Rhetorical Strategy

‘The Psychology department at the University of Kent is well known for its research on the psychological aspects of phenomena such as racism, sexism or nationalism. However, the department tends to favor approaches which look upon these ideological aspects of inter-group conflict as manifestations, at a societal level, of individual attitudes. Consequently the majority of research on racism, sexism or nationalism involves traditional, positivist methodologies which are thought to tap these psychological underpinnings of social phenomena’ Jovan Byford tells us. The method which he chose for his research is closer to the post-structuralist tradition, which conceptualizes ideology not as something which misrepresents or interprets reality, but rather as something which plays an active part in its construction.  ‘The advantage of this approach is that, in contrast to traditional theories of nationalism, ideology is not seen as consisting of static systems of ideas which affect social behavior. The traditional view, inherent in the Marxist conceptualization of the term, implies that people and societies are more or less clearly definable in terms of the ‘system of ideas’ to which they adhere, and can therefore be allocated to mutually exclusive categories such as nationalist/non-nationalist or democratic/undemocratic. Consequently, traditional sociological, psychological and political theories of nationalism have put forward a number of formal classifications which include the distinction between nationalism and patriotism, or between ethnic and  civic or Eastern- organic-mystical and Western-rational- association types of nationalism, etc. Following this kind of classification, certain societies or cultures are often easily dismissed as inherently nationalist (in a negative sense) and undemocratic’ Jovan Byford explains. For example, Margaret Thatcher is generally seen as a (former) democratic leader of an essentially ‘civic’ British nation. Although her patriotism has been both praised and criticized throughout her career, she has never been associated with the kind of nationalism to which Slobodan Milosevic is linked. Milosevic, on the other hand, is seen as a politician with dubious democratic credibility and the leader of an essentially ‘ethnic’ Serbian nation,  associated with the kind of policies which form the essence of the definition of virulent nationalism: expansion of the nation state, striving towards national dominance, ethnic cleansing, genocide etc. One possible explanation for the perceived difference between the two politicians, and which stems from traditional, realist theories of nationalism is that they adhere to different ideologies, such as ethnic and civic nationalism, which manifest themselves as more or less acceptable social and political behavior.

In contrast to this view, Byford’s research attempted to demonstrate that discursive themes which characterize ethnic and civic nationalism are present in the political discourse of both politicians. ‘The conclusion of my thesis was that an essential function of political discourse is to portray the speaker’s position as just and fair , i.e. as consistent with the norms and values which determine what constitutes a legitimate course of action. In the context of international organization the two concepts which are critical to the process of legitimization are the nation and democracy. We live in a world consisting of sovereign nations and nation states, and often construct our identity in terms of belonging to a nation. The nation is the basic unit of political organization and object of collective solidarity and therefore themes relating to the sovereignty of the nation and the nation state feature prominently during international conflict. However, such collectivist nation-based construction of the social world, which exists throughout the world, is inconsistent with democratic discourse and its traditional emphasis on the individual and his rights and freedoms. The two constructions of reality clash at the level of discourse and as a result of this dialectic process are perpetually reproduced and transformed’ Jovan Byford continues. ‘The results of the analysis cast doubt on the validity of the traditional distinction between civic nationalism which is thought to be characteristic of Western democracies, and which conceptualizes the nation as a sovereign community through which citizens fulfill their democratic rights; and ethnic nationalism which focuses on the nation as a unique community based on common blood and origin. These conceptualizations of the nation, which can be found both in Thatcher’s and Milosevic’s political discourse, are not two closed systems of ideas or ideologies in the traditional sense, but rather discursive themes which are manipulate rhetorically in the attempt to portray a political opinion or action as compatible with the epistemological principles and norms which govern a specific normative context and which determine what is credible, just or fair.

 What follows are extracts from political speeches of Margaret Thatcher delivered at the time of the Falklands crisis and Slobodan Milosevic at the time of the dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia, which have been analyzed in the study and which illustrate the similarities between the rhetorical strategies of the two politicians.

