Preparations for Future Conflicts

Ever since the Eight Session, the political system in Serbia is functioning on a mechanical relation of strength - in most cases, the conflicts of the political actors are resolved so that one side gets or loses all. Only total victory or total defeat exists, while the concept of a "compromise" is almost unknown, wrote Dusan Pavlovic, scientific associate in the Institute for European Studies in the New Serbian Political Thought magazine a couple of years ago. Last week's surprise attack and  constitutional change, complete with presenting the other side with a fait accompli, could in a certain way be interpreted as a continuation of this practice and the same technology of rule, perfected in the last 13 years.

"Slobodan Milosevic, as a rule, has only one way of entering into a conflict with his political opponents and two ways of resolving that conflict", says Dusan Pavlovic for VREME: "Either with his total victory and by simply imposing his will upon the other side, or by retreating out of the conflict and hiding his tail between his legs. The result is primarily conditioned by his strength at the moment. In all of this, diplomatic skill or negotiating skills and assessments - I'll do this, you do that - characteristic of contemporary politics, don't play a decisive role. Only a pure mechanical relation of strength. It's the same as when you have two balls which are moving towards each other, at which point the one with a larger mass and acceleration hits the smaller one and continues on its way because it is stronger. And the smaller one usually moves out of the way."

VREME: In the collisions on the internal plan Milosevic has rarely hidden his tail between his legs, he was usually the stronger ball?

PAVLOVIC: It truly can be said that he is the "technologist of power", who always knew how to procure a large enough mass and acceleration for himself. However, with these constitutional changes things didn't go as smoothly as before. Naturally, he is still trying to resolve conflicts in the manner he is accustomed to. However, my impression is that these constitutional changes are not directly conditioned, are not a consequence of an open conflict which currently exists. Instead of that there is a conflict in the background between him, on the one side, and the Montenegrin government and Serbian opposition on the other side. That still isn't a direct clinch. It seems to me as though Milosevic, by changing the constitution, has actually tried to procure himself with the mass and acceleration in preparation for the conflict which is to follow. To procure a favorable position for himself from which it will be difficult to shift him.

VREME: To impose the rules of the game which suit only him?

PAVLOVIC: One of the assumptions why he had undertaken all of this in such a manner is that he, let's say, no longer trusts his party. He doesn't believe that that party is capable of amassing a number of votes at the elections necessary for an absolute majority in parliament. However, Milosevic probably believes that he as an individual is capable of such a thing. That is why he doesn't wish to risk to be a president who would be elected by parliament in which SPS and the radicals wouldn't have the majority. Such a parliament could easily replace him. Milosevic now primarily depends on himself alone. There are many indications which say that he enjoys more confidence than his party. It is also evident that there is no real counter-candidate on the horizon for the FRY presidential elections, and that he could profit from such a thing. In case he wins the direct elections, he becomes a president who couldn't easily be ousted. Such a thing would be possible only by a two-thirds majority of votes, and the assumption exists that the opposition, even if it were to win, cannot have the majority in parliament. In such a way, Milosevic is securing his positions for the next four years. However, even such a move, just like all of his previous ones (anti-terrorism law or police activities in the last few months), are signaling panic amongst his ranks and are a sign that he is aware that he is losing the necessary support. Naturally, it is too early to conclude that such support is so small that we could say that the regime is sociologically totally dead. However, Milosevic had obviously assessed that it would be difficult to win a majority and by changing the constitution he is trying to salvage what can be salvaged. If not the entire party, then at least himself.

VREME: Can you envision Slobodan Milosevic as FRY president without the backing of "his" parliament? He has demonstrated on a number of occasions how insecure he is when he doesn't have one-hundred-percent control of power. He would find it extremely difficult to adapt to being president and to having a member of the opposition as prime minister...  

PAVLOVIC: Milosevic has four levers of his own power: control of the monetary flow, control of the army and the police, media, and, as far as I'm concerned, the "stupid opposition" as well. With these levers of power anyone would be capable of ruling. It truly is difficult to imagine him in a new situation where that control is slipping away from him. If such a thing was to happen, he will try to divide the power in order to leave the other three levers intact. He won't cause any problems for the opposition if they win, he will even allow them to form the government, but that government wouldn't have any power, just like Panic's in 1992. He'll try to strike such a deal. For him, there's always the possibility to enter into a deal with someone from the opposition, especially since there are those who are offering their services. If he doesn't have the majority which enables a comfortable government, Milosevic might try to shake off Seselj as his companion with whom there's no going forward. He would then have to choose someone from the opposition who is least radical of all. At this moment, that's Vuk Draskovic. Whoever finds himself in such a position, the story would resemble the one with the radicals. I will hand over such and such a number of ministerial seats over to you, a certain number of deans in the university schools, some of the media, but I won't give you what's dearest to me. It would mean a continuation of political life and power with a fictional division of power.

