Kadijevic Cussed and Yelled

You are talking about Kadijevic's (Defence Minister of former Yugoslavia) visit to Yazov, the Soviet Defence Minister?

Yes. As far as I know, Brovet (Stane, Kadijevic's Deputy) and Kadijevic were in Moscow.

These visits took place in March 1991, at the time when the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command was working overtime.

We had not received any official information about it. Ante Markovic (former Yugoslav Prime Minister) told me about it. The Presidency met on March 12, 13 and 15. In the meantime, Kadijevic was in Moscow. Those were delicate sessions, since the army proposed the introduction of a state of emergency in the country. Our generals obviously communicated with Moscow, and discussed whether or not to strike. The generals then shut themselves up for several days, and I expected them to strike. However, obviously on the basis of talks with Moscow, they could not decide. There was a similar situation in January 1991, when it seemed that the army was in the lead during the 24-hour Presidency session. It was just after the broadcasting of a tape containing evidence about the illegal arming of Croatia. Only Mesic (Stipe, the last President of former Yugoslavia, the Croatian representative) was against a military intervention in Croatia. At the time, I reacted violently, I walked out of the session, slammed the door and, simply, walked out before the voting. It is important that the army did not then receive explicit support and that is why it did not "strike". When I last talked to Kadijevic, late in July at a Presidency session in Ohrid, he told me he was profoundly sorry that the army had not gone all the way in Croatia on January 25th. He said several times that he had made a mistake then, and that that had been the last minute to resolve the Yugoslav crisis. Kadijevic was in a dilemma whether the army should intervene or not. With every Presidency session, when the situation began to deteriorate, he tried to reach a new agreement. I had the impression that he was buying time, so that he wouldn't have to take the ultimate step and send the army to the streets. In Ohrid, he told me that the military leadership had really considered to attack Slovenia, twice. That was on Sunday, and then on July 8th. An air raid alert was sounded in the morning, but the army was in fact seriously considering an attack that afternoon. I was constantly in touch with Kadijevic that afternoon. I remember he hung up on me several times, in anger. I could never imagine he could be so angry; he cussed me, Slovenes, everything that came to his mind. Again and again I tried to contact him and buy time, so that things might settle down and that the last resort should not be used.

Do you see the army's actions then as rational or irrational?

The army had at the time of the aggression on Slovenia been caught in its own trap. On one side, it was burdened with the rational conclusion that a large-scale attack was simply not worth the trouble, and on the other, burdened by the emotional answer to the defeat which it saw as an insult and demanded to be avenged.

(Excerpts from an interview to MLADINA (Slovenian weekly))