Seventeen signs of a clash between Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic

1. The Socialist Party of the Serb Republic in BosniaHerzegovina has announced the unification of socialist parties in all the Serb lands, which means that the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) has probably abandoned its decision to freeze all political activities in BH for the duration of the war.

2. The Socialist Party in BH has called Karadzic's authority in the Serb Republic in BH an ``oligarchy which is linked to crime.''

3. Serbian Radical Party (SRS) leader Vojislav Seselj continues to hurl accusations against the League of CommunistsMovement for Yugoslavia (SKPJ) and some SPS officials, holding them responsible for the military rebellion in Banja Luka dubbed ``September 93,'' and aimed at toppling Karadzic. In order to save his party, Seselj is trying to exacerbate the clash between Karadzic and Milosevic.

4. SKPJ leader and SPS left wing ideologue Mirjana Markovic has criticized Karadzic for continuing with a war policy.

5. The Serb Republic in BH organ ``Jedinstvo'' brought attacks against Mirjana Markovic.

6. RadioTelevision Serbia boycotted Karadzic during his tour of Vojvodina, carried out with the idea of founding a Socialist Party in BH branch in Serbia.

7. The Serbian judicial organs delivered Milan Lukic, suspected of kidnapping Muslims in Strpci, to the Serb Republic in BH without previously informing the Federal Ministry of Justice or giving any relevant explanation for their decision. Lukic was held in custody and received several sentences for lesser crimes. This extradition was a symbolic gesture, making it clear to Karadzic that he belonged to another state. It is very likely that he has been saddled with a hot potato and the message that the Serbian regime is not prepared to have anything to do with persons who have blood on their hands. Karadzic will have to deal with war criminals at home, ahead of the session of the International court for war crimes in the Hague.

8. Democratic Party (DS) leader Zoran Djindjic and Karadzic offered Milosevic the post of Yugoslav President, or as Karadzic put it, ``to become the formal leader of all the Serb lands,'' something that Milosevic is not mentioning.

9. Karadzic allowed the start of the new round of negotiations in Geneva to be postponed for a few days, because several score Serbs and civilians had armed themselves, since they live in the threekilometerswide security zone around Gorazde, and are afraid of Muslim reprisals. This is an act of defiance to Milosevic who has long been insisting on the speedy signing of a peace treaty.

10. This vacillating brings to mind Karadzic's belittling of Russian peace mediator Vitaly Churkin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who received firm promises from Milosevic that the Serbs would stop military actions around Gorazde, which soured the tottery relations between Belgrade and Moscow.

11. Karadzic's frequent going back on his word has produced a side effect. He is trying to persuade his followers that the concessions he has to make, are not his choice, and that he is being forced into making them by Serbian President Milosevic, whose advice he is ignoring increasingly. DEPOS deputy in the Serbian Assembly Milan Bozic, said in his program ``Srbotopija'' on Belgrade's Radio B92, that Karadzic and his comrades were not administering a state, but a military camp with a few civilians present: ``Karadzic's army and administration have been left with a rural population. They are at a very low level of economic development, one which boils down to mere survival, so that sanctions do not affect them to the degree they do Yugoslavia.''

12. Because of the elimination of cities, and in general, the urban population, Karadzic will not have to face political problems, because there is no critical mass of public figures who would know how to articulate dissatisfaction, and lead the dissatisfied into political action. Thanks to the victory of the rural component, Karadzic is immune to political problems. This is why, said Bozic in conclusion, the mainstay of Karadzic's oligarchy lies in a dramatic sociological transformation, or more precisely, in the destruction of Serbian society in Bosnia. From this position, Karadzic's ideologues attack ``Belgrade for lacking in national awareness.''

13. Accusations often made by Belgrade, concern the quality of the territory Karadzic is holding, and the most glaring fact is the lack of cities. Karadzic is trying to neutralize this fact with demagogy, by saying that he will demand to be given Tuzla and Sarajevo.

14. Serbia is sending political signals to Pale (Bosnian Serb political center) and the world, and carrying out a few cosmetic changes in its policy, because it is weak and powerless in Bosnia as far as actions are concerned, concluded Bozic, who believes that the international community relies too much on the power of sanctions and Milosevic's influence with the Bosnian Serbs. The sociological catastrophe which has taken place in Bosnia, has put an end to the possibility for political activity. Bozic believes that sanctions will continue to be a permanent form of pressure on the big Serbian state which should, but can't, force the small Serbian state to make concessions which would help ease the noose around the neck of the big state.

15. The Serbian Orthodox Church Holy Synod praised the authorities of the Serb Republic in BH and the Republic of Serb Krajina, saying that they were doing a lot for the spiritual renaissance of the young generation, by instructing them in the faith of their forebears, and introducing Religion into the curriculum. The Church appealed to the authorities in Serbia and Montenegro to allow the same.

16. The fact that Karadzic is hiding behind the Church, means that he is attacking Milosevic in his own political backyard, so that we can expect that he, like former Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic or the Crown Prince earlier, will become a figurehead of a potential opposition coalition at elections. Seselj says openly that he would gladly appear on the same ticket with Djindjic and Vojislav Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS).

17. However, in the event of such an outcome, it is not clear how the army could be manipulated. In a verbal duel with the regime, Seselj criticized President Milosevic of working against Chief of Staff general Milan Perisic, and that the relationship was problematic.