On the Eve of a Decision

It seems that General Zivota Panic (the YA Chief-of-Staff) had a pleasant chat with Mr. Dragoljub Micunovic (the Democratic Party leader) and that they liked each other. Then General Panic said that UN sanctions will seriously affect the Yugoslav Army's (YA) combat readiness. On Wednesday, the Chief-of-Staff met Mr. Vuk Draskovic, the Serbian Renewal Movement leader, who came alone. As this is being written, General Panic will have talked to DEPOS (Serbian Democratic Movement) representatives, in whose opinion concerning the army the general is allegedly very interested. We can suppose that he has already met with the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Dobrica Cosic, for he is his Supreme Commander. This series of meetings has been taking place within an unprecedented political context in the history of this country (since 1945): the regime in Serbia is confronted with the largest-ever resistance from within since it came to power and with a complete international isolation. The Church, the better part of the Academy of Sciences, the University, and everyone in Serbia who thinks with one's own head (as far as things stand now, it could easily turn out that this is a large majority) are against Slobodan Milosevic. On his side, there are only a few pseudo-opposition parties headed by Mr. Seselj and an indeterminable part of the Socialist Party of Serbia. The chaos is complete, or will be soon; now everybody is waiting for the army to take a stand.

Under the assumption that the armed forces have drawn a lesson from their one-year-long traumatic experience and three lost wars, their position can be logically concluded, bearing in mind the political constellation in the new state and the army's basic interests. General Panic's alleged statement given to Vuk Draskovic that the army will not interfere in Serbian political matters, i.e. that it "will not repeat the mistake from March 9, 1991, when tanks were sent to the streets of Belgrade", shows that certain lessons have been drawn. The passive attitude is imposing itself as the best tactical solution: why should the army compromise itself for someone else's sake, when it's much easier to sit in the barracks and wait for the victor, who will be grateful because the army did not side with the opponent. After all, that would be completely in accordance with the army's latest political doctrine: we are apolitical professionals.

The army now clearly understands, not only what it has lost over the past twelve months, but who was responsible for this. It could turn out that General Kadijevic's curse will be fulfilled: the former Federal Defense Minister allegedly told Mr. Borisav Jovic on March 10, 1991 that that was the last time that the JNA would save the Serbian regime, next time it will just sit and watch. After all, what has the army acquired from Slobodan Milosevic and what can it lose with his departure from the political scene? It has the sanctions, the ever larger shadow of a humiliating military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, widespread poverty, and hopelessness through which it is living together with the tax payers, a disagreeable mark of a communist regime, a threat over its head - for no-one is making a distinction between the Serbian army in B&H and the Yugoslav Army anymore,and - Slobodan Milosevic whose company is not recommendable these days. It's interesting that authorized military commentators and the army press very rarely mention that name.

Overt complaints against the position that "Serbia is not at war" could have been heard many times from generals. The muffled conflict between the Yugoslav Army and General Mladic's Serbian Republic of B&H's Territorial Defense is still smoldering: General Nedeljko Boskovic (Head of the YA Security Directorate), in his interview to a Podgorica newspaper POBJEDA, very cleverly attributed all the blame for the bombardment of Sarajevo to General Mladic himself. That fits perfectly well with the current distancing from Mr. Karadzic and his extremists, and with Belgrade's attitude that the Bosnian-Herzegovinian question has nothing to do with the FR Yugoslavia in any way.

Therefore, it would be best for the army if the political crisis in Serbia were to resolve peacefully and that the solution be long-lasting. However, none of these wishes can come true while Mr. Milosevic is still there. Serbia cannot survive the sanctions and the internal tensions, and the army will share the people's lot, as the proverb goes. When the armed forces abandoned the SKPJ (League of Communists - Movement for Yugoslavia) platform, they were left without an ideological framework in the name of which and for whose preservation they could engage in political struggle. This regime is not able to provide such a framework. Mr. Milosevic cannot offer anything anymore. Theoretically speaking, he could start a war, in the south for example. The trouble is, and the army is aware of this, that a war crisis in the Kosovo-Macedonian theater would bring Serbia and Montenegro into a strategically unbearable position. It would be an irresistible temptation for Mr. Tudjman's nervous regime to hurriedly compensate for the loss of territories by launching an attack, while the international community would completely lose its nerve. All of that is perfectly clear to the army.

What can the DEPOS and others wishing for Milosevic's departure offer to the army? They could allow it to forget General Mladic. Serbs living outside Serbia are already angry with the army for having deserted them; now they will be left to international protection, which without a straightforward agreement with the YA as a possible threat will not consist a proper guarantee.

The DEPOS and the rest of the opposition to Mr. Milosevic's regime will have to redefine Serbia's national and strategic objectives, and that will mean another painful step towards sobering-up. The attempt to wrap old politics in new paper - towards which Dobrica Cosic's nomination could lead - will not last long: Serbia can survive only if it renounces the politics that led to all of this. The army can preserve itself, its combat readiness and professional interests only if it helps Serbia to precisely do that. Mr. Milosevic's stubbornness is driving the present crisis into possible chaos: in the case of potential disorder and incidents - unwillingly or deliberately incited (it doesn't matter) - the army will have to intervene; it would be hard to remain neutral. The bane of civil war is the regime's favorite propaganda weapon and it has been flaunted considerably recently. It is interesting that news of concern and anxiety is coming from police circles; policemen, do not see anything good in a further escalation of the crisis.

The one who provokes or does not prevent violence in Serbia will be the responsible for this country's definitive catastrophe.