The Right to self-determination:

Margaret Thatcher:
  ‘In many of these meetings [between the British and Argentine governments] elected representatives of the Islanders have taken part. We have always made it clear that their wishes were paramount and that there would be no change in sovereignty without their consent and without the approval of the house.’ (3 April, 1982, p. 633-634)
‘During the long-term negotiations we shall closely consult the Islanders on their wishes and of course we believe in self-determination.’ (20 May, 1982, p.479-480)
‘[The Islanders] are few in number, but they have the right to live in peace, to chose their own way of life and determine their own allegiance…It is the wish of the British people and the duty of Her Majesty’s Government to do everything that we can to uphold that right.’  (3 April, 1982, p.637-638)
‘..…the people of the Falkland islands shall be free to determine their own way of life and their own future’ (14 April, 1982, p.1145-1146)
‘That solution must safeguard the principle that the wishes of the Islanders shall remain paramount.’ (ibid., p.1149-1150)
‘For years they have been free to express their own wishes about how they want to be governed, They have had institutions of their own choosing. They have enjoyed self-determination. Why should they lose that freedom and change it for dictatorship?’ (20 May, 1982, p.477-478)
‘The principles we are defending are fundamental to everything that this parliament and this country stands for. They are the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Argentina invaded the Falkland islands in violation of the rights of people to determine by whom and in what way they are governed…Britain has a responsibility towards the Islanders to restore their democratic way of life.’  (20 May, 1982)

Slobodan Milosevic:
‘…   we believe that one cannot leave Yugoslavia by unilateral acts or by making unilateral decisions, but that the right of a nation to self-determination must be organized and exercised in a unique way which would apply to all Yugoslav peoples. The essence of the proposal is a referendum which would enable the Yugoslav peoples to express their wishes.’ (Politika, 20 March, 1991,  p.7)
‘Nobody, at home or abroad, can deny us the right to pursue the right and democratic path. We don’t know anything more democratic than a referendum. Therefore our direction is one of democratic and peaceful solution, it is the only direction which respects basic human and civil rights, as well as the basic national rights of the Yugoslav peoples.’ (Politika, 20 March, 1991, p.8)
However, in Milosevic’s speeches, the insistence on the democratic nature of the right to self-determination is blended with the nationalist principle that national and political units should be congruent, i.e. that national borders should correspond to those of the nation state. In fact the right to self-determination implies the right of nations to chose to live in one state, thus achieving the nationalist ideal that national boundaries should correspond to those between states:
‘Our position, as is well-known, is that the starting point in resolving the Yugoslav crisis is the right of nations to self-determination. In accordance with this right, Serbia will respect the rights and interests of all Yugoslav people to decide their own future. I believe that, on the same basis, the interest of the Serbian people to live in one state must also be respected.’ (Politika, 1 February, 1991,  p.1)
‘As far as the Serbian people are concerned, they have, both in Serbia and other republics where they live, expressed both directly and via their legitimately chosen representatives the wish to live in one state. The considerable sacrifices which the Serbian people gave for their freedom, and the genocide to which they were exposed during WW II is too high a price for national liberation and unification for anyone today to be able to negotiate whether or not they will live in one state.…under no condition will Serbia accept any formula that involves splitting the Serbian people between a number of sovereign states, against their wishes.’ (ibid.)

Constructing the Other

The analysis of Margaret Thatcher’s speeches revealed that in political rhetoric which surrounds a bipartisan international conflict, discourse not only involves the construction of relevant events in terms of abstract principles such as those of democracy or nationalism as an international political principle, but also entails the portrayal of the enemy as the antithesis of the legitimate and justified position epitomized by the politician’s own political stance. Consistently with this assertion, in Milosevic’s case the idea that Serbs should live in a single state was not justified only on the basis of the more general principles concerning the right of nations to live in nation states, or the democratic nature of the right to self-determination, but also by denigrating the other side in the conflict. Particularly important in this respect are references to the history of the ethnic conflict between Serbs and Croats:

‘We will not allow anyone to take part of the Serbian people with them. The fate which the Serbian people suffered in the Independent State of Croatia was far to tragic for us to allow them to be once again exposed to such risk.’ (Politika, 20 March, 1991, p.7)
‘In the places where they have already once been exposed to genocide they could not allow, for the second time in this century, to be killed so that peace could be preserved.’ (Politika, 10 October, 1992, p. 8)

Similarly, Margaret Thatcher constructed the invasion of the Falklands as a direct result of the desire of the Argentine to punish the Islanders for their willingness to exercise their right to remain British:
…My first consideration is the British people of those islands, who for years and years would not let us even discuss sovereignty with the Argentines, because they did not want to go under the Argentine. The Argentine is now punishing them for it...(ibid.)

