Status and Territory

On September 17, Pristina’s daily Albanian newspaper, Koha ditore published an article which it presented as the American proposal for an agreement on Kosovo.  In that article the naming of the political status of Kosovo was eschewed, as being neither a “republic”, a “region”, nor even meriting “special status” — in that proposal it is called a Territory.  It is not explicitly stated whether Kosovo will be a part of Serbia or of Yugoslavia, but the text itself indicates that the manifold stages of autonomy are within Serbia, with strong emphasis on joining the federation with very pronounced national and local management.

For instance, already in the second preamble it is stated that federal officials and those employed by the republic will not interfere in the working of the authorized officials of Kosovo who will work within their jurisdictions, and that the officials of Kosovo will not interfere in the work of federal officials, nor those who represent the republic.  If this division of authorizations, along with the absence of hierarchical subordination, is carried out, it will limit to a certain degree the spirit of the Serbian Constitution which gives the Assembly of the Republic the option of assuming authority in the region, which it has already done in the case of Kosovo.  It will annul some of the “sources” of popular revolts, but, as it appears, not the main source — Serbia’s unity.

MEMBER OF A FEDERATION: Vice-President of the Serbian Government and Serbian Radical, Dr. Vojislav Seselj, stated that Kosovo could obtain the status that the Northern Serbian Region of Vojvodina has, and nothing more, even though there are already many suggestions that, with the introduction of proportional representation of nationalities into Federal Parliament, the distribution of power will change, and that also implies a fairly delicate political job.  Miodrag Vukovic, Advisor to Milo Djukanovic, President of Montenegro, stated that the American proposal can only be adopted if it does not change the political status of Serbia within Yugoslavia.  Before the American proposal was released to the public, Kosta Cavoski expressed the conviction in the Press Club of Belgrade’s Media Center that the idea of multi-staged autonomy cannot be adopted, because it would change the status of Montenegro and the existing balance between the members of the federation in the Peoples’ Assembly.  In this context, the group of constitutional lawyers who are lobbying for the regionalization of the state is growing.

Among the Serbian political parties, this proposal has received the harshest criticism from Vojislav Kostunica (DSS), who announces that a signature on such a proposal, or a similar one, would mean a “Dayton-like” acknowledgment of defeat.

The BETA Agency observes that, according to this plan, Kosovo would get a total of ten MP’s in Federal Parliament, and that it would also get proportional representation in the Government of Serbia.  This detail suggests that those who drafted the proposal kept in mind that Serbia has a so-called rigid constitution which is extremely difficult to change, so that an attempt has been made to circumvent the constitution with a view to legitimizing changes.

ON THE LOCAL, NATIONAL, REGIONAL, REPUBLIC, FEDERAL, AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS:  A “Territory” has its own parliament and government; a Representative (something like a President), a Governing Body (government), an Administration and an Ombudsman (an individual who will be responsible for implementing an agreement and who will be appointed by the Government of Yugoslavia, from a list of individuals which would be proposed by the European Court for Human Rights).  Through an ombudsman (an ancient Scandinavian institution which was created for examining citizens’ complaints to abuse of power), a fairly ingenious element of international control is being introduced without overly insulting state sovereignty.  Our prominent political scientist, Vojislav Stanovicic, has been proposing the introduction of this institution for some time now.  According to this proposal, Kosovo would also get its own judiciary.  After election by local officials, judges would be sworn in by Parliament, which could also appoint officials of Appeals Courts for the entire territory of Kosovo.  It is also being said that Kosovo could have its own judges in the supreme courts of Serbia and Yugoslavia, which would again guarantee uniformity in the legal system.

However, there is also mention of courts for ethnic communities whose procedures would be established locally, because ethnic communities have the right to protect national customs, the right to regulating family law, inheritance, marital relations, education and adoption of children, etc.

From this example it can be seen that the proposed structure of territorial government is very complex.  Officials in Kosovo, just like those in the Federation and the Republics, would also not interfere in the work of institutions created by ethnic communities with a view to realizing their special rights.  According to this initial proposal, every ethnic community would appoint its own National Council which would have its own executive officials.

Territorial Parliament would partly be made up of delegates chosen under international supervision, and would partly have members who would be chosen by ethnic communities according to their own procedures.  It should be established that every ethnic community gets a certain number of delegates, while the degree to which the population size of an ethnic group should be represented in the territorial parliament would be agreed upon in negotiations.

A parliament with such a structure would coordinate its operations with federal and republican officials, as well as with local and ethnic communities.  According to the diction of the proposal, the Governing Body (government) would have a multiethnic makeup.

