Guerrilla Opposition

Among those who still deal with the Serbian political scene (many have given up, considering this task to be an inhumane exploitation of brainpower), there are fairly divergent views on whether there is still in Serbia anything that could still be called a “democratic opposition”.  Particular theorists claim that the opposition in fact disappeared the moment its leaders demonstrated an incredible ability for wasting the energy of people’s discontent which sprouted in the winter protests of two years ago.

However, there is a slightly different opinion according to which the situation of the Serbian opposition is not unlike that in the “Negro” candy commercial — “there is nothing so black that it could not be still more black.”  According to such opinion, what fell apart in Serbia is only that which masqueraded as the opposition, and now the picture is far brighter, even if, for purposes of analysis, it is necessary to use a magnifying glass.

Last weak the leaders of several opposition parties, joined by the former Federal Premier, Milan Panic, and the former Governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, Dragoslav Avramovic, promoted the Alliance for Changes.  One of the founders of this newest opposition alliance, the leader of the Democratic Party, Zoran Djindjic, as on many earlier, similar occasions, claims that changes, which are not foreseen by the majority of people, are quite possible.  In his latest public appearances, he even predicted that these are the last months of Milosevic’s regime.  It is not the first time that he has predicted something of the sort.  Although, he is not alone in this.

“I do not base this prediction merely on the fact of how the patient is feeling today, but on the history of the illness and whether there is any medicine for it,” states Zoran Djindjic in his interview for VREME.  “If you have in hand an X-ray picture of the patient and his blood analysis and, along with that, you know how it has all ended in similar cases, then the outcome is certain.  Of course, it is not insignificant, either for him or for others, whether that end comes a day, a month or a year from now, but in general, the time is up for this regime.  Along the way, on several occasions, there has been mention of whether or not Milosevic would be capable of adopting some other alternative, to become a reformist.  It turned out that this was not possible.  Even this last experiment with Seselj has absolutely demonstrated that the specific mass of Milosevic’s negative energy is such that it absorbs everything around it.  He absorbed liberals like Danko Djunic and Misa Beko, Seselj’s Radicals and Vuk Draskovic’s Hajduks.  At the same time, there has not been a single shakeup in the plan for executing power — supposedly, with the introduction of all those many alternatives which were beyond his reach.  Well, the other question to which I have no answer is — whether we will succeed in creating an alternative to this system.  It is certain that with Milosevic’s ruin, what follows will not automatically be better.  Milosevic’s ruin could be followed by chaos, by a dictatorship in which some other state agencies might take over the country, a turnaround could happen, civil war.  There are many scenarios and many paths which could lead out of that crisis into some other, worse crisis.  There is only one path which leads us out of this labyrinth.”

VREME: You are packing all that into the next several months.  At the same time, it is a fairly widespread view that there will not be any changes here unless things break from within, from within SPS itself, somewhere in the government.  Like happened in Montenegro.”

DJINDJIC: In all other countries of Western Europe, the alternative was a rebuilding of the system from within.  Evidently, this is not possible in Serbia.  When I say from within, I am referring to political parties, to the ones in power, but also to the opposition.  The model of national mobilization which brought Milosevic to power was far too tolerant and took hold of all segments of the system.  All institutions, including the church, universities, parties...  When I say that it will fall apart, I do not mean that the opposition will suddenly become more powerful because this is not possible in that system.  Sometimes I compare this to an occupation.  In an occupied country the opposition is never on TV.  We are hiding in the woods and mountains, in Knjazevac, Leskovac, Zajecar...  On the main roads, there is nothing happening.  Even in 1943 there was no resistance against the Germans on the Belgrade-Nis road, but there was in the woods.  That is why, in a guerrilla sense, there is an opposition on ground.  While Milosevic is in power, there won’t be any opposition in the normal, civilized sense.  Anything that is regular as an opposition is part of his system.  And this has been brought to perfection with SRS and SPO, which have become better SPS spokesmen than Ivica Dacic himself.

VREME: The democratic opposition has recently entered into a new project called the Alliance for Changes.  Given that we have seen various coalitions, initiatives, alliances, what exactly is new here?

The attempt is new.  We are not accepting the fact that we did not succeed in the past.  Even after mistakes, we still keep trying.  Had we not attempted to unite even once since 1990, there would certainly be a myth here that the opposition certainly would have won, had it only united.  However, it is easy to forget that in 1996 we ran in the federal elections as the broadest coalition of the democratic opposition — DS, SPO, DSS, GSS, and some syndicates.  And that we got very few votes.  We later won in local elections because of the principle of the majority, that is to say not because we got 50 percent of the votes.  At that time it became apparent that if we adapt to conditions, if we exploit intelligently this principle of the majority and make an intelligent campaign in the second round, then we could win.  But this was more a question of our experience, than of the attitude of the people toward the unification of the opposition.  We must understand the last ten years as a process of searching for a formula for changes in Serbia, and if it did not succeed his way once, twice, or three times, it does not mean that there is another formula.  In any case, I would like to hear what it is.