By constructing the invasion as an event directed against the Islanders, as well as one which violates basic democratic principles which are incidentally inherent in the ‘British way of life’, Thatcher makes the capturing of the Islands look like something more than a territorial dispute, in which the Islanders are only of secondary relevance. The whole purpose of the conflict appears to be to destroy the lifestyle and freedom of the Islanders:
‘The people who live there are of British stock: they have been for generations and their wishes are the most important thing of all. Democracy is all about the wishes of the people. The people of the Argentine do not have it so it is not surprising they want to deny it to other people…’ (Panorama, 27 April, 1982)
This statement is particularly interesting because Thatcher portrays democracy as something that distinguishes the British from the Argentineans. Although the maintenance of the contrast between Britain and Argentina runs throughout Thatcher’s discourse, in most cases it is emphasized on a governmental level, as a distinction between a democratic government and a military dictatorship. In the above case however, Thatcher did not contrast the British and Argentinean constitutions or governments but the ‘people’: it is the Argentine people rather than its military dictators who are trying to take something away from the British. Also, although Thatcher acknowledges that the Argentine people do not have the freedoms which the British are used to, including the ‘universal right to self-determination’, she does not lament over that fact.  Instead, it is used to establish the contrast between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and provide an account of the Argentine’s motivation for invading the Falklands.
Similarly, Milosevic portrayed his own policy as legitimate by contrasting it with the nationalist and discriminatory policies of Croatia and Slovenia:
‘we are proud that Serbia is not pursuing a nationalist policy and that no one in Serbia is discriminated against because he is a Slovene or a Croat, or a member of any other nation’ (Politika, 31 May, 1991,  p.2)

Also he was implicitly referring to Croatia when he stated that:
‘Yugoslavia is the only country in Europe which is witnessing the restoration of the forces of fascism and genocide.’ (Politika, 1 February, 1992,  p.1)
In the attempt to portray the Serbian attitude towards the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis as democratic, progressive and essentially non-nationalist, Milosevic presents it also as compatible with trends in the democratic world. For example the creation of larger political structures such as the EU, was contrasted with Slovenian and Croatian attempts to secede from Yugoslavia:
‘Attempts to abolish a country in order to create a number of little nationalist states, are deeply inconsistent with current trends in the world and express a unhistorical and conservative approach. Especially in Europe, where thousand-year-old borders between states are being erased, aspirations to turn Yugoslavia’s internal boundaries into borders between states present an absurd idea…’ (Politika, 31 May, 1991, p.2)

