Living with the UCPMB

Vice-President of the Serbian Government, Nebojsa Covic informed the public in a somewhat unusual way of his plan for calming the situation in the communities of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac.  Covic did this at a seminar entitled “Where Next With Bulldozers? Serbia After Milosevic” which was held last week at Belgrade’s Hyatt Hotel under the auspices of the Helsinki Committee and the Washington Institute for Peace.  The expectation was that Covic would address participants of the seminar and open discussion: instead of that, he spoke for nearly an hour before some hundred local and foreign intellectuals, diplomats and journalists, spending nearly an hour on Milosevic’s sins, after which he briefly suggested his recipe for gradual calming and subsequent permanent stabilization in the three Serbian communities on the border with Kosovo.  Only several days later, news agencies reported that the plan had been submitted to the Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica as well as to the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic.

Covic probably resorted to this unconventional maneuver in order to avoid endless debate of his plan and quibbling within DOS and among government officials prior to its reaching the public.  Given the diverse attitudes of political leaders to this problem, these debates would probably only dissolve the plan, and would in any case postpone its application.  Shortly before the seminar in Hyatt, Covic had a public debate with Zoran Zivkovic, Federal Minister of Police, on this issue.  He responded to Zivkovic’s promis that he will drive out the armed members of the self-proclaimed Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanova (UCPMB) from the tampon zone which separates our armed forces form those of NATO by stating sarcastically that “Zivkovic should do this himself if he thinks that he can and with the aid of the Ukrainian police dogs which he wants to import.”  This friendly “exchange of fire” had to be stopped by Prime Minister Djindjic who suggested that “ministers should not give such statements.”  “In fact, they should not give any statements at all,” Djindjic stated prior to his official visit to the USA.  Two days later Covic came out with his plan.

HEART AND SOUL:  In a nutshell, Covic’s plan has three phases which VREME reports in their entirety in this issue.  They boil down to removing the fundamental causes of the problem which lead to the crisis in the south of Serbia, and these are the many years of discrimination against Albanians in this are.  That is why the first and most important phase of this plan is “integration of Albanians into the state and the social system, and respect for their human rights in keeping with European standards,” that is to say going for the heart and soul of the local population.  Only after this, in the second and thirds phases would there be demilitarization and the establishing of solid foundations for normal and stable life in these three communities.

Already at first glance it can be seen that the biggest problems in the realization of this plan will occur in phase one in which the Albanian population is supposed to get the opportunity to participate actively in the local police and government.  Namely, local Albanians have gotten used to not expecting anything good from the Serbian State: even though it was marginally less exclusive, Milosevic’s police toward Albanians from the South of Serbia boiled down to the fact that they could only expect to be second class citizens in it.  The symbolic presence of a small number of Albanians in that government merely served as an addendum to that policy, and what ultimately happened in Kosovo merely served as the proverbial nail in a coffin.  Albanians in the South of Serbia do not have any media in their native tongue; it is very hard for them to get jobs in state enterprises, and of course, they are completely absent in the police.  The problem is only worsened by the fact that after the withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo, there is a high concentration of policemen in that region where these men are hard in getting used to the new policy toward civilians.  That is why it is not surprising that the efforts of the new government in getting minimal credibility have yielded meager results: only six Albanians signed up for the job of policemen, with their names being kept secret in order to avoid retaliation from fellow Albanians, while the Bujanovac Radio in the Albanian tongue, founded by former minister Biserka Matic has still not gotten off ground.  The situation is complicated by the fact that the communities of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac are traditionally the poorest communities in the otherwise impoverished South of Serbia.

POINTS OF RESISTANCE:  The biggest hurdle to Covic’s plan are members of the UCPMB who at the beginning of this week mounted their strongest offensive thus far.  Parallel with this, they undertook steps to isolate moderate Albanian representatives such as the Community President Riza Haljimija and Saipa Kamberija from the local Human Rights Council from any eventual negotiations.  At the meeting with leaders of the military and political wing of the UCPMB held two weeks ago in Gnjilane, moderate Albanians were forced to give their places at the negotiating table to armed extremists.  After this UCPMB commanders announced the formation of their own negotiating team, as well as their own political platform for negotiations.  It can be guessed ahead of time how that platform will look: they will demand complete withdrawal of the Serbian Army and police from the three southern communities, and perhaps even further, and the creation of conditions for Kosovo to spread to the East.  Even though Belgrade is not excluding the possibility of direct talks people who are still officially terrorists, it is highly unlikely that anyone will take seriously such “minimal demands.”

Negotiations with the UCPMB will be made more difficult by the very structure of this organization which is looser than most people think, and can hardly be characterized as “Tachi’s army”, which is how Djindjic described them recently.  The role of Hashim Tachi in the developments in the south of Serbia is minimal by comparison with the role played by other commanders of the former KLA, on whom the international community has far less influence than they do on Tachi.  Arms, men and orders come from Ramush Hajrudin and Commander Remi, who did not fulfill their political ambitions after the war in Kosovo, as well as from Albanians in Western Macedonia who see the tampon zone as an ideal place for training and two-way traffic for weapons.  It is deffinitely not in the interest of these people for the situation to be stabilized through negotiations, and their only hope is that they will force a direct conflict between the Yugoslav Army and NATO through constant provocations.  On top of this, local UCPMB commanders, such as “Commander Leshi” (meaning “hairy” in Albanian) have gotten used to visits from ambassadors and other international high mediators.  “Until yesterday these people were simple peasants, but not they dreamed up that they are very important,” states a western diplomat who had occasion to talk frequently with representatives of the UCPMB.  “It is very difficult to reach a compromise with them.”

RAY OF HOPE:  Finally, resistance in the way of a hurdle could be expected from DOS itself, where individual party leaders support the view of the American general who concerning the idea of curbing communism in Vietnam by winning over the hearts and souls of the local peasants, stated: “Grab them by the balls, and the heart and soul will follow.”  Those who think that everything could be solved easily with the getting of the “green light” from the international community for our Army to enter the demilitarized zone and “clean up the area” should ask themselves – what after?  Namely, even if inevitable civilian and military casualties during such a “clean up” are glossed over, members of the UCPMB would most probably withdraw from Kosovo, only to return to the zone as soon as our forces withdraw.  Therefore, we would be facing the same situation once again, only worse this time because there would be bloodshed in between.

That is why Covic’s plan, despite all the difficulties and the delay of almost ten years, is the only intelligent thing which can be done under the given conditions.  Also encouraging is the fact that the plan has been accepted at home and has met with exceptional understanding in Washington and Bruxelles.  And finally, the plan, with minor reservations, was favorably characterized by Veton Suroi, publisher of Koha Ditore and a man with considerable influence in Kosovo.  And above all, the most encouraging aspect is the fact that the plan was drafted by a man without ideological and national prejudices and with an unquestionable reputation of a pragmatist.

Standing fully behind his plan, Covic made a brave move: on the one hand, he liberated the Yugoslav and Serbian leadership from a problem which has been tapping endless energy and time, while on the other, he took on a political risk.  If his plan falls apart under a shower if shrapnel and lead which are coming from the tampon zone these days, Covic will pay the price of his “dove” strategy; but if he manages to achieve even a half of phase one, he will have secured for himself a leading place on the Serbian political scene.