Bowing the Head Down Angrily

The Serbian government and parliament have not demonstrated such efficiency and speed — such reflexes! — for some time now, as they have in the case of the UN Security Council resolution on Kosovo.  This is the best indicator of the fact that no one here is really insane.  When push comes to shove, it is clear what needs to be done, and there are no arguments over that, no postponing or weaseling out.  Clearly the regime is not really counting on Russian or Chinese support, on the domestic propaganda offensive of discovering “crematoriums”, nor on national consensus.  Neither is there much time for discussing at length the legitimacy of the fight against terrorism, nor for listing all the rights which have been guaranteed to Albanians.

The greater power demanded a cease-fire, and the answer was a cease-fire.  We ourselves were just about to declare an end to the whole matter, to declare that the terrorists had been defeated and that the police are withdrawing, but the Security Council was a step ahead of us, so that it turned out that, because of that, we...  Such a spectacle can hardly appear good or dignified, except if Milosevic himself were to submit his resignation, explaining that he would not retreat on his policies, but that, being aware of the dead-end, he felt obligated to open the way for someone else.

Such procedure is fairly old fashioned, a moral response which politicians have long stopped observing, nor for that matter, is anyone expecting any such thing.  Did we not recently have opportunity to see in the example of Clinton that there is no public disgrace which a politician will not try to and maybe even succeed in surviving?  Hence, keeping in mind the kind of situation it found itself in, our regime did the only thing it could.  It promised police withdrawal with the same degree of seriousness with which the NATO threat has been understood, which means that there will still be more mutual testing of nerves.

This mere withdrawal before a bigger power was carried out in a manner which fits with political exigencies, national customs, our mentality and habits.  On the whole, it could be described as the angry bowing down of the head.  There was much deception, police withdrawal was not being tied to NATO threats, there were outbursts of anger, swearing, dithering and abhorrence over the great injustice being inflicted upon the Serbs.  Whoever watched the Serbian parliament session had a choice of many pitiful spectacles: swearing and threats by the Radicals, or SPO’s promises that Serbia would one day become America.

Everyone was spooked, but no one smartened up.  This means that there is no reason that such things should not happen in the future, as soon as fear subsides.  In any case, so far, Milosevic has proved himself adept at provoking the rest of the world and testing its tolerance to evil.  In Bosnia, Serbs managed to corner NATO into giving them a thorough thrashing, which is the first such success in the history of that organization; Serbia itself is constantly under some sort of sanctions, chronically punished, expelled from everywhere, while Milosevic has become the most authentic modern incarnation of Beelzebub.

Even if the activities of his police in Kosovo were faultless, and they are far from that, he would still have great difficulties in convincing the world of that.  It’s like Jack the Ripper trying to convince everyone that his last victim really attacked him first, pointing to evidence, calling on witnesses and all the while being endlessly surprised at not getting full attention from the judge.  And regardless of what Albanians of Kosovo did and how much violence the KLA reeked, no one can convince me that there was no other way to respond and that Serbia had to go right up to such a Security Council resolution.

Thus, the real question is why does Milosevic like so much to bring himself to ultimatums, and to bring the country into impossible situations out of which there is no way out without a thrashing, without disgrace, or both.  I think that it is hopeless to look for explanations in ideology, politics or any sorts of national interests.  Were he lead by any such considerations, this leader, like others, would know how to stop and change course before coming to the very edge.  Perhaps at the beginning of his crackling career, he did care about some things, perhaps he did have some convictions and objectives.  But in this mature phase, he has gotten rid of all of as mere extra baggage.

However, neither could I say that he is only concerned with staying in power, as is often thought.  Were that the only issue, it would be more efficient if he were not to do the sorts of things which make for such eyesores.  In any case, it is not evident that this man particularly enjoys any one thing which power brings.  Naturally, the feeling of power and of controlling people and their destinies could itself be a source of satisfaction.  But not even that explains why he is antagonizing NATO and the big powers of the world.
It is possible that Milosevic has actually developed some kind of impure gambling passion which drives him to expose himself to the biggest risks, to raise his stakes to the limit, to bluff and test the opponent’s strengths, so that he is no longer able to remain calm unless his name is on the Security Council’s agenda.  He has plainly been the principal actor for too long in a big drama which has had global echoes, and he is no longer satisfied with any small role in a provincial theater.  That is why the problem of Kosovo had to be taken to such an extreme and raised to the heights which are reminiscent of Bosnia.

The man has developed an addict’s dependence on history and is not interested either in issues, themes, or even outcomes, but only the size of the stakes.  I would be prone to say that he is only interested in playing for as long as possible in as big a game as possible, even if the outcome is a predetermined disaster.  There is no question that over time, he has developed skills and mastered many tricks, so that it’s probably exciting for him to try them out on the big players and under real danger.  Thus, if he is finally forced to deal with Kosovo, then at least a great European crisis should be orchestrated, and the world powers should send him various signals, while he will see to it that they end up fighting amongst themselves.

Finally, it’s better that they thrash him with the biggest, heaviest and most modern stick, than to neglect him, forgotten on a dead-end road, knee-deep in Kosovo.  That is why Serbia has found itself in real danger of NATO bombs.  It is quite possible that Milosevic is already too far gone into the game, and that he needs to make far bigger concessions for stopping intervention than he is presently able to make.  But, as I said, it is a big if, whether he is at all concerned about those bombs.

NATO itself, along with what is referred to as the international community, are probably thinking more about the consequences of intervention.  They generally like to plan ahead and strive to achieve some objective which, in this case, is slightly complicated.  NATO bombs can certainly force Milosevic’s police to take a few steps back from Albanian villages, but the whole problem is bigger and truly difficult to solve from the sky.

That could be a reason for some hesitation, but it seems to me that no one here should count on that.  Namely, in recent times not even the world powers are going deeply into problems and are not working hard at carefully studying every possible consequence of their actions.  A uni-polar world has become safer globally, but as a result, locally that much less safe.  Americans are deciding with ever greater ease to drop a bomb on some ugly spot, and to wait and see what happens.  The newest example of the Albanian civilian casualties in the village of Gornje Obrinje menacingly looks like a good excuse.

I believe that now those people who would belong to some democratic opposition, were there such a thing here, are likely to feel most at a loss.  They cannot but feel a sense of glee at the difficulties the regime is finding itself in, but how can they feel at all good about bombs?  How is it possible to explain to someone the interconnectedness of foreign bombs and domestic authorities?  How is it possible to explain that openness to the world is a good thing, when for Serbia, the world has the appearance of a bomb?