Tightly Tailored

Right up to 1981, Mahmut Bakali (61) occupied the very top positions of authority in Kosovo, having had to submit his resignation after bloody unrests which took place during that year.  Even though he has held no political position since then, nor belonged to any party, even today Bakali still continues to be one of the most influential politicians on the political scene in Kosovo.

For a certain time he was a member of the Albanian negotiating team (G-15) and in that capacity he participated in the meeting between Ibrahim Rugova and Slobodan Milosevic.

This interview for VREME was conducted in Bakali’s apartment in Pristina on Tuesday, October 10.

VREME: In recent weeks, the biggest part of the police force and the army withdrew from Kosovo.  This fulfilled the main demand by the Albanian side for beginning negotiations with the Serbian side — but negotiations have yet to happen.  Where is the problem?

BAKALI: First of all, the atmosphere still continues to be strained because of sporadic incidents and provocations on the part of the police and certain factions of the KLA.
Still, I think that this tension can be reduced with the beginning of proper negotiations which would open up the possibility for resolving the position of Kosovo and regulating Serbian-Albanian relations.  First of all, I would like to point out that a state of war has been avoided through UN Security Council resolutions, through a determination by NATO to use force in stopping the offensive by Serbian forces, as well as through the arrival of the members of the OSCE verification mission.

Thus, it is this which sent the ball into the political court.  It is still not a real peace, but we have some kind of truce, and that is positive.

With the withdrawal of the army and the police, conditions have been created for shifting the Kosovo crisis toward a peaceful, political resolution, but all the necessary elements for the beginning of serious negotiations are still lacking.  Above all, the draft of Ambassador Hill’s political agreement needs to be completed, for even the latest version is not sufficiently stimulating for the Albanian side, and needs to still be reworked.  The other problem concerns the Albanian political corpus itself, which in my opinion, has still not been sufficiently consolidated, organized and unified in order to be able to legitimately and competently carry through the process of negotiations.  As you can see, in Kosovo there are many leaders, but we still do not have a legitimate leadership which can represent the Albanian side.

What is the problem with the latest Hill paper?

The basic problem is that according to the latest draft, in the transitional period, Kosovo would still be under the control of the Republic of Serbia, besides the inevitable control by the federation and the international community.  I fear that Serbian jurisdiction during that transitional period could prejudice the outcome toward Kosovo remaining within Serbia after a period of three years had transpired, which is how long the transitional period should last.  I think that it is absolutely unacceptable for Albanians that the final solution for Kosovo be within Serbia.

The draft stipulates that in the transitional period Kosovo would have its own president, parliament and police, so that the presence of the Serbian state in Kosovo would be more or less symbolic.  Why is that symbolic presence such a big problem?

It is not quite so symbolic.  First of all, some segments of the Serbian police would remain in Kosovo, although with a limited mandate.  Second, the draft stipulates that the Serbian government would get a member from Kosovo, along with the presence of MP’s from Kosovo in the Serbian parliament.  Who needs that and where is the sense in it?  The complete entity of Kosovo should be organized in the transitional period under the control of the federation and the international community, and that’s that.  What is the point of establishing some links with Serbian institutions?  It would not be so tragic in the transitional period, but it would prejudice the remaining of Kosovo in Serbia over a longer period.

Yes, but what if during the transitional period Kosovo were to completely leave Serbia, would that not be prejudicing, instead in the opposite direction?

Well yes, but...  Listen, according to the conclusions of the Contact Group, Kosovo must remain within the existing borders of Yugoslavia.  It is worded as “autonomy within Yugoslavia.”  Serbia is not mentioned anywhere.  It is clear to the entire world — and not just to Albanians — that Serbia can no longer maintain control over two million Albanians.

There is a view in Serbian public opinion that Kosovo has already been lost for Serbia.

I hear that these days even certain esteemed opposition parties are saying: “We won’t give up Kosovo!”  Those who say that are not aware of the fact that this is neither a democratic, nor a patriotic solution for Serbia.  It means that they still continue to harbor intentions of ruling Kosovo by force.  How can someone say that they want a democratic Serbia while supporting police and repression in Kosovo?  Besides that, it is not patriotic, for Serbia won’t be prosperous as long as it continues its repression of Kosovo.  The whole story of Kosovo being a domestic Serbian issue has been outdated for some time already.  The moment the international community came to Kosovo, it became clear that it is an international issue.  In Kosovo, the Albanian people must be taken as equal partners in this territory.

I think that it is high time for it to be peacefully and realistically stated that it is in the interest of Serbia and the Serbian people for the will of the Albanian people to no longer to live under the jurisdiction of Serbia to be acknowledged.  The Albanian people are ready to live on equal terms with the Serbian people in Kosovo, and they are ready to live on equal terms with the Serbian state within some broader community.  The longer Serbia hesitates to accept these facts, the worse it will be for Serbia.

When you say “broader community”, you are probably thinking of FRY.  However, the Yugoslav federation is not functioning all that well even in the present state.  Besides that, the Montenegrin leadership stressed on more than one occasion that it is against the inclusion of Kosovo into the federation as a third member.

When I say that Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo can live on equal terms in some sort of state, then I believe that such a common state should look like the present FR Yugoslavia.  This Yugoslavia is tightly tailored.  It is too tight for Montenegro, too tight for many in Serbia, especially the democratic forces, and it needs to be radically changed, and not just because of Kosovo.