VREME: If we are talking about Milosevic as a "technologist of power", then a permanent destruction of the institutions is part of that technology. Kosta Cavoski claims that for the current president, the constitution is merely a book which he could tear up whenever he so wishes...

PAVLOVIC: I would say that such a fate of the institutions is a consequence of Milosevic's rule, not a principle. It is primarily a consequence of his wish to remain in power. Political and economic institutions, the university, media, culture - all those institutions and areas were trampled over by the government. However, Milosevic is not the type of ruler who is principally dedicated to the idea that such institutions should be destroyed. He enters into such states out of need, when he believes that there is no other way to procure his survival in power. I am convinced that he would, just like in 1990, let the press remain free if he knew it wouldn't threaten his power. He was at the height of popularity back then and free media didn't bother him, there was no need for a law on the press, a law on the university. Now that all is creaking and leaking on all sides, he has to tighten the screws, to try to fill up those holes, and the destruction of the institutions results from that. If Milosevic was capable of procuring 50 percent in parliament with ease, he wouldn't have changed the constitution. He isn't ideologically, on principle, turned towards such an option, however he is prepared to tear apart the constitution like a cookbook since it is outdated and since he is cooking another meal now. Milosevic is an authoritarian ruler by nature, yet he would gladly surround himself with democratic institutions if they didn't threaten his survival.

VREME: You claim that the opposition falls under the category of pillars of the regime. It seems as though it has once again been caught unawares by the latest events. Some blame Draskovic for having enabled Milosevic to procure a two-third majority, others mention the election boycott, the third group has devoted itself to finding the best counter-candidate. Djindjic says that the most natural thing would be a citizens protest yet people aren't up to rallying on 40 degrees Celsius.

PAVLOVIC: As far as Djindjic is concerned, he first of all has to declare what the real reason is why people no longer want to rally. Which is that three years ago they had invested vast amounts of energy, projecting all their hopes towards himself and Draskovic. At the end, that energy was spent on the conflict between him and the SPO leader. It's just like when you invest money in a bank and that money is lost. Those who had rallied 88 days against the government don't want to invest in that same bank again. If the bank wasn't the same, people would rally on + 48. As far as SPO is concerned, it is difficult to claim whether all surrounding the election of the delegates for the Council of Republics was preplanned or whether it was a principle stand of that party. It is a fact that the opposition in the institutions, even if it wanted to, couldn't do much. Even if SPO had been there, they would have unearthed the additional four delegates who would procure all that was necessary. Generally speaking, our opposition is irresponsible. It is similar to Milosevic since it doesn't bear responsibility for its acts and failures. They act as though they have been scoring victories over him in the last ten years and not vice versa. Which is why I say that the opposition is the fourth regime pillar.

VREME: Is the manner, primarily the speed and secrecy, of the change in the constitution motivated by the wish to further confuse the political opponents and catch them while they're sleeping?

PAVLOVIC: It could be said that Milosevic had jumped his opponents who weren't expecting presidential elections as well. No one here in the last six months had given thought to any kind of presidential candidate. The intention to confuse the other side is obvious. However, that confusion was evident even before that, since it isn't difficult to confuse such an opposition. New overturns can be expected in the opposition now. Amongst them there are those whose adrenalin always jumps at the mere mention of elections, especially presidential ones. I can't even claim that Seselj doesn't have his own combinations.

VREME: It seems as though the government in Montenegro, which is now sending out messages that it has definitely given up all thought of federal elections, has also been caught unawares?

PAVLOVIC: Elections can be held there even with the help of the army, in the barracks, or even in the houses of SNP members. To prevent such elections would require the intervention of the police and would lead to a conflict. I don't believe Djukanovic would opt for such a move. What could happen would be for the Montenegrin parliament to issue another declaration by which it wouldn't recognize such elections. All of that doesn't necessarily have to be too problematic. For Milosevic all is cheaper than to dissolve the federal state. He will hold elections, whatever they might look like, he will produce the illusion that the federal state is functioning, that a parliament exits. This new constitution now guarantees him 4 + 4 years in power, and he won't dissolve such a state.