Possibilities for Defense

Many people in Serbia said after the earthquake which shook Belgrade last week that they thought it was NATO airplanes dropping bombs, which resulted in certain cynical comments by refugees from Croatia and Bosnia, who are more than familiar with the difference between earthquakes and bombs.  The threats of air attack if Milosevic does not accept the UN Security Council resolution were repeated ad nauseam in recent days, but — luckily — the increase in political will for force to really be used was not observed.  Russian and China are now openly threatening that they will use their powers of veto in the Security Council if the latter attempts to sanction air attacks; British Defense Minister Robertson expressed certain reservations last week toward military intervention; unnamed high officers in the US Army whispered to reporters in the Pentagon that the whole matter does not appear to them as serious and that they fail to see any sense in such use of force.

Meanwhile, the Yugoslav and Serbian authorities — with the usual dose of thrilling fear — are simultaneously terrifying and reassuring the public.  On Tuesday, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Vojislav Seselj stated on Radio B92 that he is not too worried: “today and tomorrow,” he said, “there will be no bombing, but as soon as he learns when it will happen, he will immediately tell everyone to get ready.”   Other states are telling their citizens not to come here and to leave Yugoslavia if they happen to already be there. An ever growing number of embassies is reducing their staff to a minimum, just like back in the summer of ‘92.

On the other hand, the government and top officials are uttering war cries such as “at all cost”.  In some circles, on the other hand, it is possible to hear threats of reprisal: they will bomb the enemy with ground-to-ground missiles, they will hit the enemy “if not in California and north Germany, then at least those within reach,” they will take hostages, mercy on foreign nationals, and especially journalists who are not to their liking, foreign and domestic alike. Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff and the Ministry of Defense are keeping quite, even though earlier they voiced themselves on far smaller issues, which should suggest something.  We sincerely hope that the message is that someone there has actually started thinking.

Thus, the time has come for cool analysis.  As the incomparable von Klausevitz puts it, “a threat is the shadow of any object, just as credit is the shadow of money.”  What are USA, NATO and the UN Security Council (all of them put together) threatening Yugoslavia with?  From what was said thus far, they are threatening us with air attacks against specific military and police targets using guided missiles and military airplanes.  Information leaked from the Pentagon that the latest idea is “step by step” bombing: they hit once, then ask Milosevic if he still wants more; then they hit again until the latter finally signs something.

It is clear to everyone that air attacks on military targets in FR Yugoslavia in and of themselves do not solve anything — if there is a political objective lacking which could only be achieved in this manner.  If in the meantime they come up with some such thing — which is not beyond the realm of possibility — the situation could suddenly become serious and any showing off would hardly be worth the effort.

However, something else could be worth the effort — making use of the brain.  The Yugoslav Army and their antiaircraft defense have at their disposal different systems for this purpose, along with trained personnel.  If we begin chronologically (from the oldest to the most recent ones), first we have the systems SA-2 and SA-3: these are antiaircraft rockets from the late fifties (the spy plane carrying Garry Powers was downed in 1961 with such a weapon), which — according to the prevalent doctrine at the time — were intended for targeting strategic bombers at high altitudes.  These rockets are not efficient against aircraft which fly at relatively low altitudes, which already became clear in the Vietnam War.  Today those rockets are not of much use, except if NATO were to think that they are so outdated that there is no reason to use electronic countermeasures for their radars.  The other rocket system of certain importance is SA-6, with three rockets mounted on mobile launchers.  SA-6 is efficient against airplanes which are flying even at relatively low altitudes, but it is also based on radar guided controls, which is a big downside.  Since 1973, technologically developed modern armies do not consider SA-6 a serious threat, because the guiding radars they use can be easily scrambled.  However, if there is no scrambling, SA-6 is a dangerous device: in the summer of 1995, using such a rocket, the Bosnian Serb Army downed an American F-16 fighter airplane above Bosnia, the airplane having lost its electronic defenses.

As paradoxical as it may sound, the most serious defense against NATO aircraft are those antiaircraft rockets which an infantryman can carry and use with little training — therefore “Arrow” (SA-7) and “Needle” (SA-13, an improved version of the same).  These rockets are guided by infrared light technology to reach the source of heat (the exhaust pipe of jet powered aircraft), they have fairly high ranges (the highest range), and in skilled hands can be extremely precise.  At least three NATO airplanes were downed since 1991 up to today using such rockets: in 1993, an Italian G-222 Transporter above, a British “Harrier” near Gorazde in the same year and, in 1995, a French “Mirage 2000” above the Romania Mt., all above the Bosnian soil.  The only defense measure is a magnesium flair attached to a parachute, for which it is believed that they will attract the rocket with their high temperature; the problem is that newer generations of these antiaircraft rockets can distinguish and abandon sources of temperatures which are too high, thereby sticking to the real target.  If low flying airplanes are at issue, modern antiaircraft artillery of the Yugoslav Air Forces can also be very efficient — assuming personnel are well trained and have regular training sessions.

Thus, it is clear that the entire adventure with air attacks on FR Yugoslavia — should it be taken up — will neither be easy or without a price.  That is why, among other things, NATO is still behaving the way it has up to Wednesday evening, when these lines were being written.  Tonight NATO announced that withing 48 hours it will acquire “a firm legal basis” and the political agreement of all 16 member nations for a military offensive.  The latest news is that American Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke and the President of FR Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic have come as far as considering the placement of NATO ground troops in Kosovo during their talks in Belgrade (according to the American Secretary for Defense, William Cohen).  If that is true, then we are afoot of a new Dayton, but without airattacks, so that we can afford to relax.  On the other hand, it is said that Holbrooke stated — somewhat in general terms — that “there has hardly been any progress in talks with Milosevic,” but he did not specify what kind of progress he was referring to, from which point to which point — something that could be a good sign.

However, given the fact that we are in the Balkans, too much optimism is out of place. It could still happen that Milosevic cannot deliver, just like several times during peace negotiations in Krajina and Bosnia, that the big powers will lose their patience, that Clinton will conclude that the initiative for his impeachment could be brought to an end with something spectacular, that Yeltsin becomes so caught up in his own problems that he gives up altogether on the Security Council veto, that the Chinese make another calculation with the same conclusion...

All that remains is to trust in the rational side of all the actors in this planetary game — despite previous illustrations of deficiencies in that selfsame rational side.