The Opposition Should Rather Wait

I shall demonstrate in this article that the Serbian opposition would be much better off with regular elections for the republican parliament, while the coalition of the Serbian Left would be far more satisfied with pre-term elections. Since the question of approaching elections in Serbia is essential, not only for the interests of all political parties, but also for further development of the political situation in Serbia, I shall also call attention to what the regular elections could cause, and why they are more favoured than the pre-term elections. The explanation of this thesis will, however, be different than that given by the coalition of the Serbian Left, which claims that there is no need to call any pre-term elections, since our country is not in the state of crisis at all. My first argument will deal with the theory that Serbia is still on the level of pre-political culture and that, under such circumstances, Milosevic is the only one who can win at the elections. My next argument will be directed towards revealing the major mistake of the opposition, which is so anxious to compete with Milosevic in this situation. I shall conclude by pointing out that the opposition must wait for more convenient circumstances regarding the transmission of Serbia from the pre-political level to a modern political structure, since the rise of the opposition is now more likely than it had ever been before.

The contemporary Serbia is a pre-political association. In short, in pre-political associations voters are not assembled by presenting various policies, but by manipulation and by recalling different myths and symbols. Milosevic's initial success in 1987/89 can only be explained with the fact that he had managed to infiltrate his own personality into the myth of Kosovo. Thus, in a symbolic sense, he had established himself as head of an entire organism, which stood as a guarantee for its unity. Milosevic's successors believe that without their leader they would lose their own identity, pride and honour. Ever since then, Serbia is characterised by a nationalist political discourse, in which the symbols of nationalism and Kosovo are beyond doubt. The political history of Serbia in the period between 1987-1999, excluding the crises of March 9th 1991 and November 17th 1996, is in fact the history of conflicts about who is the more loyal and trustworthy representative, defender and interpreter of the Serbian national identity.

PUBERTY: On the other side, in a political association politics is based on interest, or rather on increasing the prosperity of all citizens. The logic which rests on increasing the wealth and satisfying the interest is as follows: I shall vote for you if you promise me that the ranges of my freedoms and rights will constantly increase, if the regime offers me more favourable conditions for prosperity, if my children have a better chance to advance on the social ladder, if my salary is higher than it was last year etc. Whoever, in a political association, is not capable to satisfy the basic human needs and make everything possible for their development, is obliged to leave the world of politics.

Serbia is a pre-political association, since it is still governed by the same nationalist political discourse, which has its source in the myth of Kosovo. Milosevic, the first one to begin such an exploitation twelve years ago, has no intention to abandon that discourse. In my previous analyses (VREME, No. 383, 409, 447), I made a mistake assuming that Milosevic would focus on a peaceful discourse concerned with interests just as he had done after the Treaty of Dayton four years ago. It has not happened. Milosevic is still exploiting the Kosovo myth and maintaining his regime successfully. He is keeping Serbia and the Serbs - as Aleksandar Tijanic once illustrated - 'locked in the phase of puberty'.

On analysing the political discourse in Serbia it is necessary to discern the will for exploitation from the convenient circumstances for exploitation. In order to maintain Serbia as a pre-political unit it is not enough only to identify oneself with the Kosovo myth, it is necessary to have some real and convenient circumstances for that. The efficacy of a national discourse depends on Milosevic's capability to persuade the Serbs that they are always faced with threats, blackmails and permanent conflicts, while offering them defeat in return. Milosevic did not even restrain from initiating many of those conflicts himself, directly or indirectly, and thus produced a real basis for preserving the Kosovo myth. When war in Slovenia was over, there were plenty of reasons and sources of conflicts. Milosevic did not find it difficult to divert the attention of the Serbs to Croatia, afterwards to Bosnia and in the end to Kosovo. All those wars represented that real source of supporting the nationalist political discourse.

ENVIRONMENT: This Milosevic's strategy is perfectly compatible with the fact that Serbia is a pre-political association, since the interest-based politics plays no part in such an association. So, those who think about any form of elections should ask themselves when and in what environment they wish to compete with Milosevic. The last book by Vladimir Goati Elections in FRY between 1990 and 1998, shows that the elections held in the conditions of pre-political unit always benefited Milosevic in some way. He always easily manipulated with political discourse, election terms and results. However, as the issue of Kosovo is now closed, another question emerges: how will Milosevic explain to his successors that they are in danger? Let us assume that the elections will be called in September and October 2000, when they are actually supposed to be held anyway. Let us also assume that the Serbian issue will be closed by then, in one way or the other, and that Milosevic will not have another spot where to cause a new outbreak of violence and convince the Serbs that their unity is the only thing that matters. How would Milosevic explain to his voters that they are endangered and that they may be wiped out from the face of the earth? The more he waits, the less successful he will be in persuading his audience in the righteousness of his policies. Supposing that Milosevic does not command his army to return to Kosovo and that he does not wage a war in Montenegro, as soon as the question of secession of Montenegro is settled, the Serbs will remain merely on their own. Only when Milosevic comes to the point from which he cannot point his finger and say 'they wishes us evil!', could the opposition weaken his position, or even win at the elections. Therefore, the elections should be postponed as long as Milosevic can make use of some favourable circumstances to exploit the national political discourse or the myth of Kosovo. The Serbs should be given a chance to start living a real life. The last research by Srecko Mihajlovic, published in 'Blic' daily of December 2nd 1999, shows that the Serbian matters are already directed in that way.

CONCEPTION: All this does not mean that the opposition is supposed to sit and wait for Serbia's pre-political period to end, and call the elections subsequently. The Serbian opposition is, along with that of Croatia, the worst opposition in Europe and the analysis of its activities cannot be reduced to the span of this article. It is beyond doubt that such an opposition has to take care of at least several things. First, it is essential to avoid any pre-term and unfair elections, such as the local ones, recently announced by the regime. Second, it is vital that no party of the opposition joins Milosevic's coalition for some mutual benefit. (Such cases occurred earlier, in 1990 and 1992, when the Democratic Party announced that it would not appear at the iniquitous elections and consequently induced other parties to follow the same path; in 1993 when the New Democracy almost spared Milosevic from sharing the power with the opposition; or in 1997 when SPO (the Serbian Renewal Movement) legitimised another false elections.) Third, and probably the most important thing is that the opposition has to have a clear election politics, which would be based on interests, not on myths and symbols. That politics has to result from a liberal conception of citizenship and democracy, not from nationalism and the myth of Kosovo. The only time when the opposition managed to be close to victory was in 1991 and 1996/7, having fought for the legal state and democracy, and not for the idea of the Great Serbia. If, at the next elections, the opposition keeps accusing Milosevic of betraying Kosovo and Srpska Krajina, or competes with him in condemning Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, NATO and other leaders of the West, it will not be able to overthrow Milosevic, even if all circumstances happen to be favourable.