethnic Albanian politicians, became the KLA's political representative a few days ago. Not only did Demaci threaten to declare Rugova a traitor if he gave up the demand for Kosovo's complete independence, he threatened NATO too! "In case agreement is reached on some kind of autonomy to be supervised by international troops, NATO troops will be treated like the Serbia n army", he told the B 92 radio. Although most Rugova's adversaries are not quite so militant, they are unanimous in condemning both Rugova and the international community that supports him.
Ironically, the only side in a rush to bring peace to Kosovo is the United States of America. Having chosen Rugova for their ethnic Albanian partner, the Americans have infuriated the other ethnic Albanians but haven't moved an inch closer to getting the peace talks underway. Things have become ever so uncertain thanks to the Contact Group. The Contact Group's plan on Kosovo's new status, submitted to both Slobodan Milosevic and Ibrahim Rugova, includes three models. One resembles the Z-4 plan offered to the Serbs in Croatia, envisaging territorial and cultural autonomy as well as local police for ethnic Albanians, but no army or border guards of their own. The Alpe-Addigio model envisages territorial and administrative autonomy as well as a joint police force whose officers must speak both languages. The third model based on the example of Finland's Aaland archipelago, populated by Swedes only, envisages a special status, full regional control over the police force and regional citizenship). Russia has come up with its own idea how to resolve the problem. The Russians came forward with the proposition that relations between Serbs and ethnic Albanians should be regulated like Russia did with Tatarstan, a region with strong autonomy but no right to secession.

The situation, however, was never more hopeless. Both sides were deliberately obstructing peace talks, and the ethnic Albanians have formed a united front against Rugova and his efforts to gain a monopoly of the ethnic Albanian political structures. As far as lasting solution to the conflict is concerned, the chances for one are as realistic as the Contact Group's three propositions. After Milosevic's decade-long struggle to force the ethnic Albanians to become Serbs has ended in failure, Kosovo's Albanians can now choose from the international's community's offers to register either as Swedes or Tartars. Unless, of course, they accept the Z-4 replica, in which case they become Serbs. Perhaps Ratko Markovic should consider taking a Finnish course while waiting for his the ethnic Albanian team to arrive.