The discourse of War and Peace:
In the early stages of the crisis, it was not apparent that British intervention would end in a military conflict. Not only was the formidable Task Force supposed to convince the Argentines to withdraw without combat, but also, throughout the Falklands crisis, attempts were made to secure a peaceful negotiation between Britain and Argentina (among others by the US Secretary of State Al Haigue, the UN, the government of Peru, etc). Similarly, opinion had been expressed, both in the House of Commons and in the media, that all measures should be taken to avoid military confrontation. However, a war did take place in the end, requiring of Thatcher  to justify such an outcome. As we will see, Thatcher approaches the matter differently, on different occasions.
‘…Of course we will try to go on getting a peaceful settlement. No one wants it more than I do. It seems to be absurd that the Argentine does not withdraw her young men from those islands under the UN resolution…’ (Panorama, 26 April, 1982)
‘…We shall always use minimum force at all times. We are a democracy, that is what we believe in. We shall always use the minimum force to attain our objective. I want the  minimum escalation.’ (ibid.)
In these statements not only is British policy presented as a peace-loving one, but again a contrast is made between Britain and Argentina, in terms of democratic credibility: Britain is dedicated to peace because it is a democracy; Argentina is not, which is why it resorts to aggression.  IN such a context, every, even the smallest use of force has to be justified:
‘Of course we too want a peaceful solution, but it was not Britain that broke the peace. If the argument of no force at any price were to be adopted at this stage it would serve only to perpetuate the occupation of those very territories which have themselves been seized by force.’ (14 April, 1982, 1149-1150)
The statement contains an expression of devotion for peace, as well as an explanation of why force has to be used (the need not to perpetuate the occupation of territories). The first part of the statement is aimed at dismissing accusations of saber-rattling and warmongering which might occur on the basis of the contents of the  second part. Subsequently, however as the war was becoming imminent, the use of force was justified became more frequent and explicit:
‘Without Argentine withdrawal we have no choice but to exercise our unquestionable right to self-defense under article 51 of the charter.’ (29 April, 1982, p.981-982)
Following the Argentine surrender, Thatcher established, that in fact Britain had not resorted to a military solution at all:
We went to recapture what was ours. We had to do it by military means because the Argentines would not leave peacefully. We condemned their military adventurism. We were perfectly right to repossess what was already ours and to look after and defend British subjects. That is not a military solution. That is repossessing what we should never have lost. (15 June, 1982, p. 735-736)
Consequently, she  argued not only that the use of force to recapture the islands was justified, but also that a use of force which is legitimate does not constitute a military solution. The unusual rhetorical construction of the concept of military is aimed once again at dismissing allegations that the use of force was unnecessary or avoidable, and therefore that British policy violated the ‘universal’ norm against the unnecessary use of force for resolving disputes between states.
As was the case in Thatcher’s discourse, Milosevic also presented his  position as essentially dedicated to peace and the avoidance of war. One of the reasons for this is that if or when military conflict does take place, the involvement can be justified on the grounds that all efforts have been made to ensure peace, and therefore that the blame for the consequences of the war should be borne entirely by the enemy side.
For example, before the conflict brought its first casualties, but when the likelihood of a peaceful settlement was diminishing rapidly, Milosevic was keen to stress the devotion of Serbia towards peace, and his own resolve to preserve it:
‘Economic revival, democracy and cultural renewal, all these great and small ideas can be brought into question if we allow conflicts and bloodshed. That is why our greatest common project, more important than any other, is that there should be peace.  In peace we can do a lot in terms of social and economic renaissance. In war and in conflict we can do nothing except bring our people to the verge of starvation and exhaustion, the way it happened so many times throughout history. That is a historical experience that must not be repeated. We are a small people, and for almost a decade we have been in an economic crisis, and in a political one as well for almost as long…’ (Politika, 22 November, 1990, p. 1)_
While in the early stages of the crisis the utterances regarding the desire for peace were more or less unconditional, once the chances for a negotiated settlement were definitely non-existent (i.e. when Croatia issued a unilateral declaration of independence at the end of June 1991) the dedication to peace was somewhat modified:
‘ Nobody wants their children killed. We want neither our own, nor anybody else’s children to have to die, and that is why we advocate peace both in Serbia and outside it. That is our choice above all others. It is our strongest and oldest choice. However, in order to secure peace, for tomorrow but also for today, we must be ready to defend it where, and by whomsoever, the interests and peaceful existence of Serbia and the Serbian people are threatened.’ (Politika, 7 July, 1991, p.1)
 ‘That is why, bearing in mind the current threat of war that is cast over our country, I believe that the Yugoslav People’s Army should remain on territories inhabited by peoples who are determined to live in Yugoslavia and in peace.
…We are not afraid of a fight, but we will only get into one which is in the interest of the people and our fatherland. But before we are compelled to fight, we will advocate peace, and do all we can to ensure that it is preserved.’ (Politika, 7 July, 1991, p.1)
Once it became apparent that military conflict is unavoidable, the justification of the use of arms was provided by using a number of arguments similar to those utilized by Thatcher during the Falklands campaign. For example, Milosevic justified the intervention in terms of broad principles such as the Serbian nation’s ‘legitimate rights’ which undemocratic and fascist Croatian government, characterized by ‘obsolete nationalist conceptions of the state’ is infringing:
‘…we will arm ourselves because we have no right to wait unarmed for the moment when those [Croatian para-military] formations attempt to take by force what is the legitimate right of our people. That is the beginning and the end of the matter…’ (Politika, 20 March, 1991, p.7)
Similarly, like Thatcher Milosevic constructs military conflict as legitimate in the context of the right to self defense:
‘Therefore, it is a basic right which belongs to everyone, the right to self-defense, the right to protect one’s own country, one’s own people…and all we insisted upon was exclusively directed at the peaceful resolution to the Yugoslav crisis’ (Politika, 10 October, 1992, p.8)
However, throughout the war Milosevic denied involvement in the Yugoslav crisis. First of all Milosevic argued that Serbia was not a warring faction:
‘Even children in Serbia have stopped believing that the sanctions were imposed because Serbia perpetrated aggression against Bosnia. Everybody realizes now that no aggression ever took place. This has been acknowledged by representatives of the UN, EU, OESC and other international organizations who are going up and down the country every day’  (Interview to French state television, 30 May, 1992)
‘If I could order a cease-fire right away, I would, but what we are talking about is a conflict between three ethnic entities which Serbia can influence only politically but never militarily because there is not a single soldier from Serbia left in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is why the pressure on Serbia for alleged involvement in the war is a typical example of pressure on a small country’ (ibid.)