If everyone agrees that it should really be changed, that new common state would be radically different from the present one — both in the matter of the constitution, the political system, and everything else.  Here it is not a matter of Kosovo being a third republic, but rather that the present federation change in a way which will be agreed upon by those who will constitute it.  This change needs to take the path of democratization and complete equality between its peoples.

Because of all this, the comments coming from Montenegro are not entirely clear to me.

If changes in relations within the federation — or confederation — were to take place in order for Kosovo to became a new member, than that would be in the interest of the forces of reform and democracy in Montenegro.  That is why I do not accept the view of a segment of the Montenegrin leadership that it would threaten Montenegro in any way.
On the contrary, I am convinced that relations in the region at large would be stabilized in this way: in Macedonia, in Albania...  The entire Balkans would be stabilized.  I fail to see who could be threatened by this, except the forces for a Greater Serbia.

Let us return to what you cited as the second condition for beginning the negotiations, that being the consolidation of the political corpus.  How responsible is the leading Albanian party, i.e. the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (LDK)?  You directed criticism at them several years ago.  At that time you said that they did not work sufficiently on the inner organization of their movement and that Rugova is relying too much on the international community.

Those comments hold true today as well.  In any case, the better part of the Albanian people think the same way.  LDK, without question, has a historical role in awakening the consciousness of Kosovo’s Albanians and their political organization after forced discontinuation of Kosovo’s autonomy.  However, it is a fact that LDK was not sufficiently inventive and energetic, that a good part of their activities boiled down to the writing of political announcements and press releases.  But today we have a flowering of new political forces in Kosovo, a string of new parties within movements, and we also have the KLA, as a violent part of the movement.

Today the main problem is how to unite all parts of the movement into a single leadership which would represent Kosovo’s Albanians.  Therein lies the knot.

It appears that Kosovo’s Albanian’s are fairly united in the attitude that Kosovo should be independent, but there are drastic differences on the issue of who should rule over it.  Relations between LDK and the opposition are very reminiscent of the political scene in Serbia...

The Albanian political scene is even more comic in some of its elements, for the battle is being fought over power which is as yet still fictitious in Kosovo.  All those leaders are in fact competing over who will become part of the “Who’s Who” registry in Kosovo.  That is the lowest point of politics, and it, unfortunately, has gained the upper hand at this point.  Precisely because everyone has the same objective, they should all unite around it and form a team which will head the negotiations.  They should realize that they have historical responsibility.

You already stated that the KLA should also become part of that team, but many are asking now whether it is a unified organization or a loose list of opposing factions which merely harbor pretensions to having the same name.

I myself am no longer certain of that.  As far as horizontal organization, they appear to me to be good, but as far as vertical organization goes... there, I’m no longer sure.  Let us leave that to those who are more familiar with that organization.  What is important is that tens of thousands of people exist who are ready to fight in order to get Albanians out from under Serbian authority.  They are a reality which must be lived with.  Well, I doubt that their representatives will sit directly at the negotiating table.  In fact that is not necessary, but it is essential that they enter the political process of decision making.  In order to do this, at the very least they must become part of the common leadership.
Therefore, a coalition government needs to be formed, after which that government would appoint a serious, representative negotiating team.  If the KLA has representatives in that government, they will realize their influence on the negotiating team without having to negotiate directly with the Serbs.  In any case, they are an unavoidable factor.

The problem is that, judging by all accounts, certain elements of the KLA believe that, as they are, “freedom fighters” can do as they please and that no one has the right to criticize them.  Even earlier, especially in the last several days, we had a string of kidnappings, assassinations, inhumane treatment of civilians...  Is there a danger that the KLA might become completely uncontrollable?  Some people think that this has already happened.

Listen, in every organization which uses violent methods for achieving political objectives it is possible to have uncontrollable elements.  This danger will exist for as long as the armed part of the movement does not get the representation of the people — this means a legally elected parliament and government.  Excesses and provocations such as unnecessary arrests of journalists and certain political opponents, liquidation’s of innocent people... that must not be the future of Kosovo.  I am convinced that with time, the KLA will stop doing such things.  I do not wish to say now that the Serbian police have behaved even worse, to point to the 2000 Albanian civilians killed and approximately 1400 who disappeared...  After all, the objective of the police is to subjugate the Albanian people, while the KLA, as the armed segment of the movement, is obligated to behave in accordance with humanitarian principles.  What the police did is no excuse, it is not an alibi for the KLA for them to now begin to imitate the police.

Last question: how do you see your role on the political scene in Kosovo, given that you neither have an official position, nor a party to which you belong?

Correct, for eighteen years already I have not held any official position, if you exclude the fact that for awhile I was a member of the G-15.  We had to break up that group because it was senseless to negotiate while guns were being fired and people were getting killed in Kosovo.  Now there is a narrow team of five people around Rugova, of which only three are working.  I respect these people, but I think that we Albanians would have to organize better for this negotiating process.

I do not know how great my influence is in reality.  I have my political attitudes and I state them publicly, both here and in Belgrade, through the media, as well as in the West.  All I wish is to be of help in the reaching of a peaceful, political solution in Kosovo which will be in the best interest of both the Albanian and the Serbian peoples.  I do not know if it is having any effect, but I do know that many politicians, diplomats, and even statesmen are consulting my opinions.  I am also in contact with political parties, including Serbian democratic parties, I participate in round table discussions...  Listen, for me politics is a vocation, I have no other profession and do not know what else I could do.

However, the fact that I am in politics does not mean that I have ambitions of winning a position.  It is that much easier for me to act, and whether that has any effect is not up to me to decide, and perhaps it is not yet time to make assessments.