Who is Afraid of Nebojsa?

The SZP delegation's visit to Washington last week was the stirring point. It was represented by the Democratic Alternative president, Nebojsa Covic, former Yugoslav Premier, Milan Panic, head of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights, Srdjan Darmanovic, editor-in-chief of the daily Dnevni Telegraf and the weekly Evropljanin, Slavko Curuvija, and a member of the student organization called Otpor [resistance], Boris Krajacic. The five spoke before the Helsinki Committee about the situation in Serbia, about ways and means of bringing democracy to the country and about resolving the Kosovo conflict.

Covic took the opportunity to criticize the international community for being a source of Milosevic's power and legitimacy. Having assessed that Milosevic (Covic refers to him as the Untouchable) rests his power on the media, financial institutions, industrial giants and secret police, Covic called on the international community to trust democratic forces in Serbia, lift the sanctions and distance itself from the Belgrade regime. Covic said there could be no solution to the Kosovo conflict unless the entire country is democratized, as the basic human rights of all its citizens are threatened. He added that there was a realistic danger that the crisis might spill over into Montenegro if the present regime remains in power.

"Both sides realize that the Untouchable one is not a man you can resolve a problem with, as he is a problem himself", Covic told a press conference on 16 December. Covic started his interview with the weekly Vreme with assessment of the SZP positions in Washington and whether there were any changes in the US policy in the Balkans.
"We were given a great and understanding welcome. I think they understand what this is all about and they are now looking for a way to help Serbian citizens integrate with the world. We have even heard criticisms of the US policy on Serbia and Yugoslavia, and we believe that the desire to help Serbia's citizens will prevail so that we can go back to the positions we had as a nation and a country".

V: What is your comment of the anti-SZP campaign, Uros Suvakovic's question broadcast on prime time news and the attacks against you personally?

C: We were aware that all this would happen. We knew certain media would attack us as well as try to discredit us and diminish the effects of our visit to Washington. We didn't go there to sell anything, we couldn't do that even if we wanted to. We went there to see for ourselves what exactly Milosevic had signed, what his deal with the international community is. We want to make that public here. We went there to present a different image of Serbia and to explain that Serbian citizens can't and mustn't be personified with Milosevic's regime. I do not wish to comment on the media attacks, I won't pay any attention to what that boy wrote. I didn't pay any attention to him even when I was being made to by party rules. These articles are being orchestrated, I am the one under fire because they are aware that I know how they work.

V: You said you knew how they work. Several top ranking officials were sacked recently - Generals Perisic and Velickovic, head of the secret police Jovica Stanisic as well as Milorad Vucelic. Can you comment on this and the general situation within the Socialist Party?

C: These people were sacked because Mirajana Markovic doesn't trust them. This situation has been present for quite some time. Naturally, these people were offered other posts but their integrity and reputation is such that they would never accept something like that. The system works so that all those who get too close to the top are eliminated, to verify that only one man is really in charge whereas all others are dispensable.

V: Is that case with Jovica Stanisic too?

C: Stanisic is a man with integrity, at least that's the impression I got. He always had the courage to say he disagreed with some things. I think that's why he was sacked.

V: You said earlier that it would be interesting if General Perisic ventured into politics. Jovica Stanisic was mentioned recently in the same context. Do you expect support from some people sacked by the regime?

C: I think their inclusion would be very interesting but I don't want to prejudice anything or offer any comments that might be understood as a demand to these people. They are serious people with very strong integrity, meaning that they are capable of making their own decisions.

V: Most of the top ranking SPS and other officials sacked by the regime have kept quiet, apart from General Obradovic and yourself. Are attacks pointed against you a warning to other converts as to what might happen to them?

C: It might be one of the reasons, but I wouldn't call myself a convert. Even when I was a member of the Socialist Party (SPS), my work was public and it's not up to me to judge whether I did a good job or not. When I left, I did it in public. I have no second thoughts as to whether I did the right thing. My political beliefs basically remained unchanged. The difference is that I didn't want any part in shameful games against Serbian and Yugoslav citizens.

V: You spoke of Mrs. Markovic's influence on SPS staff policy. In your opinion, what are the relations between the SPS and the JUL?

C: The present situation is such that the JUL has a very aggressive approach to the SPS. The Left Wing Alliance is virtually swallowing SPS officials and boards, threatening them that they won't have a future even within SPS ranks if they don't join the JUL. If you look closely, you will realize that not a single SPS official is among top ranks in the state. Those who do have high ranks are only formally SPS staff, whereas they are actually working for JUL interests. I think the SPS does not have the strength to resist this onslaught, bar a few sporadic outbursts of rage. The motto is "We are all left wing, party membership is a formality".