ADDITIONAL RIGHTS: Members of ethnic communities are entitled to additional rights which concern cultural, ethnic and religious matters — these are the rights to their mother tongue, to media and education in their mother tongue, to denoting cities and villages, squares and streets with local names, to official information in the mother tongue, to creating educational, cultural and religious associations, to freely displaying national symbols, to the right to communication with their fellows outside FRY.  This last point also has a decree which entitles officials in Kosovo to their own foreign policy which would be in keeping with the Constitution of FRY.  All this would mean that Serbia would probably have to change some laws (on language, toponyms, etc.) which were adopted in the nineties.  Equal access to employment openings in the public domain is stipulated, which probably assumes the return to their jobs of a large number of workers who were fired during the nineties or were recently employed on ethnic basis.
The breaking of ethnic rights is limited only to instances where they infringe upon the rights of other ethnic communities.

The right to education in the mother tongue is guaranteed, while the state would have to commit to assisting ethnic institutions.  Ethnic communities would be helped in coordinating their programs with the programs of the Republic (for instance, the possibility of equal standards in the teaching of mathematics and the sciences for all students).  Every ethnic group would be guaranteed at least one radio and TV frequency for programs in the mother tongue.  Protection of certain localities of religious, historic and cultural significance is also stipulated.

Officials in Kosovo would be financed by special taxes which they would collect themselves, as well as by state taxes.  The proposed solution appears fairly expensive, as such solutions generally tend to be.  Predrag Simic (Institute for International Politics and Economy) recently stated (at the Press Club of Belgrade’s Media Center in “conversation with Milosevic”) that the so-called Tyrolean solution cost about 3,000 dollars per capita — per month!

POLICE: Ensuring freedom of movement would be under the jurisdiction of the regional authorities.  Every community would have to form its own police force which would be made ready in accordance with international standards, with special emphasis on the protection of human rights.  The Kosovo Police would be exclusively responsible for keeping public peace.  This would not fall under federal or republican police jurisdiction, which would be entrusted with border security, border police and investigations associated with crime which fall under international criminal warrants.  (State and border police would recruit their members from ethnic groups in accordance with proportional national divisions which occur in this territory.)  For Serbia this will be the most problematic point, given that Albanians who, as things stand now, are permanently in favor of secession, and in this way will be getting a chance to arm themselves with service weapons which they could turn against the state in eventual renewed insurgencies.  As a measure of trust, it is proposed that state security forces reduce their presence only in places where they are permanently located.  It is possible to expect that the Serbian side could demand certain additional guarantee mechanisms.

Both sides will encourage the process of refugee return, will cooperate and will offer maximum assistance to international non-governmental organizations, and will offer assistance in the investigation of war crimes.  Implementation of the agreement would presume the modification of state acts and laws to suit the agreement.  After a given number of months (the number is not given), internationally monitored elections will be held for officials stipulated in this agreement.  Also under international supervision, an objective census will be carried out, which is what Serbs have been insisting on in recent times.  In the space of three years, signatories of the agreement will thoroughly review the agreement, with a view to improving its implementation, and will take into account suggestions by the opposite side for further steps, for which reciprocal agreement will be mandatory.  This is similar to what came out of President Slobodan Milosevic's cabinet — that the two sides will review questions which they agree can be opened.

ECLECTIC THOUGHTS: In other words, the proposal is a kind of eclectic mixture of traditional institutions, of self-management, of European civil society institutions, of complex measures for establishing trust, of models of personal autonomy, of some of Kardelj's solutions from 1974, of Leke Dukadjini's Law — with mechanisms for the protection of small ethnic groups having been introduced in a transparent way, the same ethnic groups whose representative this spring, on several occasions, while waiting for Rugova to arrive, spoke with the Serbian negotiating team, which was headed by Professor Markovic, Vice-President of the Government of Serbia.  In some details, the proposal is similar in spirit to another solution for territorial-personal autonomy which, in 1993, the Magyars of Vojvodina proposed for their ethnic community.

The thing looks exceedingly complicated, but, it must be admitted, a relatively correct reflection of the way in which society in Kosovo functioned, as a system of parallel and relatively distant ethnic worlds.  In this, the proposal differs significantly in sprit from the solution adopted by the 1974 Constitution in which ethnic minorities are tied to a territory and to the creation of ethnic societies.  Ethnic (personal) organization was not permitted according to that Constitution; on the level of existing republic and territories, ethnic groups were forced into sending their representatives into shared legislative bodies, but in that monolithic concept, ethnic groups were informally tied to their representatives in a status quo of authority, attended by constant tension coming from pressures for ethnic dissolution.

