Alchemists Out of a Job

I see that many are gladly drawing up lists of the things which, from October 5 until now, haven’t changed. I don’t doubt that such an activity is entertaining and useful, but I feel that it isn’t the most important one. In any case, I am personally more drawn towards viewing the proportions and consequences of the changes which did occur.

First of all, Serbia is no longer on the warpath. That doesn’t mean that there is no more shooting (on the contrary, shooting is still going on), but instead that no one wants a war, that a pretext for a quarrel with anyone isn’t sought, that we don’t live off insults, intrigue and by nurturing hostilities. This change doesn’t only have to do with the new policies of the new government but more so with the consequences of the people’s extreme satiation, since in the previous regime there was no pause, unless it was needed to prepare a new war. Simply, the season of uniforms and arms is gone; even our famous seamstress would no longer allow officers to lead her. Milosevic would have absolutely adored the problem with Albanian violence in southern Serbia, while Covic is trying to get rid of it as soon as possible and to move on in another direction. Neither he, nor Djindjic’s government, nor the citizens who had voted for them want to wrangle endlessly over it and to remain bogged down in their conflict with the Albanians. They aren’t overly interested in the other disputes either, like the one over The Hague tribunal, nor anything as pointless as that, as though everyone has become very practical all of a sudden, maybe even to a slightly exaggerated and unhealthy degree. 

Even news about Albanian terrorism in Macedonia wasn’t greeted here with any great enthusiasm, although that could be wonderfully used as crown evidence that, after all, it is all being carried out for a Greater Albania. Serbia, however, no longer wants to play in that manner, it isn’t even trying to gather propaganda points and would only like to pull itself out of and to close that part of its unfortunate history. On top of that, Covic is acting like someone who has seen through all the tricks and is avoiding all the traps which lead to postponements, complications and irritation of its opponents. He accepts everything that sounds in the least bit reasonable, quietly refuses all nonsense and is demonstrating superhuman patience.

One such trick is the invention of the problem with the Pristina corps, which people from NATO say should be replaced since it had taken part in the crimes and is irritating the Albanians, even though it is a well known fact that the military composition of that corps has in the meantime been completely changed. Beside that, such a demand is in actual fact a message which says that Albanian terror is still deemed as an answer to Milosevic and, as such, is therefore even slightly justified; the Serbian side has to make concessions to the terrorists. However, Covic refuses to become confused, he isn’t taking offense, he isn’t furious and says that if that is a problem, another corps can come.

That the international powers (or briefly: the US) is in no hurry to accept this change in Belgrade’s conduct only shows that the whole massive industry of “resolving a problem” was launched and put into operation over this current crisis and it is difficult to stop or redirect that. Obviously, all the assessments pointed out that there will be plenty of work here for years, for both the uniformed and the various civil pacificators, negotiators, mediators, international relations experts, for minorities, for democracy and for all other types of diplomatic alchemy.

By a miracle, Serbia has managed to extricate itself and to partially evade that fate, and the alchemists are now left with the Albanian problem in which the Serbian side is in the role of supporting actor. Whichever way one views it, in the final outcome it will turn out that it is an attempt to round off Albanian ethnic space. That is neither strange nor unexpected, it would actually be very strange if that wasn’t the case and if it turned out that in both southern Serbia and in Macedonia only small, isolated groups of desperados, accidentally Albanians, were only slightly celebrating.

I am certain that Albanian politicians in Kosovo, Macedonia and in Albania will distance themselves and condemn any violence, and throughout it they will mostly be honest, and that the majority of the Albanian nation certainly isn’t happy with the violence and deaths. The majority hardly ever supports such terrorist-freedom guerilla fighters, which doesn’t mean that they aren’t capable of provoking serious wars, producing mass carnage and sometimes winning, especially when, due to other reasons, they are provided with strong outside assistance. That’s how the Liberation Army of Kosovo (OVK) succeeded in Kosovo, or the Thalibans in Afghanistan.

Serbia has positioned itself in the best possible way and I believe it will defend its three southern municipalities, while God, or at least NATO would have to come to Macedonia’s assistance. But, prior to it all one needs to understand that the real issue is the Albanian national problem, the last and now greatest such problem in the Balkans. That cannot be totally cut down to the issue of the protection of human and minority rights, as can clearly be seen in the current crisis in Macedonia, because that country has acted totally oppositely to Serbia and has done all that it could to cheer up its Albanians, and it seems as though that hasn’t helped either.

The Albanians have all the conditions and all the reasons to try with all their might to attain as much as they can of their national dream just now and there is no doubt that this dream, or at least some hazy premonition that the "final hour” has arrived, is connecting all of their actions in Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia. As I’ve already said, this won’t have anything to do with Serbia, as soon as Covic completes his mission. The only thing that could be clearly pointed out to the world now is that even in the case of Kosovo, Albanian responsibility was underestimated and the image of Serbian fascism and innocent Albanian civilians was slightly simplified for bombardment needs.

However, this new, practical Serbia isn’t overly interested in proving even that. The way things now stand, it is more beneficial not to be right. Not to haggle over blame, to admit to all that is required, agree that those bridges were ugly and unnecessary anyway… And to throw anyone into jail, one can hardly go wrong there.