V: Isn't that a kind of a front for President Milosevic's strategy and his intention to assume the role of "the savior of democracy" at some point, nullify the controversial laws and blame the JUL and the Radicals for repression?

C: In all honesty, I don't believe this kind of strategy is possible. Milosevic will not certainly nullify the laws and look for a scapegoat, but I don't think he will be able to distance himself from all that. I think the basic intention is to reshuffle and purify the cadres. Milosevic elects people he believes are unreservedly loyal and able to help him out in some future combinations. Milosevic will face some very hard times in the future.

V: In that context, what is your assessment of the "national unity government" and its stability?

C: I think relations within that government are very insincere. Everything rests on personal interest, meaning that everyone is waiting for half a chance to get rid of someone. The Radicals are taking a course for coming to power and gathering documents that could compromise their coalition partners. It is possible, however, that a would-be break-up between the partners will be staged.

V: In the event of this, Milosevic can always count on his "reserve radical party", more precisely the Serbian Renewal Movement, judging by this party's recent behavior.

C: That's how it looks, but I sincerely hope that the SPO will find the strength to get out of Milosevic's grasp. It is becoming ever so apparent what his policy will produce as the end result.

V: It seems that elections will be held in Kosovo. You are advocating general elections, while the authorities are arguing that this would deteriorate Serbia's negotiating position?

C: This argument doesn't hold water. The regime is trying to avoid the elections because, for the first time, they wouldn't get any votes in Kosovo or the 40 easy seats of the 250 they have in the parliament. These 40 seats have been a head start for them in all elections held so far. Naturally, they are offering all kinds of other explanations through their media. Apart from all that, the next elections would be supervised and all parties taking part would get equal time on air, which hasn't been the case so far. They know that they can't win under these circumstances, which is why they don't want elections.

V: Who should supervise the elections?

C: Our own as well as international observers. The elections would be organized under the same conditions as in Kosovo, as all Serbia's citizens are in a bad position. All this is going on because there is no democracy in Serbia. Yugoslavia and Serbia need reforms so that a solution to the regional problem can be found. If the democratization process skips Serbia, we will face huge problems, huge misunderstandings and ethnic conflicts, so I think international officials now understand the need to replace this regime.

V: Which officials? You only got back from Washington after getting verbal support there, while Holbrooke is due in Belgrade on 16 December for talks with Milosevic. Aren't they safer making a deal with one man controlling everything than doing business with a group of people they don't know?

C: Their belief that one man is pulling all the strings is mistaken. It is on the basis of this mistake that they built his position. If they had extended their meetings, these mistakes wouldn't have occurred. The international community is still divided, but US officials have made it clear that Serbia's democratization was the basic prerequisite for lifting the sanctions. For the very first time, this condition comes first.

V: Nevertheless, ethnic Albanians can always boycott elections in Serbia, one way or another. Aren't the separatists also better off with Milosevic's undemocratic Serbia, as it would be easier for them to secede from this kind of Serbia?

C: That is true and that's why the ethnic Albanians are partly to blame for what's going on in Kosovo. We are bound to live together. The problems that emerged are a result of the regime's extremist actions, which in turn caused extremist actions on the other side. It is only natural that one extremist policy feeds on another. Had the ethnic Albanians taken part in the elections, these conflicts probably wouldn't have happened. Now, it is too dangerous for both sides to say enough, because those who did would run the risk of being labeled as traitors. Two extreme points along the line should be brought closer together through democratic dialogue, so that common interest in a joint state is achieved where everyone's human rights will be respected.

V: How can we expect an alternative party among the ethnic Albanians if we still don't have one. The Vojvodina opposition, the Sumadija coalition, the Democratic Party of Serbia an other organizations have distanced themselves from the Alliance for Changes.

C: Unfortunately, we are wasting our energy fighting each other. The Alliance for Changes came out with a clearly defined position. We are not saying that we are the only ones in favor of reforms, we believe that all other opposition parties are thinking in the same direction and fighting a common cause. We don't intend to join any other coalitions, or force anyone to join the SZP. Anyone who wants to join us is welcome but we will hold nothing against those who don't. We never made any controversial statements. Statements to the effect that we are "The Alliance for Changing borders" are ridiculous but the state media later take advantage of them. We have made it clear that we are for Serbia and Yugoslavia, a state in which all citizens will live on democratic principles. We want a state with none of the ethnic conflicts that are now occurring on a daily basis. It is true that Kosovo is our spiritual, national and cultural stronghold, it is true that Kosovo is our sacred land, a part of Serbia and Yugoslavia, and we must reach a solution together on the basis of these postulates. If we don't, the solution will either depend on one man or be imposed on us by the international community.