By comparison with the 1974 solution, which was in many ways “rural” (connection between ethnicity and territory), this solution is a “metropolitan” mixing of languages.  Your author is here lead to an association of an observation made by Bogdan Bogdanovic in a 1992 interview for VREME: “in the big cities of the world, from Memphis to Babylon, a ‘national’ language was not a very clear category.  In the same big city, within the metropolitan culture, it was possible to communicate in many languages, assuming that the basic language was understood, whether it was quietly or loudly spoken, but in any case, the mute language of the metropolis which was chosen according to free will.”

ALBANIAN NATIONAL STATE: The Albanian side submitted its 16 points of a proposal for creating a transitional agreement with the Serbian side, holding to what it got in the 1974 Constitution.  In that solution there was a strongly felt intention for Kosovo to become a separate (Albanian) national state which would declaratively guarantee standard protection of minority rights, but there was no specific mention of the mechanisms for that protection.

Therefore the proposal published by Koha ditore on September 20, 1998 requires international guarantees for a transitional solution.  America is mentioned explicitly, whether because of easy promises, or whether because Kosovo politicians interpreted the concern of different governmental and non-governmental organizations in a subjective way.  This means Kosovo's Albanian politicians are trying to decide with Western politicians whether the latter gave them loose promises, or whether they merely misinterpreted their concern.  (One anecdote from a meeting of NGO's in Sweden relates that, in his speech at the ceremonial banquet, a Montenegran said that he understands that friends from happier nations are concerned about the situation in our country, concluding that "had we known that you would be quite so concerned about us, we would not have gotten ourselves into this situation!")

In the Albanian proposal there is also mention of UN General Principles, international rules, the final Helsinki Act, but because "Helsinki" does not agree with the declared intention of having Kosovo become indepenent one day, there is insistence on the fact that Yugoslavia (SFRY) has disintegrated, that is, insistence of a de facto revision of the London and Geneva Convention, as well as on the fact that before the disintegration, Kosovo had the status of a constitutive element in the federation, with the 1990 Constitutional Declaration by Kosovo's Albanians and the 1991 Referendum serving as starting points for the whole.

TRANSITIONAL PERIOD BODYGUARD:  Albanian politicians wish for Kosovo to function within Yugoslavia during the transitional period, as "an associated entity for a limited time."  It is being demanded that relations between institutions in Kosovo and in Yugoslavia, or other federal units, Serbia and Montenegro, function on the basis of equality and coordination - without any hierarchy.  The institutions of Kosovo would include domains of political, economic, social and cultural life, with the exception of those which, in the temporary agreement, would partly, mostly or entirely belong to the federation.  In the federation, functions of territorial unity, of the common market, of deciding upon the currency, of defense, of foreign policy, of customs would mostly, but not entirely, be instituted, along with other functions which could be specified in the temporary agreement.  The type, manner and degree of Kosovo's participation in carrying out these functions would be a matter of agreement.

Point 4 of the Albanian proposal states that during the temorary, transitional period, Kosovo would be governed by its own legislative, executive and legal institutions and by its parliament which would have full constitutional and legislative authority; a president chosen through direct elections, along with an elected Government of Kosovo and a corresponding administration, as well as courts of different jurisdiciton, including a Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, and a Chief Prosecutor's Office of Kosovo.
It is demanded that Kosovo get its own system of security and protection, a police and a secret police, which both in structure and function will belong to Kosovo, and that the international community will help their organization, launching and operation.

According to the Albanian proposal, every ethnic group in Kosovo will be permited to fully realize its rights in the domains of education, language, protection of culture and identitiy, along with other issues, according to the agreement, and as a safety mechanism, there is reference to standard international declarations.  It is stated that there will be special arrangements for particularly valuable historical, cultural and religious monuments.

There is mention of "Kosovo and its people" (in the singular), to whom "all the natural resources and other wealth created in Kosovo belongs."  It is said that Kosovo will have monetary-credit functions, a Central Bank and corresponding institutions, a fiscal system, taxes, participation in duties and excises, its own budget, participation in economic relations with the world and cooperation with international financial organizations and institutions.  It is demanded that Kosovo have control over its public economy, or to participate in the exploitation of complex systems.  If certain measures in the unified Yugoslav market threaten the economic interests of Kosovo, Kosovo will be able to undertake specific temporary measures for protecting its interests.

Appropriate international institutions could help in the realization and supervision of economic relations in the period of the temporary solution (something like a small protectorate).

Internationally supervised elections should occur within three months of the signing of the agreement; a truce and a withdrawal of forces would begin immediately, and for instances of breaking of the truce, international observers will be informed, but that "won’t be used to justify a response of force."

