Mikhail Gorbachev, The Intermediary

Stalin had a standard procedure for the "disobedient ones" and for the overambitious leaders from the parts of the world he considered his own. Since then, the circumstances have changed completely, but Mikhail Gorbachev has kept some of the Russian idiosyncrasies, if only through his own particular brand of humour. No one, however, except for the Soviet leader, could have come up with the idea of bringing these two together. I can well imagine in what good humour Mikhail Gorbachev must have been to intentionally ignore the fact that his guests avoid to look at one another during the dinner. I believe that they found it more difficult to survive that particular dinner than all their warmongering. All this came at the end. The negotiations took place prior to this, but in such a way that even Gorbachev later described it as "painful". However, he did not mean painful for him. Milosevic and Tudjman only repeated themselves and they came to Moscow at Gorbachev's request to hear what he had to say.

They were certainly flattered by the invitation from one of the world's leaders, as they were when Francois Mitterand invited them. The two of them were making front page news for the past few months, but isn't it time it should start to worry them? Haven't they noticed that they have become the heroes of the scandalous chronicle? The world is getting tired of their journeys and their joint or individual appearances. It seems that the world is still astounded and worried by the fact that the Serbs and the Croatians could have elected such leaders, since it points to the fact that there exists a serious error in the European and world framework.

It was believed that, immediately after Gorbachev was elected, everybody has finally adopted the basic rules of political behaviour. It was also believed that the Saddam- style escapades will not be repeated soon. But just as after the "perestroika" the notion of the "end of history" was premateruly adopted, so the Serbo-Croatian conflict, its cause and extent are too easely giving rise to the conclusion that a new era of widespread madness is coming to life. The madness is contageous to an extent, but it is also true that in Eastern Europe and particularly in the Soviet Union certain motives are becoming overt, pointing to the fact that many cities in those countries can soon look like the Vukovar of today. That is why the world is anxious to stop this war and not let the Serbs and the Croatians conclude it in their own manner. This is why the intervention of Gorbachev himself was called for. He is in the best position to understand the problem and realize the threats to his own country as well.

But this is not the main reason his involvement as an intermediary was so important.

Gorbachev was not only well acquainted with the process of disintegration, but also had an excellent insight into the mentality of the postcommunist biggoted and unscrupulous national demagogues. He knows the characteristics of the party modelled leaders only too well. He knows how to handle them, whereas the West still has too much respect for them: it cannot shake off its preconceptions of concidering them equals and is always looking for the rational explanation of their actions. For this reason, the Western diplomats have no reason to envy Gorbachev if it turns out that his single intervention had more success than all their efforts put together. His guests could not pretend to act as statesmen concerned about their national interests; he had seen plenty of those in his own country.

Although Tudjman is definitely more West-oriented than Milosevic, neither the European nor the American diplomatic intervention could significantly influence him. The Gorbachev's response to Tudjman's obsession with independence must have been hard, since the Croatian leader represents everything the Soviet leader considers wrong and dangerous and is trying to prevent and constrain within the reasonable limits. The warning of Moscow to the Government in Belgrade and to the Army, concerning the destruction of Croatian towns, should not be understood as the support for Tudjman.

Moscow's response is in accordance with the West. The main Gorbachev's task was to bring Milosevic to his senses. The popularity of Russia in Belgrade has been rising in recent years, parallel to the discovery of anti-Serbian conspiracy in America, Vatican, Germany... Serbia has revived its memories and embraced the old world framework, whereby the trouble allegedly always comes from Europe, and the help from Russia. For Milosevic and his party this great hope of Russian help was not strictly connected with Gorbachev, which was obvious from the public approval of the two day coup against him. But even the Serbian elite is pinning its hopes on the East, believing in the conception of the incompatibility of the unshakable orthodox world with the materialistic civilization of the West.

Gorbachev is a grate disappointment to them both. Both he and his country are oriented towards the materialistic model, whose products they miss much more than socialism and the orthodox spirituality. He undoubtedly expressed no sentimentality towards Serbia. The love between the big and the small nations and countries is always onesided. Not only did Milosevic fail to get the consent for the creation of the "Great Serbia", but he also found out that Moscow has become a part of the anti-Serbian conspiracy. Whatever Gorbachev said sounded familiar, as if he were listening to Lord Carrington or Van den Broek. The only news concern the possible sanctions which could affect Serbia much more profoundly than the ones adopted by the West.

When the big fry have a unified stand and lose their patience, the small fish find themselves in trouble and have to start considering ways for ending the war. The solution they will most likely be offered will be in the shape of the federation of sovereign states, a looser one than it used to be before the war started, but stronger than Slovenia and Croatia are willing to accept. Serbia does not want it either, since it has neither got rid of the Slovenes and the Croatians, nor has it succeeded in forming a big national state. The only satisfaction they are likely to get is the despair on the other side. Many would consider that it was much easier and better to have been in war than to have suffered such a widespread European and world condemnation, particularly with the view that the rights of all the minorities have to be protected, and not only that of the "chosen" and the privileged. Many will be of the opinion that the world is trying to make them go back to the beginning, as if there was no nationalist enthusiasm. There is truth in this. Everyone in this country is getting rid of all the others. The aggressors are the national minorities, so the war is primarily being directed against them. This is a no-winner war, since Yugoslavia is made up of numerous minorities so it is paramount that the skill of self-control should be mastered in order to abstain from squeezing out the weaker and the smaller ones. The two heroes of this drama will definitely suffer the most since they have nowhere to go and get sympathy. They are the ones who will bear the brunt of the unseccessful war, and there is no greater failure than the failed war. Tudjman has an obvious advantage here since he is much older than Milosevic, who is only in his fifties. Even if he were to resign now, he would, for a long time, have to witness the consequences of his rule and may even bear some of them himself.

Some of the historical patterns are repeating themselves. The ones who were by Milosevic's side until now will vehemently turn away from him. They will claim to have been tricked or, even more likely, that they were always against him and were digging his grave from the inside. They will present proofs and witnesses of their invisible sabotages and will look for recognition. It is likely that many will get it and continue with their careers in a different regime. And everything will be as it always has been.