One Act Drama of a Parliamentary Session

At the already usual brief session of the Serbian Parliament (Wednesday, May 3), a new delegation has been chosen to the Council of the Republics of the Yugoslav Parliament.

Who lost out in this one act drama?  The boycott by the Serbian Renewal Movement (45 MP's) of the Serbian Parliamentary sessions has allowed the ruling coalition to form a compact delegation in the Council of the Republics and thus to increase pressure on Montenegro, which will most likely not have indirect effects, while direct consequences are certain.

The ruling party in Montenegro is not giving any signs thus far of wanting to participate in the federal elections, given that it submitted a proposal for a redefinition of relations within the Yugoslav Federation.  The Serbian regime reacted negatively to this proposal and tried to direct it through federal state institutions, which is not accepted by Djukanovic's Montenegrins, given that they believe that the Yugoslav Federal State exists only on paper.  Admittedly a great number of federal state institutions and operations on the territory of Montenegro have been derogated.  The only practical exception is the Army.

WHEELING AND DEALING:  A change of the Serbian law has been formally carried out on the basis of a decision adopted by the Constitutional Court, which is supposed to send a message to Montenegro that it should do the same thing.  The mandate of "Djukanovic's members of parliament" in the Council of the Republics has not been ratified.  Instead there are MP's sitting there from the old guard, which makes all decisions adopted by that body constitutionally problematic.  The election of a "proportional" Serbian delegation was supposed to represent a contribution to the consolidation of the federation.  This could appear as an attempt at wheeling and dealing and forcing the Montenegrin Parliament to send a few of "Bulatovic's MP's" to the Council of the Republics, i.e. people loyal to the regime in Belgrade.  However, the Serbian Parliament did not elect a "proportional delegation", but rather "a delegation of the ruling coalition" in which the Serbian Parliamentary President exercised his right to "give" the mandates of parties absent from parliament to the parties that are present during the process of election.  Thus the crisis in the Yugoslav Federal State is by no means solved.  On the contrary, with the absence of the Serbian opposition from the Serbian Parliament during the voting, the Federal State merely lost another part of its legitimacy, with the confusion merely continuing.

The Serbian Opposition is demanding elections on all levels, including the federal level, but is not mentioning federal elections out of respect for Djukanovic, who is not giving any indications of wanting to take part in a federal election.  This means that there is confusion with regard to the future of Yugoslavia on the opposition political scene in Serbia.  The opposition has not demonstrated that it will be able to come to terms with Djukanovic more easily on the issue of the fate of the federation, even though it cultivates a solid relationship with him and is tactically lobbying for Djuknaovic every time it emphasizes that the equality of Montenegro is being ignored by Belgrade.

ELECTION FORMULA:  In this atmosphere the ruling coalition in Serbia is entering the pre-election period, opening up the question of the fate of the federal state, expecting to profit politically from this.  Thus far, this formula gave the regime a certain victory and led to the dismemberment of our state territory.

If the ruling coalition in Serbia has control over the Council of the Republics, it will at least enable the current President of the FRY, Slobodan Milosevic, to continue his mandate as President even after an eventual election defeat, given that in order for a new FRY president to be voted in, a majority in both federal chambers is mandatory, with elections in the fall of year 2000 being a certainty.  This is merely a prolongation of procedure given that an eventual majority in the Serbian Parliament, after the new parliament is constituted, can quickly change things by electing a new delegation to the Council of the Republics.  The insurance that the FRY President will remain in power to the end of his mandate ("longer than Clinton") might serve as a kind of psychological ladder for Slobodan Milosevic to come down from power, but all that is still not of crucial importance.

The main objective of this operation is to ensure a dominant position for the Serbian "triple-coalition", as well as the position of the newly formed Bulatovic's coalition (SNP-SRS-JUL) in the election period.  The regime's preparations indicate that the main theme of the next election will be the fate of Yugoslavia which is why there is a need for the homogenization of political influence on the federal level, along with complete control over the institutions of the federal state.

Now it is fairly certain that local and federal elections will be called on the same day, which would permit the Federal Election Committee to be the principal controller of the elections, formally limiting the jurisdiction of local authorities throughout Serbia in the control of the election process - for instance with regard to election lists, and the consequent reduction in the possibility of preventing the rigging of elections.

What is a possible response by the Serbian opposition?  A boycott of the federal elections would practically not mean anything, given that the proportional election system on the federal level does not require at least 50 percent of the electorate turnout, which is also the case for the elections on the level of the republic in Serbia.  This is not solely an exception of our election system, but is also used in other election systems which use a formula of proportional calculation.  Formally speaking, the regime could carry out parliamentary elections even with a considerable boycott of the election process.  In any case, boycotts did not yield results in the past, because of a tendency among voters to consider elections an expression of loyalty to the state.

The opposition players in Serbia, whose only chance in the elections is a large voter turnout, must realize that the game with the federal elections is merely one of the maneuvers designed to homogenize the regime's forces, with the objective of dividing, splitting up and discouraging the forces of reform.  In other words, Serbian opposition leaders, their advisors and activists should not delude themselves with ideas of a boycott of the elections.

They practically have no parliamentary mechanism under their control; they don't even have the possibility of observing the election process which they might have as a potential parliamentary minority.  After attempt at forcing a discussion on elections, the SPO left a session of the given parliamentary council, with one representative of this party stating at that moment - "We will do what we must do!"  It has still not been made clear what exactly that means.  With the spring meeting in Belgrade, the opposition demonstrated that it has the public's support for changes.  The regime tried hard "not to see" that mass of people and waited for the balloon to deflate.  It was logical to expect that after that positive day for the Serbian opposition, a positive scenario would be activated.  This did not happen yet.  The Serbian opposition did not demonstrate to the regime that it is exploiting this mass support with action and energy.  In thermodynamics this is called entropy.  On the Serbian political scene, this is called fear from a final outcome.

This is not a positive development, given that a large number of public opinion polls indicates a drop in confidence for political institutions and a rise in support for the opposition.  When dissatisfaction is not articulated politically, it can easily end up in unrest.  The only protection against such an outcome is for the opposition to work seriously with the people, for it to increase its influence, to motivate the undecided and realize a clear, evident victory "in open field" which will discourage the regime.  Until that time, there is still a lot of pavement pounding to be done.