Platform For Separation

Two events from the last week of the old year prepared the terrain for the big game whose stake is the future of FRY. The successful completion of the elections in Serbia and the new platform of the ruling coalition in Montenegro were the last preconditions for the commencement of fundamental talks between Belgrade and Podgorica. Talks can commence as soon as the leftover controversial procedural issues are resolved, such as the participation of the federal agencies and the constitution of the government of Serbia. The outcome is uncertain, but the starting positions of the negotiators can already be clearly seen.

The platform of the Montenegrin coalition foresees a "union of two independent and internationally recognized countries" linked by weak federal institutions. The federal parliament would have one house, and would have an equal number of deputies from both republics (i.e. only the upper house of the federal parliament would remain). Beside that, on the federal level a Ministerial Council would exist, with ministries of defense, finance, economic relations with foreign countries and foreign affairs. Some or all of the ministers (especially the foreign minister) would at the same time be ministers of the corresponding field in their home republics, and would be rotated. The federal police and the function of the federal president wouldn't exist even on paper. Briefly, this federal state would have a weaker central government than the one established in Bosnia following the Dayton Agreement, and the republics would be more sovereign than Bosnian entities are today.

HOW HIGH ARE THE STAKES: The Serbian platform still needs to be publicly formulated once President Vojislav Kostunica and the future prime minister Zoran Djindjic agree on it. According to Djindjic's recent statements, that will happen soon, and in principle it has already been agreed that the federal state should be the only internationally recognized one, and that defense, international relations and protection of the boundaries (federal police) should be placed under the federal cap and, according to Djindjic "possibly customs and some tax systems" as well. Yugoslavia would most probably retain both houses of the federal parliament, and deputies would be elected as was usual prior to the constitutional changes which Slobodan Milosevic imposed last year in May.

The question of the future of the federation of Serbia and Montenegro is the last poisonous apple which Milosevic left on the table prior to departing from the political scene. That question, for the first time since 1918, has once again been opened by the constitutional changes, with the primary goal to prepare the terrain for a permanent domination of Belgrade over Podgorica under Milosevic's presidential power. However, a secondary goal has also been achieved, which was to drive a wedge between Djukanovic's administration and the leaders of the democratic opposition in Serbia. Following the constitutional changes, their interests were immediately diametrically opposed: the Serbian opposition couldn't, due to its own survival, boycott the federal elections, while the Montenegrin coalition couldn't allow itself to run in them. Out of this clash of interests, and not due to some higher "principled" reasons, evil blood flowed in the form of accusations from Belgrade that Djukanovic had indirectly supported Milosevic, i.e. accusations from Podgorica that the opposition is continuing Milosevic's greater Serbian concept. That evil blood has outlived Milosevic and is threatening to poison the upcoming talks on the future of the country.

In addition, there is also the circumstance that the Montenegrin stake in this game is a lot higher than the Serbian one. Montenegro will, in the talks and later in the referendum in the middle of this year, make a decision which will have far-reaching consequences on the lives of each of its citizens. In Serbia, regardless of the outcome, not much will change, i.e. as Djindjic himself noted, "that topic hasn't even been broached yet".

WITHOUT THREATS: It can be stated somewhat cynically that Serbs will notice the change of Montenegrin's status only if it affects their holiday plans, while the issue of Montenegro's membership in the UN interests them about as much as the issue of East Timor's membership. Undoubtedly, by abolishing Yugoslavia Serbia's position in relation to Kosovo would weaken, since the framework from the Security Council resolution 1244 would disappear. However, that definitely doesn't mean that Kosovo would automatically become independent: that problem will be dragged out for years in whose resolution Belgrade will play an important role in this way or that, with or without Podgorica. 

It turns out that Serbia without Montenegro wouldn't be either economically nor politically weaker than it now is, while the same couldn't be said for Montenegro without Yugoslavia, despite the optimism of some of Djukanovic's experts. Independence won't solve the problem of the catastrophic economic structure of Montenegro, dependence on foreign aid and corruption. Following an eventual separation, Serbia won't try to make those problems worse but it probably also won't fall over itself trying to help the young Montenegrin state to overcome its labor pains. The example of the Czech Republic and Slovakia couldn't be very instructive here: while the Czech Republic, after the separation of the federation, advanced towards the European Union, Slovakia has remained one of the least developed countries in its part of Europe.

Still, the most important thing in it all is that no one in Serbia dreams of preventing Montenegro from going its own way by force or threats, if it should decide to. However, responsibility for all future dangerous curves, rockslides and ambushes will fall upon those who are now luring it to head down that road.