Two Wasted Years

Throughout ’97, we saw the greatest strife inside the liberal opposition. The main point of contention was over the coalition’s leadership, which had been raised even during the crisis. At the end, the question remained unresolved, and it became the central question in Serbian political squabbles in 1997.

WHO IS THE LEADER: During the 88-day-long protests by the opposition, the balance of power was upset by this very question. The opposition entered the protests with Vuk Draskovic at the helm, being the unchallenged leader. However, the entire power structure of the opposition shook up, when the protests themselves gave birth to another key figure in the coalition: Zoran Djindjic...

Both their parties found the dualism unacceptable, and started working on a plan to resolve the matter in their favor. Since the protests themselves were an inadequate framework, a new one had to be created. It was centered around the September elections, and were meant to solve the problem at hand, once and for all.

When the possibility occurred that Milosevic might not run for the Serbian presidency, the priorities of the coalition changed dramatically. In the days of the “Zajedno” coalition, both parties, and their leaders, had roughly the same goals: fair elections, including a fair electoral system, freedom of the media, and control in the electoral process. These were also the essential demands put out by the demonstrators in November. But even during those demonstrations, few remembered that the elections for the Serbian presidency would be right around the corner. And once word got out that Milosevic would not seek another term, it seemed apparent that convincing Draskovic he wasn’t going to be the next president of Serbia seemed practically futile. The new element simply tore the foundation of the coalition itself. Djindjic was more interested in the parliamentary elections, and his concern over obtaining a majority (especially because of the agreement that he might get the job of prime minister). But Draskovic’s concerns were strictly limited to capturing the presidency, and nothing more...

His strategy seemed to be based on a single goal: how to keep the role of leader in the coalition. As we have already mentioned, the balance had been upset even as protests were taking place. In fact, the protests were the cause of the problem. And so Draskovic hurried on to resolve his problem, and he chose to do it through the election for the Serbian presidency.

DRASKOVIC’S STRATEGY: His ambition to be the next president of Serbia was neither motivated by his desire to curtail Milosevic’s socialism, nor to obtain agenda-setting powers to put democratic reforms at the top, which just happens to be in his party’s platform. He couldn’t even expect to be able to have major influence on the parliament and Milosevic’s majority there. He did, instead, view his presidency as a place which would place him, beyond a shadow of a doubt, as the opposition’s leader. Djindjic, who could never gain a majority in parliament alone, would be the loser, but not to Milosevic, rather to Draskovic.

From that, it becomes more and more obvious why the SPO and Draskovic didn’t react so strongly to the new electoral laws passed by the socialists in the summer, helping themselves in obtaining a majority. Draskovic’s interest in parliament was not very high... His plan boiled down to a simple rule: “Let Milosevic control parliament for the next four years, as long as I can be the number one man in the opposition....”

DJINDJIC’S STRATEGY: His goals were by no means different from those Draskovic had for himself. After the protests ended, the key issue for him was the leadership of the opposition. Since the protests elevated Djindjic to political stardom, and in many ways to the position of the opposition’s new leader, the Democratic Party began to consider options of keeping their new status. Their plan was simple; to act individually, and not within the coalition’s framework. Their new strategy did not necessarily mean breaking away, but instead to start making demands within it. Djindjic and DS wanted to dictate its new organization. Their first move was for the expansion of the coalition. The main purpose behind it could have been to weaken the leadership of the SPO by introducing new parties and diluting Draskovic’s hegemony. All the political organizations proposed for expansion were either under Djindjic’s direct influence, or leaning more towards him than Draskovic. SPO was secure in its “point” role with the 5:4:1 coalition proportions. By adding new elements to it, the SPO's position could only go in one direction: down.

As soon as Draskovic started insisting on the Serbian presidency, Djindjic pushed his leverage for electoral conditions at the top of the agenda. It can be argued that Djindjic stayed true to the original message which the protests highlighted. But that only became visible when Draskovic departed from the coalition’s main principles. Djindjic only used his principles as an accusation of the SPO for breaking up the coalition, thereby generating enough sympathy to rally all the liberal forces behind him. His plan also boiled down to a single sentence: “Let Milosevic control parliament for the next four years, as long as I can be the number one man in the opposition.” In the end, the irreconcilable strategy of the opposition played right into the hands of Milosevic, who solved his problems by breaking up the coalition....

MILOSEVIC’S STRATEGY: Two questions worried Milosevic after the protests were finished. One was to prevent them from ever happening again. And the second one was to talk at least one of the opposition parties into lifting their boycott on the elections, so that he could legitimate the ones in September....

He had two options to deal with his problem: make a deal with either Draskovic, or Djindjic. He had already had bad experience at finding common ground with Djindjic. That was clear even on the 1993 elections for the Serbian assembly. They failed one more time during the protests. The two secretly met on January 10th, 1997. But agreed on nothing concrete.

He then agreed to deal with Draskovic. With Djindjic, Milosevic would have to offer some concrete concessions; something which he could then convert into political capital. With Draskovic, no such deal was needed; a few halfhearted promises would do.

He made one verbal agreement with Draskovic. He knew Draskovic was interested in the Serbian presidency. Draskovic had only one demand: access to the powerful state media. Draskovic, convinced that his only obstacle from the presidency is prevention from media exposure, believes that a silent Serbian majority has supported him for president since 1991. After their meeting on July 24th, 1997, Milosevic agreed to Draskovic’s demand and gave him access to state television and radio.

Milosevic’s payoff was the legitimization of his September elections. SPO would enter them and break the coalition. He also sealed the fate of future protests, which was the only institution capable of bringing him down. By breaking up the coalition, Milosevic could wait for any election returns in peace.

SESELJ AS A WINNER: The crisis created two byproducts: the end to the possibility of protests, and the rise of Seselj to the political scene. Seselj gained the most from the coalition’s breakup. Thereafter, he remained the only true opposition to Milosevic.

The benefit of the coalition’s breakup can be seen in the 1997 presidential elections. In the first round, he received 1,126,940 votes. In the second, that number jumped to 1,733,855. The difference came from the liberal opposition. The breakup of the coalition, the boycotting of the election by the Democratic party, and the debacle created by Vuk Draskovic at the presidential elections in Serbia, led the liberal opposition to collapse, and its constituency switched loyalty to Seselj...

Source: Dusan Pavlovic: "Srpska demokratska opozicija u 1997. godini",
"Nova srpska politicka misao", No 1, Beograd, 1998.