VREME: The Alliance for Changes has promoted a very ambitious project and has promised a lot in only the first hundred days of being in power.  It is so ambitious that it appears to have been created by those who are not even thinking seriously about being in power?

Only on two or three points of that program do we actually promise success.  We do not promise immediate returns of pensions, nor that we will solve the problems of refugees, of villages, of unemployment.  We promise that in the first hundred days, our government will come out with a clear program and clear commitments to those problems, which has not been the case yet.  But success is only being promised with regard to Kosovo, Montenegro and the international community.  In this a cease-fire is being promised in Kosovo, with regard to Montenegro, normalization of relations, and finally, the initiation of the already begun process of returning our country into the international community.  In all other areas we promise that our government will make a contract with the people, and will show up as one side in that agreement, a side which will honor its obligations.  We are well aware of how things are.  We could certainly not say — we will sell Dedinje and will pay back the foreign currency savings.  This cannot be said or done in a hundred days.  But in those hundred days we could say — savings accounts holders who have up to one thousand marks in savings, and this amounts to around 300 million marks of total state debt, will get their money within that period, because we would take out a credit from the international community.  We could make deals with those to whom the state owes more.  That would be the idea, and not — we will give back all in a hundred days.  Unemployment in Serbia will not be solved in the next five years.  But if we continue with this kind of government which we have today, no one in Serbia will be working, five years from now.  Only the criminals.

VREME: Your Alliance for Changes is demanding new elections.  There is much talk about this possibility, but the impression is that considerable time will pass before the next elections.

As far as we are concerned, the elections are relevant only so long as they result in a change of government.  Elections which would lead to a reshuffling of power and which would merely force the people into deeper despair, that is to say the kind in which the democratic opposition would get 49 percent, are not relevant for us.  The only ones which are relevant for us are those in which Milosevic, Seselj and Draskovic would get 49 percent.  It is clear that an election which would suit us will not be the result of events which will take place on the political scene.  There is no chance that a sufficiently strong impulse will come from government or official opposition ranks for such an election to be held.  Otherwise, we are not interested in elections about which the Radicals and Milosevic are talking — those “Kosovo” elections which, supposedly, are going to lead to the solution on Kosovo.  In such elections SPS might lose 30 more of its MP’s which it regularly appropriates from Kosovo, but would get them through the Radicals and the SPO.

VREME: But that means that the Alliance will continue to play outside the court, and few people are interested in such athletics.  It will sooner lead to complete loss of influence among the voters...

We are not handicapped in the least by playing outside the court.  The cause of the present desperation and the present mood in Serbia is not the fact that the opposition is not in government institutions, but that public opinion is laboring under the perception handed down to it by Milosevic — that the only thing that matters is what happens at the royal court.  As we are not under Milosevic’s spotlights, we are supposedly not relevant.  Even if we were in parliament, our status would be the same as it is today when we are outside parliament, because we do not support Milosevic.  We were in parliament from 1993 to 1997, yet we were never on TV.  Since my 1993 election campaign, I personally never appeared on RTS.  I am the first Mayor of Belgrade who never appeared on RTS.  No one said at the time that this is something quite pathological.  Only when I ceased to be Mayor, they said — now you have been marginalized.  Well, I’m sorry, and where was I before that?  I was also marginalized before that point.

VREME: The opposition ranks have frequently fallen apart even during maneuvers, before the elections.  Sometimes this occurred when, ahead of time, it divvied up some future political power.  If elections do not happen soon, will the Alliance for Changes survive long enough to participate in them?

If there were any sort of chance for victory in the elections, we would insist on creating a broad alliance, not only to achieve the victory itself, but so that later it would not result that we were partisans, wishing to cash in on our efforts, and not wanting to share this with anyone who earlier sat at home.  The most dangerous thing would be if changes in Serbia were to happen according to the principle of the change of dynasties in XIX century Europe.  For Serbia, the cliché that the government and the opposition are dynasties which change and appoint their people is most dangerous.  And after that, for 50 years one dynasty rules.  We can only escape this vicious circle if we broaden the power base.  These alliances are one of the ways in which this can be done.  They are not only an important form for winning the elections, but even more so a guarantee that after the elections there won’t be narrowing and abuse of power.  The more witnesses there are, the harder it is to commit abuses.  It is more difficult to succumb to the mermaid’s call to power, which is something no one in Serbia has yet been able to resist.

VREME: Your political opponents say that virtually every day you call on a united opposition, but that you have, in fact, greatly contributed to its falling apart.

What does falling apart mean?  DS was the first political party I joined in my entire life.  I am the first and only president who did not come into a party as a president, but rather I spent four years in it, first as one of the founders, and then as president of the Executive Council.  People who left this party immediately became presidents of parties which they formed.   And they left because they did not wish to be partners, but presidents.  So that I don’t know what it is I broke apart.  Coalition “Zajedno” would not have happened as an idea had it not been for me.  Had it not been for my extreme understanding in 1996, it would have fallen apart a hundred times before it was actually put together.  What Kostunica and Draskovic used to do to me! How many times they cornered and blackmailed me at the last minute.  In any case, the fact that DSS has more MP’s in the Federal Parliament than DS, sufficiently speaks for my readiness for sacrifice in order to rescue this project.  That is why I think that I worked the hardest in Serbia on uniting the opposition.  If you look at actions, and not words, you will see that those who say such things have nothing behind them.  Among Serbs, who are a people given to epic tails, stories are frequently taken for deeds.  In this way, those who talk a lot but don’t do anything fare best.  Of course, I made a lot of mistakes during these last ten years because I also worked very hard.

