Somoza's Paradox

The Serbian regime has three goals: to break up the opposition in Serbia (a task now somewhat more difficult than before), to separate the opposition in Serbia from Djukanovic (which might be a little easier), and to thwart the West's help to the opposition.  Within that context, the regime in Serbia can look for a solution in the Somoza paradox (Nicaragua's dictator Anastasio Somoza 1896-1956): "You have won the elections, but I have won in counting!"

CONSOLIDATION:  Technically speaking, one might say that the opposition is now working somewhat more seriously than before.   For the sake of coordinating a joint political appearance, the opposition has scheduled or had already held a number of local "summits" in the provincial towns of Serbia.  The Alliance for Changes (AFC) is preparing an agreement these days, in which the representatives of the G-17 Group, CESID and the Civic Parliament of Serbia (which includes 60 non-governmental organizations), will take part.  The Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) is working on the amassment of its ranks (the recent admission of new members in Kragujevac, the founding of the University youth organization).  The juniors of SPO and Social Democracy (SD) have invited other opposition parties' young members to participate in the organizing of their joint activities throughout Serbia.  Democratic Party (DS) is making preparations for the party's electoral assembly. There are two candidates for the DS president -- the current president, Zoran Djindjic, and the party's vice president, Slobodan Vuksanovic.  Allegedly, the candidates are going to sign a statement obliging them not to leave the party if they lose the elections.

REGENERATION:  As far as the regime is concerned, the rulers are about to finish the organizational part of their job.  The Socialist Party (SPS) is trying to revitalize its membership (the recent replacements in the SPS boards in Nis and Kragujevac).  On the basis of this, some newspapers began to speculate that the elections in Serbia would be scheduled after the SPS congress, taking for granted that SPS had made an agreement with the Serbian Radicals (SRS) and the Yugoslav Leftist Party (YUL) to schedule local elections immediately after the congress. What, however, is obvious is that SPS and SRS  launched a winter offensive against the city authorities in Belgrade, taking as the motives the snow and the delays in the city transport, due to private transporters' strike.

The Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) deems that the latest announcements of a possible abrupt scheduling of the elections are aimed at "scaring the public," and that the regime wants to present as an accomplished fact that the local elections will be held according to Law on local self-management, i.e. according to one-round, majority system.  DSS thinks that the democratic opposition parties should not undertake any kind of activities that might be understood as their acceptance of these pre-election games, and should continue to fight for acceptable elections conditions...

The regime has been ignoring the opposition's request for the revision of the election conditions, and is using the prosecution techniques. One of the most widely quoted statements on elections, the one by Mario Kuomo (sic), who said "Your campaign is a poetry, and your rule a prose," could be rephrased here to say: "Your campaign is swearing, your rule a tragedy."  

The Radicals have finished their congress, during which they tried to present themselves as a massive and disciplined party.  They also tried to prove that their president's position had been strengthened (one of the guests called him a "Serbian samurai"), that their political program was clear and their political rhetoric very strong (full of anti-Americanism, alliance with Russia and Byelorussia, and the preservation of the federal state at all costs).  The Radicals are trying to force the local elections hoping that they will "drive the opposition away" from big cities, and thus get advantage for the federal elections, which according to them, should be held "at all costs," precisely as the federal state should be preserved at all costs.

AT ALL COSTS:  Srbobran Brankovic from Medium Agency stated on February 1 in Press Club that judging by a survey he performed, one third of the Montenegro voters is for preserving the Serbia-Montenegro common state "at all costs."  This number tends to be constant, while in Serbia 43 percent of the poll participants gave the same reply.  According to Brankovic, the number of the supporters of an independent Montenegro is decreasing.  In September, their percentage was 42 compared to 40 percent of Montenegrins supporting the common state, while in December, the ratio was 36 percent for independence, and 47 percent for federation. This shows a decrease of 11 percent.  Brankovic thinks that this decrease has to do with the consolidation of the Serbian regime and the constant threats to Montenegro that are coming from Serbia.  According to the same surveys, the ruling Montenegrin coalition "To Live Better" still enjoys much more confidence among the people than Bulatovic's Socialist People's Party (SNP).  

In that way, the regime is arranging things to make the "Montenegro question" the main theme of the elections, rather then the loss of Kosovo, or the outcome of its ten-year policy, or the low standard of living.  In spite of their disastrous output, the ruling parties in Serbia, and particularly SPS, have so far held the key of victory, due to the people's fear from a vacuum, and loss of their state.

So far, Djukanovic's relations with the Serbian opposition have been good and full of rhetorical niceties, but their strategic approaches have not been coordinated, and could even be evaluated as strategically opposite.  So, while Djukanovic does not even think of  federal elections, the Serbian opposition requests elections on all levels.       
The member of G17 and the dismissed judge of the Constitutional Court of Serbia, Slobodan Vucetic, stated in Press Club last Monday that we are faced with a "long, dangerous political process, depending on the balance of political forces in Serbia."  So, in a way we have the dilemma of 1990 once again -- what comes first, the Constitution or the elections.  The researcher of the Belgrade Institute for European Studies, Zorica Radovic, stated that this dilemma was present again, and that a part of the opposition parties had actually requested the elections for a constituent assembly.  She stressed that Montenegro's authorities had not exhausted all prerogatives granted to them by the FRY Constitution, that they could have worked out the disbanding of the Federal Parliament and consequently, the new federal elections.  The Montenegrins, however, do not count on federal elections.  Political expert Vladimit Goati stated these days that it would be unrealistic to expect federal elections to take place at all.  

Djukanovic's party activists are mentioning December 2000 as the best time for scheduling a referendum on Montenegro's independence.  This means that Djukanovic is giving some time to Serbia to develop a new political group, with which he might organize mutual relations.  This kind of thinking is not bad for Serbia, but it is not sufficient, since the election question will be: "Is the common state in existence or not?" I.e., shall we have the federal elections or not...

LACK OF SUPPORT: The third problem of Serbia's opposition is the lack of a visible support of the western factor.  The majority of the opposition parties and coalitions have expressed their regret about the fact that the European Union had not eased the sanctions against FRY.  The DSS president, Vojislav Kostunica, has stated that by refusing to suspend a part of the sanctions to FRY, EU showed that "in this or that way" they have been helping the regime in FRY for years.  Djindjic has stated that the opposition will continue "on the road it has taken" and that it was not the West that had united the opposition, but rather the situation in the country, and that the fight for democracy will not be waged in Brussels, but here instead.