INTENTION AND ANESTHETIC:  The Albanian side proposes that, in the event that within three years an agreement is not reached on a permanent solution, a referendum be organized under international supervision in which the people of Kosovo will voice themselves on the future.  Even though this is a true reflection of intentions on the Albanian side, the spelling out of the word "independence" on the flag appears like the administering of an anesthetic to a disappointed public.

Practically without exception, Albanian politicians in Kosovo have supported the KLA, and have perhaps calculated on its activities, in combination with international efforts, resulting in a fait accomplit.  This calculation has appeared dubious at a moment when many signs are appearing of a crack in the separatist revolt.  The political representative of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Adem Demaci has withdrawn for medical reasons after he had first directed all his firepower at the American Mediator Hill.  Ahmet Krasnici (50), one of the officials of the self-proclaimed Government of Kosovo in Exile, and probably one of the leaders of the new armed fraction of Kosovo's Albanians, has been killed in his apartment in Tirana.  This puzzle also includes the news that the KLA has kidnapped ten political representatives of Kosovo's Albanians.
The police organized a possy in the villages on the sides of Mount Cicavica.  Colonel Bozidar Filic, Spokesman for the MUP of Serbia in Kosovo, stated that the police have blocked the broad region around the mountain, and have begun "to chase after the remaining groups of KLA which have withdrawn from Metohija, Drenica and the Village of Likovac."

Veton Suroi, who did not become part of the negotiating team, has called in to a Serbian language program on The Voice of America, saying that he is spending time in (governmental and non-governmental) offices in New York and Washington, lobbying for diplomatic and military pressure on Serbia, and expressed his dissatisfaction at the slowness of international reactions.  Be that as it may, diplomatic representatives (in the vocabulary of the Third World: "Americans") have been placed in a situation in the Yugoslav crisis, as well as in some others, in which they became ministers of domestic affairs of distant, tumultuous countries, which has not proven very productive for those countries.

TIME IS RUNNING OUT:  The Serbian side has not as yet submitted its proposal, even though some of the ideas which have been mentioned as legal projects (for instance on ethnic communities) have been included in the project.  The Albanian project has not yet been commented on, if the fact that permanant armed formations of Kosovo's Albaninas (which Belgrade officially calls terrorists) have been thwarted is not taken as commentary. For instance, SPS assessed at a session of its Head Committee, in which the President of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic participated, with Gorica Gajevic, General Secretary, presiding, "that normalization is occurring at an accelerated rate in Kosovo, after the thwarting of the bands of terrorists."  Otherwise, SPS is holding many of its activists on the ground, mosly governmnet officials and MP's.  Another detail is that the Minister of Foreign Affairs claims that new goverment offices have appeared in villages who are helping in coordinating government structures (this probably refers to village elders who are participating in negotiations for handing over their weapons).

The Albanian side is demanding that political prisoners be freed immediately and that no one be persecuted or punished for participation in fighting in Kosovo, with the exception of those who can be proven to have comitted crimes against humanity.

The time of silent consent with armed pacifism in Kosovo is slowly running out.  British Ambassador to the the UN, Jeremy Greenstock, announced that the UN Security Council could adopt very soon a binding resolution for demanding a cease-fire in Kosovo, along with suggestions that "other measures will be considered" in the event that the President of FRY, Slobodan Milosevic, does not fulfill all the demands stated in it.  This is mainly interepreted as the preparation of the legal ground for an eventual decision on military intervention, which is once again being announced by the Americans and the German Ministers of Defense, Folker Rije, presently Serbian Enemy Number One.

Threats are being directed at Serbia, while what is being awaited are Albanian negotiators who do not hide the fact that they have been led into a trap and are calling on their last trump card - the humanitarian catastrophe in the upcoming winter.

Serbian politicians in power have mostly stuck to the opinion that Kosovo cannot go outside the borders of Serbia; Ivica Dacic, SPS Spokesman, refused to say anything on solutions to Kosovo, stating that he will speak about them when the time comes for that.

The Kosovo crisis has amplified centralizing tendencies in Seriban political opinion, even though a possible compromise, from which both sides are still far, undermines the centralist logic of the serbian government organization.  The proposal is of the type that the undermining of cetralism might not have to be quite so painful.
Even though Hill himself states in one release that "the American paper" is not his proposal, but merely a blueprint for the kinds of solutions that could be arrived at, that proposal is slowly becoming a political fact.  The proposal at once appears like Plan Z-4  - those who accept it wont be too happy, those who refuse it will regret it greatly.