VREME: Was it your biggest mistake that during the winter protests you had a meeting with Milosevic?

No, it wasn’t.  My cardinal mistake is that we ended the protests without asking for early elections in May of the same year.  That was something that Milosevic was ready to accept and to support us in at that time.  My mistake was that I did not better analyze his situation at the time, nor his loss of contact with reality.  I had it in front of my eyes and on the palm of my hand.  I had this potential in front of me — it’s not worth talking about, it’s finished.  It was merely an easy conclusion, instead of having insisted on elections — now or never.  On all levels, with Gonzales and full control.  That is perhaps my biggest mistake in my entire career.  Faced with a demand — elections in May or a continuation of the protests — Milosevic would have accepted elections.  He would certainly have lost the elections in May.

VREME: The united opposition appears to have always been short by a million votes and by two million German marks in achieving victory.  Even if, with the coming of Milan Panic to the Alliance, some money comes in, where will you find the voters?

Votes were never a problem, but the problem is that the opposition idea was never sufficiently clear.  And it was insufficiently clear above all because the time was fairly confusing.  We had a war in Bosnia, refugees, concern for the state.  The problem was that the people who proposed those ideas were not representative of those ideas.  If you have the message — Europe in Serbia and Serbia in Europe — and it is being stated by a man who belongs in the 15th century, then that can hardly move a majority.  If again we don’t do this, but instead talk about who did what since the battle of Kosovo centuries ago and up to today, where the mistakes happened, who robbed whom, we could get a number of votes from malcontents, but that is not sufficient for a victory and change.  Personally, there is no value for me in the fact that DS might win 35 percent of the votes in some future election if the atmosphere in our society continues to be the same.  What will I do with that 35 percent.  Go to the Serbian Parliament and argue over Kosovo?  So that Mirko Marjanovic can hold lectures on everything he did in Kosovo?  Well, why has he not given such a speech in the last three months?

VREME: What is the role of Milan Panic and Dragoslav Avramovic in the Alliance for Changes?

Through them, we are showing that this is no longer a party matter, as it has been thus far.  We wish to gather around as many people as possible who have positive energy, to unite them and, I hope that they will be followed by many others.  At the moment, because they are the only ones, the focus is on them, but when that extends to seven or eight prominent individuals, it will be understood that we in fact wish to gather in one place everything that is positive in this society.  All those who have been part of the opposition since 1990, who were disillusioned and who came back.  Their participation also points to the fact that every political project has its economic price.  In any case, in the eyes of the people no one individual has enough muscle power to manage the whole thing alone.  No one on their own is quite strong enough.

On Kosovo

“We said many times that any political solution for Kosovo is salvation.  Every resolution and the salvation which it brings will have to be accepted even by the devil himself.  But I fear that with Milosevic, no solid solution to Kosovo is possible because no one believes him any longer.  He has lost so much credibility that no one will accept him as a serious guarantee for any kind of political solution.  This will always recur as a problem.  There is no way around this.”

On Montenegro

“Milosevic’s system looks like a fortress with ten feet thick walls.  Within the fortress there is no defense.  Outside the fortress there is not enough firepower to tear it down.  The answer is for a revolt to occur within the fortress, but everything within is completely rotten.  And now there is Milo Djukanovic who is outside of the whole thing — he is not with our main army which is assailing the fortress, he says we are a different sort, but we are still some kind of allies.  That is why Milosevic is at a loss for what to do — if he doesn’t let him in, the pressure from outside will increase.  If he does let him in, he knows that, with Djukanovic, he will be getting a risk factor within the fortress itself.  Milosevic is not protected by his strength, he is protected by this system which is constructed like a fortress.  That is why the pressure from without must be incomparably greater.  The winter protests had as many as a million people, and yet they could not topple him.  At that time he was a petty official who was wondering where all the banging was coming from during the state television evening news hour.  His main request at that time, when we met was — is it possible not to make so much noise at eight o’clock?  I told him that it’s not possible because this is a way in which people are expressing their mood.  He also found it problematic that students were whistling beneath his window at the presidential offices.  That was his situation.  Thus, his dilemma with Djukanovic is whether to let him in through the fortress gates and have problems with him, or not to let him in and allow the state to go to ruin — which will give him even bigger problems.  I don’t know how he will solve this.  I told Djukanovic recently — imagine if he offers the position of premier to a member of DPS and includes the Radicals and SPO into such a government, and creates a kind of circus.  I told him — you must accept that because then the ball will be in your court.  If you win, you will have to keep proving that you are not the one who is ruining this country.  If Milosevic takes on such a risk, you must also do the same.  And Djukanovic agreed with this,” states Zoran Djindjic.